 |
| Larry Downing/AP - U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, left, picks up a dart during a Maori welcome ceremony at the Government House in Auckland, New Zealand on Sept. 21, 2012. |
Last Saturday, US Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta left for his third trip to the Asia-Pacific this year, scheduling stops in Japan, China and New Zealand. Panetta’s visits to Japan and China are attempts to smooth
relations between the states, and the trip to New Zealand is a follow-up
from the visit earlier this year to Washington, DC by NZ Defence
Minister Jonathan Coleman. The trip will be the first time in 30 years
that a US Defense Secretary has visited New Zealand, and marks a change
in regional strategic dynamics.
A critical part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific includes repairing and deepening strategic relationships with New Zealand (among other smaller and medium-sized states) and to sustain opportunities for regular, high-level dialogue. While New Zealand does not have a sizeable defense force to contribute to US-led operations, the small democracy is a valuable ally that can serve as an ‘honest broker’ and voice of legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific.
A critical part of the Obama Administration’s rebalancing in the Asia-Pacific includes repairing and deepening strategic relationships with New Zealand (among other smaller and medium-sized states) and to sustain opportunities for regular, high-level dialogue. While New Zealand does not have a sizeable defense force to contribute to US-led operations, the small democracy is a valuable ally that can serve as an ‘honest broker’ and voice of legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific.
Pivoting for the Pacific’s Sake? Not Likely.
Recently,
New Zealand has received undue attention from American diplomats and
cabinet secretaries because the US has much to gain politically and
economically (if not militarily) from the bilateral relationship.
Whether the National or Labour Party is in government, New Zealand has a
reputation both regionally and internationally as a state with a strong
pacifist orientation that advocates for its values and the wellbeing of
its Pacific neighbors. As a founding member of and voice within the
Pacific Islands Forum, New Zealand can be a significant agent for
American interests during the leaders’ meetings. Moreover, New
Zealand’s promotion of US naval patrols, development assistance, trade
relations, diplomatic connections and so forth would enable the US to
exercise greater power projection in the region.
The 1984
Labour government’s nuclear-free announcement reflected in part New
Zealand’s continuous desire for an independent foreign policy based on
“conflict avoidance and resolution, humanitarian assistance, human
rights, and environmental defense.” The declaration prohibiting
American nuclear ships from their ports was a policy move that was
necessitated by public opinion and new Labour supporters and
representatives. Since its proclamation, the nuclear-free policy has
been largely nonpartisan.
While the
strategic dimension of US-NZ relations faltered from the 1980’s, it
never disappeared, and was supplemented by intelligence collaboration.
In addition to a strong commitment to special forces training and
deployment (particularly the New Zealand Special Air Services), the
intelligence-sharing between the US and New Zealand has remained
significant since 1946. Despite disagreement with the US government over
the invasion of Iraq, intelligence sharing remained consistent. In
fact, after 2001, New Zealand increased its intelligence budget by 30
percent while decreasing its overall defense budget.
Maritime
defense, domain awareness, and disaster rescue operations are essential
areas of mutual concern for New Zealand and the US in the Pacific,
particularly given the Christchurch earthquake, China’s soft loans to
Pacific island nations, and overfishing. For the first time in 28
years, the New Zealand Defence Force participated
in the Exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) in July-August, the largest
international maritime exercise. Interoperability is a key component
of the Obama Administration’s foreign policy in the Pacific, and as Nathan Smith writes,
the exercises served both diplomatic and more practical purposes for
New Zealand and Australia.
Security concerns for New Zealand focus on the sea lines of communication due to heavy reliance on maritime trade; the country’s small blue-water navy is primarily geared for search and rescue and maritime interdiction. Despite not being allowed to berth ships in Pearl Harbor due to the nuclear-free policy (in contrast to former foes Japan and Russia), Kiwi sailors did not seemed fussed, and took advantage of the nightlife offered by Honolulu.
Security concerns for New Zealand focus on the sea lines of communication due to heavy reliance on maritime trade; the country’s small blue-water navy is primarily geared for search and rescue and maritime interdiction. Despite not being allowed to berth ships in Pearl Harbor due to the nuclear-free policy (in contrast to former foes Japan and Russia), Kiwi sailors did not seemed fussed, and took advantage of the nightlife offered by Honolulu.
As we have
seen through the signing of the Wellington and Washington Declarations,
the current National Government is in agreement with the Obama
Administration’s Pacific rebalancing. Moreover, the close relationship
between US Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell and NZ Ambassador
to the US Michael Moore, and the work US Ambassador to NZ David Huebner
has done in Wellington are examples of peoples and governments that seek
mutual benefits and understanding.
Improving understanding rather than compromising on ideals
A question
that NZ Defence Minister Coleman will face in meeting with Secretary
Panetta is how much more New Zealand will be able to commit to the
bilateral relationship without sacrificing its ideals. There will
almost surely be a small demonstration in Wellington during Secretary
Panetta’s visit about the TPP, or anti-US policies led by local
anarchists from Aro Valley, as there is during most high profile
visits. However, in most cases it seems that the New Zealand government
knows when and when not to compromise on foreign policy issues, with
bipartisan support for free trade agreements.
New Zealand
can leverage an improved defense relationship with the US to secure
better terms for the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) and other
future trade agreements (including a potential US-NZ FTA as sought by
New Zealand). The latest negotiation terms for the TPP are not public;
however controversial public issues being debated concern intellectual
property rights and copyright law, both of which have been met by public
protests and contestation from New Zealand and Australia. If the US
gets what it wants in terms of defense initiatives, it may soften some
of the demands of the TTP and open a path to a US-NZ FTA.
Setting the
nuclear-free policy aside, both National and Labour governments have
been fairly amicable to US defense relations. So what more could New
Zealand gain from a “stronger and deeper bilateral defense relationship”
as set out in the Washington Declaration? With both sides facilitating
the establishment of “regular, senior-level, strategic policy dialogues
between the US DoD and NZ Ministry of Defence and NZDF,” New Zealand
can not only legitimate the US strategic involvement in the region but
can continue to bolster its own authority. Welcoming perhaps the
strongest ally with shared values and democratic ideals can serve to
boost Kiwi clout and spur domestic confidence
Development
assistance in the Pacific is another area of mutual interest with
opportunity for growth. Australia provides half of all official
development assistance to Papua New Guinea and Pacific island countries
(AUD$1.17 billion) and New Zealand spends more than half of its country
programs budget on Pacific island countries. At the latest Pacific
Islands Forum, the US showed that it is ready to lift a portion of the
development aid load in the Pacific; US Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton announced $32M in new aid programs 18 years after ending such
programs in the Pacific.
As former
Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary Panetta should be
attuned to the value that New Zealand provides as a voice and ear in
the Asia-Pacific. One Kiwi commentator wrote that New Zealand should be
weary of his arrival in the country, and that the US will ask too much
from Kiwis. However, the RIMPAC ship porting issue notwithstanding,
strategic and diplomatic relations between the US and New Zealand have
moved forward since 2007.
Leadership of both states are keen to return to an era of stronger defense ties to help guarantee their security and to enhance stability in the Pacific. Having met already this year in Washington, DC, the meeting this week between defense bosses is likely more of a touch point to ensure regular high-level dialogue occurs. With the Washington Declaration in place and successes to build on from the past year, the additional avenues for deepening defense cooperation may be limited but may be milestones nonetheless.
Leadership of both states are keen to return to an era of stronger defense ties to help guarantee their security and to enhance stability in the Pacific. Having met already this year in Washington, DC, the meeting this week between defense bosses is likely more of a touch point to ensure regular high-level dialogue occurs. With the Washington Declaration in place and successes to build on from the past year, the additional avenues for deepening defense cooperation may be limited but may be milestones nonetheless.
Related:
- TVNZ Q & A program: Video of interview with US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta
- Foreign Policy Magazine- Passport blog: Panetta surrenders to New Zealand in decades-old nuclear standoff!
- National Business Review: The Dangers of Cosying up to the US
Club Em Designs
No comments:
Post a Comment