X-Post-East Asia Forum: Japan’s Pacific Islands Diplomacy At a Crossroads

May 24th, 2012

 

Author: Sandra Tarte, USP

Japan’s decision not to invite Fiji’s prime minister, Voreqe Bainimarama, to the sixth Japan–Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM 6), to be held in Okinawa this 25–26 May, represents a defining moment in its diplomatic relations with the Pacific Islands.

Fiji P.M -Voreqe Bainimarama (Source: Fiji Live)

Japan announced that due to the perceived ‘insufficient pace of reform toward democratisation’, it would invite Fiji’s foreign minister instead (who subsequently gave his apologies). That this announcement came just one week ahead of the meeting is an indication of what a difficult decision this was for the Japanese government. In addition to the immediate consequences for Japan–Fiji relations, this decision has broader implications.

The PALM summits have been held every three years in Japan since 1997, and are Tokyo’s signature event in its foreign relations with the Pacific Islands. They normally bring together the heads of government from Japanese and Pacific Island countries, plus ministerial-level representation from Australia and New Zealand. Although in the past they have been dubbed the Japan–Pacific Islands Forum meeting, the PALM summit is not technically a Forum event. Fiji remains suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum pending its return to democratic rule, but it is not officially excluded from the PALM process.

In October 2010 Japan hosted the first Interim PALM meeting — a mid-term gathering of Pacific Islands Forum foreign ministers in Tokyo. This was ostensibly aimed at assessing the progress in the implementation of commitments made at the previous year’s PALM summit and looking ahead to the next one. Most significantly, however, it was a first step toward normalising ties with Bainimarama’s government, and was the occasion for the first meeting between Fiji’s foreign minister and his Japanese counterpart. During the 2010 Interim PALM meeting Tokyo indicated its concerns that the policy of isolating Fiji to pressure it into more meaningful democratic reforms was failing, and this was taken as a positive sign that Prime Minister Bainimarama would receive an invitation to PALM 6.

Since then, Japan has watched events unfold in Fiji and in the region, waiting for the right moment to issue the invitation. As the head of the Fiji Military Forces, Prime Minister Bainimarama has not been allowed to travel to Japan since he came to power in the December 2006 coup. He has, however, made numerous visits to China and to other Asian powerhouses such as Indonesia and India, and to new friends in the Middle East.

Japan had compelling reasons for inviting the Fijian prime minister to Okinawa this year. First, it has been six years since Fiji was last represented at PALM at a prime ministerial level. It missed out on PALM 5 in 2009 due to the political upheaval Fiji was undergoing at the time, including the abrogation of the constitution and subsequent uncertainty over the country’s democratic future. The 2012 PALM summit is the last one before elections in Fiji, which are scheduled for 2014. Inviting Fiji’s prime minister would have signalled Japan’s support for the political process mapped out by the Bainimarama government. Despite its perceived flaws, this political process remains the only hope Fiji has of returning to some form of democratic rule.

PALM 6 also represented an opportunity for Japan both to rebuild bridges with this key actor in the region, and to acknowledge that the Pacific Islands is a region in transition. In the six years since he seized power, Prime Minister Bainimarama has redefined Fiji’s foreign policy, and these changes have led a growing number of Pacific Island countries to embrace new partnerships and alignments. A new diplomacy that is not contingent on the policy preferences of Australia, New Zealand or the US seems to be emerging across the region, indirectly prompted by Bainimarama.

If, as reported, Japan’s decision not to invite Prime Minister Bainimarama to PALM 6 was the result of international pressure, from Australia in particular, it signals a reaffirmation by Japan of the ‘old regional order’ and a rejection of the ‘new regional order’ that is gradually taking shape. As Japan’s prime minister welcomes Pacific leaders in Okinawa, including ministers from Australia and New Zealand, he may do well to reflect on the long-term significance of Fiji’s empty seat.

Sandra Tarte is Associate Professor and Director of the Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji.

Further reading:

Mainichi- Noda (Japan PM) Eager to Deepen 'Bonds' With Pacific Leaders.

Grubsheet- Australia Engineers Japan Snub

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Stratfor Video Brief: Australia's Bending Foreign Policy

SiFM earlier post highlighted regional observers, who advocated such a shift.

Stratfor's video brief (posted below)on South Pacific geopolitics and describes Australia's shift in foreign policy towards Fiji.

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X-Post-Island Business: New Players In The Region

The New Players in the Region

Pacific diplomacy boosts links with new friends Nic Maclellan Pacific nations are largely reliant on aid, trade and investment from traditional partners like Australia, New Zealand, United States, France and Japan. But in recent years, there has been increasing interest in finding new sources of development assistance, economic and political support. Pacific governments have been diversifying their political and economic links beyond the old regional groupings—led by France, United States and Australia/New Zealand—that dominated islands politics throughout the Cold War years.  In the mid-1980s, PNG’s then Prime Minister Paias Wingti talked of a ‘Look North’ policy for his country, to extend relations beyond the old colonial ties with Australia.  Today, Pacific Islands Forum countries are looking north-west, north-east and to other points of the compass. There is a growing interest in South–South cooperation and new countries are seeking the status of Post-Forum dialogue partner with the Pacific Islands Forum. This trend is driven by a more co-ordinated and assertive diplomacy on the international stage by island ambassadors at the United Nations such as PNG’s Robert Guba Aisi, Fiji’s Peter Thomson, Solomon Islands’ Colin Beck and former Vanuatu Prime Minister Donald Kalpokas. Currently, Nauru’s UN Ambassador Marlene Moses is the chair of the Alliance of Small Islands States (AOSIS) while Samoa’s ambassador Ali’ioaiga Feturi Elisaia represented Small Islands Developing States on the Transitional Committee for the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The post-coup rift between Canberra, Wellington and Suva has accelerated these existing trends in regional policy. Under the Bainimarama administration, Fiji is broadening its international links by opening embassies in Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 2010, Commodore Bainimarama stated that “this significant shift in foreign policy direction heralds the globalisation and maturity of Fiji. It demonstrates Fiji’s intention to become a good and engaged global citizen. Accordingly, over the past year, Fiji has formalised diplomatic relations with many countries with which no ties previously existed. In addition, Fiji has sought membership of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)”. Fiji was formally admitted to NAM in April 2011, becoming the second islands member alongside Vanuatu. Fiji’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, told Radio Australia last year that joining NAM would help refocus Fiji’s relationships away from its traditional partners Australia and New Zealand and allow Suva to pursue its ‘Look North’ policy, through direct engagement with ASEAN countries and strengthen ties to Beijing.   China’s increasing interest in the region is provoking a re-engagement by the United States, highlighted by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s 2010 visit to the region and new military deployments in Guam and Australia announced last year by President Obama. Beijing is active on a range of fronts: investment in the Ramu nickel project in PNG’s Madang province; the provision of aid and soft loans worth US$206 million in 2010; increased fisheries and construction programmes around the region and support for agencies such as the South Pacific Tourism Organisation. But increasing islands ties with China are just part of the picture. Around the region, there are a range of new players that are complicating life for the ANZUS allies—from Cuba, Russia, Timor-Leste and Indonesia to unexpected actors like the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Luxembourg. From Havana to Honiara   Cold War paranoia about the Russian threat in the Pacific lost force after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union. Once scorned as a Soviet proxy in the islands, Cuba has improved relations with the Forum islands nations over the last decade.   Solomon Islands and Cuba established diplomatic relations in December 2002 and Havana opened a resident mission in Kiribati in 2006. Honiara then signed a development co-operation agreement with Cuba on March 6, 2007. Other countries expanded ties after a September 2008 Cuba-Pacific summit in Havana, attended by Kiribati President Anote Tong; then Tuvalu Prime Minister Apisai Ielemia; and other Pacific foreign ministers and officials.  In early 2009, Cuba established formal diplomatic relations with Fiji, Tonga and Samoa. Since then, there has been increased diplomatic contact with Cuba on issues like development, decolonisation and climate change, through common membership of AOSIS and the UN Special Committee on Decolonisation.   This South-South link has focused on the health sector. Cuba currently supplies medical staff to Kiribati, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Vanuatu and Papua New Guinea, while students from these countries study medicine and primary healthcare in Havana. In Solomon Islands, for example, Cuba has agreed to send 40 doctors and offered scholarships for Solomon Islands students to study medicine in Cuba. Solomon Islands announced in March 2011 that it would establish an embassy in Havana—partly in reaction to complaints by Solomons’ medical students that they were not getting the financial and pastoral support they had been promised. From Russia with love   Russia continues to have small but influential ties in the region, with proposals for investment in PNG’s Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) industry and recent provision of ‘humanitarian’ aid to Nauru. Last year, on the fringes of the UN General Assembly in New York, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with a range of Pacific leaders and foreign ministers.   Then Lavrov visited the region earlier this year, with stops in Australia, New Zealand and Fiji. After courtesy calls on Prime Minister Bainimarama and Foreign Minister Kubuabola, Lavrov joined regional delegates at the Sofitel Fiji Resort in Nadi on February 1 for the ‘Russian Federation and Pacific Islands Countries meeting’.   The Russian minister gained Suva’s agreement to develop a treaty for visa free travel between Russia and Fiji, and Lavrov expressed his government’s interest in co-operating with Pacific states on investment, minerals, energy, tourism, education and medicine. One unspoken element in the dialogue is Moscow’s concern about Beijing’s small but growing influence in the region.   Another of Russia’s interests is winning recognition for two breakaway regions of Georgia—the states of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  In 2009, Nauru was one of only four UN member states to grant this recognition, later joined by Vanuatu and Tuvalu who recognised the Russian-backed regions.   Relations with Russia have not gone smoothly. As everyone should remember—when you’re out and about and tempted to dance with a new partner, think about the reaction of those you’ve left at home. In February, Solomon Islands Foreign Minister Peter Shanel Agovaka and Permanent Secretary Robert Sisilo met bilaterally with the Russian Foreign Minister to discuss the formalisation of Solomons’ diplomatic relations with Russia next October.  However, on his return to Honiara, Shanel was sacked by Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo who stated: “As a developing country, Solomon Islands should continue to strengthen our ties with traditional partners before pursuing new diplomatic groupings.”  Shanel’s foreign secretary was also reshuffled and is now the permanent secretary at the Ministry of Police, National Security and Correctional Services. Support for Russia’s policy has also been contested in Port Vila, with attempts to reverse the initial decision on Abkhazia and South Ossetia.  Vanuatu’s media have raised concern about the role of Mrs Thi Tam Goiset, the country’s first Roving Ambassador to Russian and the Eastern Countries. Luxembourg and the United Nations   According to the Vanuatu Daily Post, the Ambassador’s contract includes a 15% entitlement to any money secured in the name of the Republic of Vanuatu. For many years, islands governments often paralleled ANZUS policies on many international issues, except where there are clear issues that affected the region. Small Islands States governments like Tuvalu and Kiribati have fought hard against the US, Australian and Canadian coal lobby in international climate negotiations, while Tonga, Samoa and the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) nations have consistently voted for nuclear disarmament initiatives at the United Nations, in sharp opposition to Canberra and Washington. Although constrained by the high cost of attending international meetings and maintaining overseas embassies, Pacific governments have been willing to use their vote as a diplomatic bargaining tool. A solid (and potentially growing) bloc of islands votes is a major resource when it comes to decisions in UN agencies or the regular votes for rotating seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC).   Alongside the UNSC permanent members (USA, UK, France, China and Russia), there are 10 non-permanent seats which rotate among the regional blocs that group UN member states—and people are eager to woo islands votes. Last September, the Asia Group within the United Nations formally changed its name to the ‘Group of Asia and the Pacific Small Islands Developing States’, a reflection of the Pacific’s new diplomatic vibrancy and growing links between Forum Islands Countries and Asian powers. One of the legacies of colonialism is that Australia and New Zealand are members of the ‘Western European and Others Group’ (WEOG), rather than the Asia-Pacific group.   For the 2013-14 UNSC term, Australia is competing with Finland and Luxembourg for the two seats as part of the WEOG group at the high table. This competition explains the entry of the latest player into Pacific politics—the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. Luxembourg has a population the size of Solomon Islands, but it’s one of the richest European states, home to tax havens and extensive private banking. Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn has been actively lobbying for the rotating UNSC seat, travelling to the 2011 NAM meeting in Bali and wooing Fiji and Vanuatu. Prime Minister Bainimarama invited a representative from Luxembourg to attend the March 2011 MSG summit as a ‘special guest’, and both Luxembourg and Finland sent delegations to the 2011 Pacific Islands Forum meeting in Auckland to lobby on the sidelines. So far, this diplomacy hasn’t borne results. In Auckland, Forum leaders (minus Fiji) reaffirmed their “strong and unanimous support” for Australia’s bid for the UNSC seat in 2013-2014 and New Zealand’s bid for 2015-2016 (Stay tuned for October to see if Fiji can woo any islands state to switch their vote from Australia at the last minute!) Beyond support for the two largest Forum members, the 2011 leaders’ communique also noted “the importance of Pacific representation on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in ensuring the UNSC remained informed on international issues of concern to the region.” This suggests that the island bids for representation on the UNSC may be in the wind in the coming years. Fiji considered a bid for one of the Asia-Pacific group’s rotating seats in 2012, but agreed to defer its candidacy in favour of Pakistan, which went on to win the seat. Suva may expect the favour returned for 2015-2016, if national elections go ahead as scheduled in 2014 and Fiji is welcomed back into the arms of the ‘international community’. Nic Maclellan "The post-coup rift between Canberra, Wellington and Suva has accelerated these existing trends in regional policy [...] NAM would help refocus Fiji’s relationships away from its traditional partners Australia and New Zealand and allow Suva to pursue its ‘Look North’ policy, through direct engagement with ASEAN countries and strengthen ties to Beijing [...] Around the region, there are a range of new players that are complicating life for the ANZUS allies—from Cuba, Russia, Timor-Leste and Indonesia to unexpected actors like the United Arab Emirates, Israel and Luxembourg." United Arab Emirates (UAE)   In the 1980s, the Kingdom of Tonga was one of the brokers of Libya’s engagement with the islands region. Today, Nuku’alofa has opened the door for another Middle East power—the United Arab Emirates (UAE). As part of its shift towards renewable energy, Tonga has been a key Pacific player in the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), which was officially established in January 2009 to “promote the widespread and increased adoption and sustainable use of all forms or renewable energy”. After ratifying the IRENA Statute in November 2009, Tonga became one of the first countries in the world to be a full member of the new agency. Tonga has been elected to the IRENA Council, which administers decisions of the agency’s global assembly.Through IRENA, successive Tongan governments have built links with the UAE. The then Prime Minister Feleti Sevele led a Tongan delegation to the UAE in January 2010 for the Third IRENA Preparatory Commission meeting.   On January 18, in Abu Dhabi, the MASDAR renewable energy company signed an MOU with the Government of Tonga to build a 500- kilowatt solar photovoltaic power plant in Vava’u, funded by a grant from the Abu Dhabi Fund for Development, an agency controlled by the UAE government. The following month, UAE Foreign Minister Sheikh Abdullah Bin Zayed Al Nahyan toured the Pacific in a private Boeing 737 800, leading a delegation for courtesy visits to Samoa, Tonga, Tuvalu, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, and Palau (UAE is now supporting Palau’s dugong protection programme).   In Nuku’alofa, Tonga’s Crown Prince Tupouto’a-Lavaka signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the UAE Foreign Minister on February 9, 2010 and His Royal Highness has been named as the Ambassador Designate to UAE. The UAE has now launched a US$50 million “UAE and Pacific Islands Partnership Programme” to be overseen by the UAE Foreign Ministry and managed by the government-owned Abu Dhabi Fund for Development.   Seeking AOSIS goodwill as one of the world’s highest per capita emitters of greenhouse gases, UAE was also looking for support for their 2010 bid for a seat on the UN Security Council rather than Canada (Canada lost). Canada and the UAE had a long-running dispute over access for Emirates airline to Canadian airports, and the issue of airline access resonates in the Pacific.  At a time Qantas is looking at its major shareholding in Air Pacific, improved ties to the Emirates airline could be important for Fiji, which has hundreds of nationals serving in Middle East peacekeeping operations. These links with the UAE opened the way for a June 2010 meeting between Pacific countries and the Arab League, hosted by the UAE Foreign Minister in Abu Dhabi. The ‘Prospects of Cooperation between Arab countries and the Pacific Islands conference’ started discussions on aid and political co-operation and even proposed opening an Arab League office in the islands. At the meeting, “the Pacific Small Islands Developing States noted the concern of Arab states regarding the conflict in the Middle East, in particular in Palestine. The Pacific Small Islands Developing States undertook to give appropriate consideration to the Arab Peace Initiative, recognising that the views of the Arab States were crucial to a just, comprehensive and permanent peace in the Middle East.” The meeting communique agreed to support international efforts to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East (with an international conference on weapons of mass destruction in the region scheduled for late 2012). In the coming months, Pacific governments will be lobbied extensively on Iran’s nuclear programme and Israel’s arsenal, estimated at 80-200 nuclear weapons. Middle East politics   As with the China-Taiwan dispute, the Arab-Israeli conflict will force Pacific islands to juggle allegiances. The 2010 meeting with the Arab League sparked concern amongst the ANZUS allies and Israel, as some participants started to draw away from US-Israeli positions on Palestine. The United States and Israel are lobbying Pacific states against support for Palestinian statehood and, as always, existing aid and trade relations come into play. In December last year, Vanuatu was one of only 15 countries that opposed Palestine’s application to join the United Nations Economic Scientific and Cultural Organisation(UNESCO).  As the only Pacific country receiving US funds through its Millennium Challenge, Vanuatu’s Education Minister Marcellino Pipite told Vanuatu’s Daily Post that “prior to the UNESCO conference, I met USA officials and presented a request for the second Millennium Challenge Funds and did not want to jeopardise this with voting against Israel.”   Under their Compacts of Free Association, FSM, Marshall Islands and Palau have regularly voted with the United States and Israel against the international consensus on Palestinian rights. But solidarity with the United States comes at a cost. After the Marshall Islands opposed statehood for the Palestinians by abstaining in a 2011 UN General Assembly vote, Marshalls’ Foreign Minister Phillip Muller complained: “We were then told in a diplomatic note from the UAE that we were no longer eligible to participate in the renewable energy fund.We’ve been penalised for being friends with certain countries and no one is stepping up to fill the void.” Other countries with strong ties to Australia, like Solomon Islands, have also developed new ties with non-traditional partners in recent years. Honiara has been building diplomatic links with Iran and has joined Vanuatu to call for an end to the US embargo of Cuba.   In 2008, Solomon Islands’ then Foreign Minister William Haomae met his Iranian counterpart Manouchehr Mottaki in New York to discuss formalising diplomatic relations. Haomae then led a Solomon’s delegation to Tehran and the two countries signed a Cooperative Memorandum to explore development cooperation agreements. At the time, the Solomon Islands government rejected criticism from Israel over alleged Iranian influence, with an official stating: “We have no enemies, and therefore, we will be friends to all the nations, including both Israel and Iran.”   Israeli officials travelled to Honiara in 2009 to lobby the Sikua government over perceived policy shifts on Middle East affairs. In November 2009, Solomon Islands was the only Pacific islands nation to vote in the UN General Assembly in support of a resolution calling for independent investigation of allegations of war crimes documented in the Goldstone report (a study by a leading South African jurist which criticised human rights violations by Israel and Hamas during the Israeli invasion of Gaza in early 2009). Australia, Nauru and the US Compact states all voted to reject the report, with other Forum members abstaining.   In response to this increasing Pacific dialogue with the Arab world, Israel is increasing its regional lobbying. In January 2010, FSM President Emanuel Mori and Nauru’s then President Marcus Stephen travelled to Israel, meeting with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman and President Shimon Peres. In April 2011, the speaker of Israel’s Knesset, Reuven Rivlin, visited Tonga to improve relations between the two countries, while last August Israel’s President Shimon Peres offered Nauru support for desalination projects.   Tel Aviv has approved new aid programmes through MASHAV (Israel’s International Development Cooperation Agency). TAG International Development will implement development assistance programmes in Solomon Islands, with visiting delegations investigating agricultural projects in Malaita. Israeli experts are also looking at a hydroelectricity project in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Timor-Leste and Indonesia   Closer to home, independent Timor-Leste gained Special Observer Status at the Pacific Islands Forum in 2002. Even though Timor-Leste is still primarily looking west to the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Dili is co-operating with the Melanesian Spearhead Group on trade, climate change and other issues.   In early 2011, MSG member states agreed to allow Indonesia and Timor-Leste to attend the March 2011 MSG leaders’ summit as observers. In September 2011, Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão visited the MSG Secretariat in Port Vila (the first visit by an overseas head of government since the secretariat was opened in 2008) and Timorese officials announced a US$500,000 grant for salaries and projects.   For many years, Indonesian diplomats have lobbied the islands region from embassies in Canberra, Wellington, Beijing and Tokyo but now Jakarta is seeking more links on the ground. Indonesia’s observer status at the March 2011 MSG summit was followed the next month by the opening of its new embassy in Suva. The Kilman government in Vanuatu too is moving closer to Indonesia, with the December 2011 signing in Jakarta of a Vanuatu-Indonesia Development Co-operation Agreement. These moves have dismayed the West Papua National Council for Liberation (WPNCL), which has an information office in Port Vila (especially as the new co-operation agreement stresses Indonesian territorial integrity, sovereignty over West Papua and prohibits Vanuatu from interfering in Indonesia’s “internal affairs”).   Indonesia’s MSG observer status was a sharp blow for the West Papuan nationalist movement, which has been lobbying for that status for many years. Indonesia is not alone as an active regional player from Asia. Malaysian corporation Naim is building roads across Fiji, Rimbunan Hijau dominates PNG’s forestry sector while Korea’s POSCO has struck a major nickel deal with the FLNKS-dominated northern province in New Caledonia. In 2011, Korea tripled its development aid to the islands region from US$300,000 to $US1 million as part of the Lee Myung-bak government’s “New Asia Diplomacy” initiative. Last June, Korean diplomats and representatives of 14 islands nations gathered in Seoul for the first ever Korea-Pacific summit (by coincidence, Korea is bidding for one of the rotating Asia-Pacific seats at the UN Security Council in 2013-14!). Canberra’s dilemma   Some Australian officials have expressed concern that the islands’ diversifying diplomatic links are simply a matter of chequebook diplomacy. But there are also some fundamental policy differences between Pacific states and Canberra, Washington and Paris. Some islands leaders increasingly attracted by economic models from Asia that involve capital controls, government intervention and reliance on state-run enterprises, rather than the Washington consensus of trade liberalisation and privatisation.  At a time when Canberra backs France’s ongoing colonial role in the South Pacific and maintains a paltry 5% target for greenhouse emissions cuts by 2020, it’s hardly surprising that Pacific nations are looking to new friends. The new role of the Pacific Small Islands Developing States (PSIDS) grouping within the United Nations is causing debate in Australia.  A 2011 report from the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) notes: “The importance of PSIDS for Australia’s regional position is that, to some extent, the group demonstrates our alienation from the FICs. The Pacific Islands Forum has had observer status in the General Assembly since 1994. The increased prominence of PSIDS derives from the FICs’ preference for a form of engagement that excludes Australia and New Zealand, which would be included in any discussions under the PIF banner. The PSIDS feel very satisfied with their inclusion in the UN’s Asia Group, especially under its new name.” With former NSW Premier Bob Carr taking over from Kevin Rudd as Foreign Minister and initiating talks with New Zealand about new policies towards the Bainimarama administration, there are signs that Canberra is starting to respond to the new regional dynamic. Sept 2012: Russian s ready to land   By Davendra Sharma If Russians have yet to make a mark on the Pacific, just wait until September 2012 when Moscow hosts the region’s most powerful meet—the Asia Pacific Economic Community Summit. Already eyes of the regional superpowers like Australia and the United States are on Russia as it prepares to host the influential meeting of leaders from the two regions, Asia and Pacific. They will be keen to study how Moscow will enhance its regional profile and gain an opportunity to establish itself in the region.   Since the visit last January by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov to Australia, Fiji and Kiribati as part of his five-nation tour, the European country has been accused of chequebook diplomacy. But economic deals are not only interests Moscow has in the Pacific, it also has military and political intentions as the former Soviet power embraces the Pacific region.   In a report, The phantom of the Pacific: Reconsidering Russia as a Pacific power prior to APEC–2012, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) argues that increased Russian diplomacy in key parts of Asia and Oceania is driven by “economic, political and military strategic considerations”. It said that the economic driver to Russia’s re-engagement in the Asia Pacific region is also to expand and find markets for its burgeoning energy industry. Russia has been able to woo support at the UN for recognition of its disputed territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia—the scene of Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia.   While the region’s biggest aid donor, Australia, accuses Russia of “exploiting” some of the world’s smallest economies like Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru, Vanuatu and Fiji, Russia is marching on and forging ties with whichever countries it can in the Pacific Islands Forum region. Russia is said to have poured tens of millions of development aid to these five countries in return for their acknowledgement of the Russian puppet states. The former phosphate-rich Nauru, which now relies on foreign remittances and assistance on living expenses, was reportedly given US$50 million.    The new ASPI report also questions Russia’s political intentions as Moscow increases its presence in Oceania which it says “provides the nation with both a challenge and an opportunity, because it allows Russia a platform to display its restored military power to potential allies and friends, including through military exercises and out-of-area deployments. Kiribati deal   Russia it seems is taking a leaf out of China’s policy book as it pursues economic deals and assistance in the Pacific islands. China also launched a campaign in the Oceania region in the early 1990s as it competed with Taiwan over recognition by Forum members like Kiribati, which has very limited natural resources and significant lag behind other Forum countries. But to Russia’s surprise, the governments in Tarawa over the last 20 years have had a long standing patterns of creating ties with new economic powers in the Pacific—be it Australia, China, Taiwan, the United States, United Kingdom, Germany or Cuba. Russia is just another new player.   For years it was China versus Taiwan. While China helped build the main infrastructure in Kiribati as well as supply specialist and skilled workers like doctors, Taiwan built a A$8 million stadium. And now it is Russia versus Georgia—both former members of the Soviet Union, which collapsed in 1991. As one regional Auckland-based commentator puts it, “It all depends on how much the latter and its Western backers would be willing to donate to this cause.”   And so as Australia’s parliamentary secretary for the Pacific islands affairs, Richard Marles argues that while competition benefits consumers the most, the resource-poor islands countries can only win here at the expense of the regional superpowers like Australia and New Zealand watching from the sidelines. While long-time major donors accuse Russia of pressuring the islands countries of trading their sovereignty, the deals actually end up benefitting the poor countries in Oceania. "This kind of cheque-book diplomacy undermines development assistance in the region," said Marles. Fiji   When Lavrov decided a stopover in Fiji to meet military strongman, Commodore Bainimarama, Australia and New Zealand were left wondering how much deeper could Russia penetrate into relations with Oceania. Like Kiribati, Suva under Bainimarama has stepped up ties with China and Russia. Shunned by New Zealand and Australia, Fiji has moved swiftly in 2012 to also reaffirm closer relationship with the United States and other Asian democracies like Japan. The Australian thinking however is that Russia has more military and strategic considerations than any other agenda as it pierces through the Oceania region. “More traditional geostrategic factors are also driving the Russians to give the Pacific greater prominence in the coming decade,” noted the ASPI report. Russia’s military potency second to none   It asserts that the Russians are concerned that on one hand Washington is talking up downsizing its military might, it is still pouring millions into its Pacific allies and territories like Guam, American Samoa, FSM and the Northern Marianas.   Russia is only second to the US in terms of being the world’s most potent military power and it also the world’s sixth largest economy. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, where Australia aspires to be in years to come.  Russian interests in the South Pacific could also extend to mining as that country has the world’s third largest gold reserves. Mining of gold is a major source of employment in PNG and Fiji, where Australian companies are predominantly engaged.   Russia also enjoys an average annual growth of over 4%, one of the highest in modern-day Europe, most of which is slowly recovering from the three-year recession. The report forewarns that renewed Russian interest in the Pacific region should not been taken lightly by existing economic powers. “Russia’s long-term economic agenda and its clear interest in cooperation rather than confrontation drive this comeback. Its intention to rebuild a credible military capability in the Pacific is driven not by threat perceptions alone, but by a pragmatic need to protect its national economic and political interests,” it said. Further reading: http://stuckinfijimud.blogspot.com/2012/03/x-post-from-island-business-new-era-of.html

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Coming In From The Cold?

In recent months Fiji has welcomed to its shores, the Foreign Minister of Russia and more recently the senior diplomat of Qatar. Other bilateral meetings with Iraq and Kuwait have also eventuated, including other nations.

SiFM
"Both Foreign Minster's unscheduled visit to Fiji, is somewhat symbolic in nature, as well as a face saving gesture to restore what shreds of their spheres of influence left intact since their self-imposed absence."

The recent announcement of the nascent Australian Foreign Minister, Bob Carr to visit Fiji, in mid stream of his Washington stop, was quite surprising to say the least . However, Carr's Fiji's stop was undoubtedly influenced by a little chat with  the 'foggy bottom' folks quite concerned at Canberra and Wellington's incessant refusal engage directly with the Fiji Government and in the process isolated the Western aligned alliance diplomatically and undermining their regional moves on the geo-strategic chessboard. 

Tagging along with Foreign Minister Bob Carr to display a united front, is New Zealand Foreign Minister, Murray McCully who also confirmed his itinerary in joining this last minute Pacific Islands Forum Ministerial Contact Group (MCG) visit to Fiji.
It is understood that other Ministers from Pacific Island Forum (PIF) nations, notably from Polynesian client states are only present to bolster the island look of the Anglosphere duo, Carr and McCully respectively; whose nations dominate the proceedings of the Pacific Forum, an organization deemed as an anachronism by Melanesian and Micronesian states.

36th Parallel interview, (video below) outlines the current seismic change in regional affairs.





This disengagement with Fiji by the Trans-Tasman nations, had subsequently encouraged other friends of Fiji, to close ranks and displace the diplomatic rapport they once held. Both Foreign Minster's unscheduled visit to Fiji, is somewhat symbolic in nature, as well as a face saving gesture to restore what shreds of their spheres of influence left intact since their self-imposed absence.

Another unspoken agenda in their visit of both senior diplomats and colonial cousins from the metropolitan nations, is the ambition to shore up support to the former premier regional multi-lateral organization Pacific Islands Forum(PIF) that has since been languishing in the looming shadow of the regional sub-group Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).

Another perspective by Dr. Wadan Narsey provides another independent view.

The excerpt:

Pacific tilting west to PNG – and Super Power rivalry

http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2012/04/pacific-tilting-west-to-png-and-super-power-rivalry/

14:56 April 27, 2012 0 comments

Papua New Guinea gold ... vast mineral wealth changing Pacific politics

Photo: Kiridaresources

Pacific Scoop:
Commentary – By economist Professor Wadan Narsey

If this was a news release by a geologist, alarm bells would be ringing around the Pacific and international scientific community. But retitle it “Pacific politics tilting to PNG” and the alarm bells would be ringing in Samoa, Tonga and the Cooks (as I am sure they already are).

However, if Papua New Guinea ever decides to flex its burgeoning muscles, encouraged by a belligerent Fiji, the alarm bells would be ringing loudest in Canberra and Wellington.
Without doubt, Pacific politics is tilting towards the west, drawn by the all-powerful and inexorable gravitational forces of the massive LNG and other minerals wealth being generated in Papua New Guinea (and in West Papua – another sorry saga).

Pacific regional initiatives such as PICTA and EPAs with the European Union (administered by Forum Secretariat in Suva) or PACER Plus (administered through the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser in Vila) are going to be largely eclipsed by the Melanesian Spearhead Group of PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, headquartered in the Chinese built secretariat in Vila. But are the PNG politicians prepared for the leadership role that comes with their wealth and markets?

Or will they be too bogged down in their debilitating internal squabbles for political power so as to ensure preferential access to the massive new wealth flows being created?
Relations with Australia and NZ are going to be a key factor in the direction taken by PNG and the MSG group, and that will depend critically on what PACER Plus offers the PICs, and how fast.
Understanding the complex chop-suey of forces at work in the Pacific is extremely difficult, as the diversity of issues discussed by this article indicates.

Super Power rivalry

But almost certainly, history, time and the “Pacific tilt” are not on Australia’s side. More than a decade ago, US withdrew its Peace Corps programme from the Pacific.  But in 2011, US Secretary Of State Hillary Clinton warned the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee not to cut the US foreign aid budget, citing the growing competition with China for global influence, specifically mentioning the Pacific and its vast natural resources.

The US is now back in the Pacific with a large new US Embassy in Suva, to rival the equally large Chinese Embassy. US has  also now stationed a small number of troops in North Australia, a move which is seen by an annoyed China as part of the US “containment policy” towards China.

The numbers of US troops will no doubt slowly grow, alarming Australian strategy advisers who see too close an attachment to US military strategies as being potentially harmful to long term Australian economic interests, which are inextricably linked to China’s economic growth (and which was the most significant factor saving Australia from the Global Financial Crisis).
Without doubt, super-power rivalry in the Pacific is now escalating.
PNG will have far more bargaining chips than ever before, especially if its leaders are able to successfully play off one Super Power against another, and take a leadership role in the Pacific, including the MSG.

W. Narsey
" Pacific regional initiatives such as PICTA and EPAs with the European Union (administered by Forum Secretariat in Suva) or PACER Plus (administered through the Office of the Chief Trade Adviser in Vila) are going to be largely eclipsed by the Melanesian Spearhead Group of PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, headquartered in the Chinese built secretariat in Vila. "

Largest market

Papua New Guinea with its population of 7 million people is the largest market in the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA), with the others just making up less than 2 million.
Yet 10 years ago, the PNG market was not given much importance by the other Pacific Island companies because the largely rural PNG consumers were too poor to spend money on modern goods. That has now totally changed with the massive economic growth now taking place in PNG, with equally large investment and consumer expenditures from both the private sector and government.

Foreign companies, including Australian, are taking a renewed interest in PNG. Even Fiji companies have made a beeline for PNG, pushed abroad by the last six years of economic stagnation in Fiji. All of a sudden, the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) of PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu has become the substantial integration movement in the Pacific, totally eclipsing PICTA.

The MSG is also achieving trade integration advances which PICTA has failed to deliver while PACER Plus totally stagnates.

Pacific countries will continue to talk endlessly on PACER Plus, as they did when PICTA was being negotiated, with every tiny trading or local commercial interest dragging the negotiations down to a snail’s pace, to the financial delight of an army of consultants.
This strengthening of the MSG has been assisted by Fiji’s belligerent attitude towards Australia and NZ, secretly admired by the political leaders of PNG, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu, who have long harboured intense resentment at what they perceive to be the paternalistic and condescending attitudes of Australian and NZ political leaders towards the Melanesians.
Underlying all this antagonism is the virtually taboo subject of Australian and NZ racism against the Melanesians, which surfaced in an oblique way at a recent conference at Deakin University in Geelong on PNG’s future.

Melanesians feel racism

This two-day conference produced many useful contributions from Australian and PNG academics and participants. But one jarring note in an otherwise diplomatic opening address by the debonair  Sir Charles Lepani (PNG High Commissioner to Australia) was his emotional complaint about the “galling” barriers faced by PNG nationals requiring a visa to come to Australia, while Australians come and go freely in PNG. This observation was greeted with applause by the largely white Australian audience, who had faced such difficulties when trying to get visas for PNG nationals.

Another senior and influential bureaucrat, a “mover and shaker” in PNG, complained bitterly that he had been coming to Australia for four decades, yet the Australian immigration department still wanted his bank balance and his grandparents’ addresses.
Ironically, while speaker after speaker (both PNG and Australian) complained about the post-independence debilitating deterioration in PNG civil service efficiency and widespread corruption, eminent Professor Ross Garnaut threw in a sobering reminder that the decades in which Australia controlled PNG before independence was “no golden era” for PNG people either, when they were required to have a permit to even come into their own capital, Moresby.

The conference was also reminded by yours truly that while Australia easily and freely gave out more than 600,000 work/holiday/study visas to a number of mostly white countries, PNG had yet to be confirmed for a quota of a mere 100

‘Blackbirding’ memories

Melanesian countries still remember their people being “blackbirded” a century ago, to clear the land in Australia for white farmers, and then callously and cruelly expelled (with the Chinese and Indians) to create the “White Australia” after federation in 1905 (led by Prime Minister Deakin). Today, the Melanesians are affronted that the descendants of that early slave labour are clearly not wanted in Australia in the way whites are.

In an evening function, very senior PNG people (including white Australian PNG “old hands”) confided quietly that the negative Australian attitude to PNG people was racism pure and simple – a continuation of the “White Australia” policy.
Few from the Melanesian Pacific would disagree, as they see that the Pacer Plus negotiations are bogged down by Australia on the one benefit that the Pacific countries feel would balance all the many costs of pure trade integration.

All PICs want is reasonable access for unskilled PIC “guest workers” into Australia – to ease their home unemployment and increase their valuable remittance earnings which has kept poverty at bay in several countries such as Fiji, Samoa, Tonga.
But for almost a decade now, Australia has been dragging its feet on proposals to let a few thousand Pacific Islands workers come to pick fruit, all under tightly controlled conditions, while 600,000 young workers from Europe, with minimal control or organisation whatsoever, come and go with a year’s permit for work and/or holiday, readily granted.

Add Sino-phobia

Many political strategists in Australia and NZ are worried about China’s rapid incursion into Pacific economies and politics, even though China is merely doing much the same kinds of things which other Super Powers and donors have done in the past century.

China may be extremely secretive about their financial flows to recipient countries and politicians. For instance, there is little publicly available data about what exactly are the loans which many Pacific countries are taking on for future generations.
But unlike Australian and NZ, China has little concern for insisting on local governance standards or basic human rights of the PIC citizens.

Sadly, the Western powers excluded China in their regional discussions with PICs, as I pointed out at a PIDP meeting in Honolulu early in 2011, on the future of the Pacific. The improbable excuse given was that there were “visa difficulties” for Chinese delegates.
It is open to question whether China will be any less racist or paternalistic or condescending than Australia or NZ.  But Chinese diplomats are not likely to make the political gaffes which Australian politicians make regularly with respect to the Pacific.
Australian failures
Australia’s failure to win the hearts and minds of Pacific political leaders may be contrasted with NZ’s greater success with Pacific countries, and with their Maori population.
No power-hungry Pacific politician is ever going to prise the Cook Islands, Tokelau or Niue (or even Samoa and Tonga) out of New Zealand’s camp.

Even Kiribati is now over the moon with Fiji, which has offered (sold) them a large block of land which will have more earth in it than all of Kiribati combined. While Kiribati’s President Tong hastily said the purchase was for food security and not settlement, there is little doubt that it also is going to provide a refuge for any I-Kiribati climate change refugees.
The I-Kiribati know that Tuvaluans are already quietly and happily acquiring property in Fiji, with no fuss whatsoever from Fiji authorities.  Tuvaluans are hard-working law-abiding residents of Fiji, enjoying all the benefits of good education for their children, health services for their sick, and a hospitable social environment.

Massive Australia, despite its daily acknowledgement of significant labour shortages for the foreseeable future, has made no such grand symbolic gesture towards the atoll countries which would have cost it so little and gained so much. It is not surprising that, apart from a few small Polynesian countries, the rest of the Melanesian and Micronesian Pacific has refused to speak out against the military regime in Fiji, despite the considerable diplomatic pressure from Australia and NZ.

W. Narsey
"Many political strategists in Australia and NZ are worried about China’s rapid incursion into Pacific economies and politics, even though China is merely doing much the same kinds of things which other Super Powers and donors have done in the past century. "

The PICs all know that Australia has been dragging its feet for a decade on PACER Plus negotiations and refusing to budge on access to Pacific unskilled labour, while the smaller NZ economy has had a small guest worker scheme operating very successfully for several years.
Australian needs to pay more attention to PNG views: one speaker at the Deakin conference on PNG futures quite bluntly told the gathering: “If Australia does not want to play ball with PNG, then we will play ball with China”.
The reality is that PNG is now positioned to lead a mass break-out of the economic barriers that Australia has built up against the ordinary poor and unskilled black populations in the Pacific.
While perpetually decrying the deterioration in governance and public services in PNG and other Melanesian countries, Australia has been ruthlessly extracting the very professional and skilled PIC citizens, whose departure is one fundamental cause of PIC economic and social disintegration.
It is a paradox to many Pacific economists why Australia is so backward in its policies towards the Melanesian countries.

Saying ‘sorry’

In the absence of any great Australian awareness of Australia’s exploitation of Kanaks in the past, it might be difficult to argue that Australia has any subconscious guilt complex towards Melanesians, as they seemed to have towards the Aboriginals.

But Australian political leaders, after a century of silence, finally said “sorry” to Aboriginals for all the horrifying injustices done to them in the past. It would be an interesting PhD to examine whether saying “sorry” has made any improvements at all to the political relationships between Australian and Aboriginal political leaders, and more importantly, to the welfare of the Aboriginals whose conditions are closer (by all the MDG criteria) to the poverty stricken people in sub-Saharan Africa, than to the rest of white or Asian Australia.

Perhaps the Melanesian countries should demand that Australia also say “sorry” to them, for the atrocities committed against the Kanak labourers a century ago. Acknowledging those past brutalities (and you might first need a few TV documentaries to drive that message home to the unaware Australian public) might encourage Australia to treat Pacific Island countries fairly and with human decency in the PACER Plus negotiations.

If PACER Plus delivers on the unskilled labour market benefits that PIC leaders want, and quickly, then Australian and NZ politicians might also have fewer nightmares about being outmanoeuvred by China in the Pacific, plus enjoy a lot of benefits as well.

Dr Wadan Narsey is a Fiji economist, academic, former parliamentarian and independent media commentator. He is a regular columnist on Pacific Scoop and Pacific Media Centre Online.

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Beazely Bi-lateral Gatekeeping & US Engagement In The Pacific

Fiji One TV segment covers the recent remarks of Australian Ambassador to the U.S, Kim Beazely (K.B) in an interview with "The Diplomat" dated April 14th 2012 titled "How Australia Sees America".

"The Diplomat "(T.D) interview excerpt that focused on US's engagement in the Pacific and Australia's assumed sphere of influence:

(T.D) Within the alliance, the South Pacific has traditionally fallen within Australia’s sphere of influence. In recent years, Australia has taken the lead on engaging its neighbors in the region on behalf of the West, including taking on major peacekeeping operations in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands and taking the lead on engagement with Fiji. However, significant challenges have emerged in a number of these countries. Democracy hasn’t taken hold and there now appears to be a slitting of the Pacific Islands Forum along Melanesian and Polynesian lines.

This raises the question of whether the United States should not only take a more assertive role in the region, but also advance an alternative diplomatic approach in situations like Fiji or PNG. From Australia’s perspective, do you see any tension forming within ANZUS on diplomatic engagement in the South Pacific? And, how concerned are you about the rise of anti-Australian sentiment and the emergence of the Melanesian Spearhead Group as a possible alternative to the Pacific Islands Forum?

(K.B) The thing that we have always appreciated in our relationship with the United States is that the U.S. has always kept its engagement with the South Pacific islands under constant discussion with us. They engage us on where American policy is going. Clearly, from our point of view, the U.S. determines its own direction wherever it goes. It will rationalize that policy direction with its friends and others as the U.S. sees fit.

From our point of view, what’s much more important is that the U.S. is engaged. We think that it is good for the countries of the region that the U.S. involves itself. We have been arguing to – rather than with – the United States for a very long time that they become more involved in the region. So, we would do nothing but encourage them.

The region is getting increasingly complex as the leaders in the region become more adept at international diplomacy and more aware of the character of international relations. Australia doesn’t own any of this territory. We did once – at least part of it. But, we don’t own any of it now. So, our concern for that region is that they be wealthy, happy, cheerful, well-governed. That is our objective. And, we all stand for democracy. So, we are prepared to provide material assistance where that aid is sought – not imposed – by countries in the region. Because the U.S. tends to have very civil values, the U.S. is engaged in pursuing those objectives too. 

We don’t have any problems with the U.S. keeping the backdoor open as long as they consult with us. Clearly the U.S. will make up its own mind on what direction it wants to go. So long as it doesn’t give us any surprises, we have no basis for complaint.
The MSG has been around quite a long while, and we have coexisted with it jointly. So, it’s not something that has us phased or fussed.

More views from Kim Beazely below:

Trade &  Security Lecture At University of Virginia March 28 2012(Video posted below)

CSIS Interview Oct 17th 2011 (video posted below)




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X-Post- New York Times: China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice

China's developments in the Caribbean as outlined in a New York Times (NYT) article, brings to mind an earlier SiFM post titled "The Islanders with a Dragon Tattoo" , the recent reports of the arrival of US Marines in Darwin and Huawei being blocked from bidding on Australia's broadband network. All symptoms of the changing geostrategic landscape.

The excerpt of NYT article:


China Buys Inroads in the Caribbean, Catching U.S. Notice 

Jason Henry for The New York Times

Tourists and locals enjoying the view at a restaurant and bar in Nassau, a beneficiary of China's largess. More Photos »Slide Show Jason Henry for The New York Times

By RANDAL C. ARCHIBOLD

Published: April 7, 2012 

NASSAU, the Bahamas — A brand new $35 million stadium opened here in the Bahamas a few weeks ago, a gift from the Chinese government. 

T he tiny island nation of Dominica has received a grammar school, a renovated hospital and a sports stadium, also courtesy of the Chinese. Antigua and Barbuda got a power plant and a cricket stadium, and a new school is on its way. The prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago can thank Chinese contractors for the craftsmanship in her official residence.
China’s economic might has rolled up to America’s doorstep in the Caribbean, with a flurry of loans from state banks, investments by companies and outright gifts from the government in the form of new stadiums, roads, official buildings, ports and resorts in a region where the United States has long been a prime benefactor.

The Chinese have flexed their economic prowess in nearly every corner of the world. But planting a flag so close to the United States has generated intense vetting — and some raised eyebrows — among diplomats, economists and investors. “When you’ve got a new player in the hemisphere all of a sudden, it’s obviously something talked about at the highest level of governments,” said Kevin P. Gallagher, a Boston University professor who is an author of a recent report on Chinese financing, “The New Banks in Town.” Most analysts do not see a security threat, noting that the Chinese are not building bases or forging any military ties that could invoke fears of another Cuban missile crisis. But they do see an emerging superpower securing economic inroads and political support from a bloc of developing countries with anemic budgets that once counted almost exclusively on the United States, Canada and Europe.

Jason Henry for The New York Times (More Photos)

The $35 million stadium in Nassau financed by China.

China announced late last year that it would lend $6.3 billion to Caribbean governments, adding considerably to the hundreds of millions of dollars in loans, grants and other forms of economic assistance it has already channeled there in the past decade. Unlike in Africa, South America and other parts of the world where China’s forays are largely driven by a search for commodities, its presence in the Caribbean derives mainly from long-term economic ventures, like tourism and loans, and potential new allies that are inexpensive to win over, analysts say. American diplomatic cables released through WikiLeaks and published in the British newspaper The Guardian quoted diplomats as being increasingly worried about the Chinese presence here “less than 190 miles from the United States” and speculating on its purpose.
 
One theory, according to a 2003 cable, suggested that China was lining up allies as “a strategic move” for the eventual end of the Castro era in Cuba, with which it has strong relations. But the public line today is to be untroubled. “I am not particularly worried, but it is something the U.S. should continue to monitor,” said Dennis C. Shea, the chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, a bipartisan Congressional panel. But, he added, “With China you have to be wary of possible policy goals behind the effort.” This archipelago, less than a one-hour flight from Florida, has gotten particular attention from the Chinese. Aside from the new stadium, with its “China Aid” plaque affixed prominently at the entrance, Chinese workers here in the Bahamas are busy helping build the $3.5 billion Baha Mar, one of the region’s largest mega resorts.

Beyond that, a Chinese state bank agreed in recent weeks to put up $41 million for a new port and bridge, and a new, large Chinese Embassy is being built downtown. The new stadium here, Bahamian officials said, was in part a reward for breaking ties with Taiwan in 1997 and establishing and keeping relations with China. It is one of several sporting arenas that China has sprinkled in Caribbean and Central American nations as gratitude for their recognition of “one China” — in other words, for their refusal to recognize Taiwan, which Chinese officials consider part of their country. “They offered a substantial gift and we opted for a national stadium,” said Charles Maynard, the Bahamian sports minister, adding that his government could never have afforded to build it on its own.

 In this enduring tug of war with Taiwan, others have switched, too, with a little financial encouragement. Grenada ended relations with Taiwan in 2004, and it is now in talks with China about getting a new national track and field stadium. The parting has not been entirely amicable; Taiwan and Grenada are now locked in a financial dispute over loans that Grenada received to finance the construction of its airport. Determined not to be sidelined, Taiwan is seeking to solidify its existing relationships with countries like Belize, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Lucia — which in 2007 broke relations with China in favor of Taiwan — with a bevy of projects, many of them agricultural, including an agreement signed with Belize in recent weeks to develop the fish farming industry there. Still, Taiwanese diplomats in the region conceded that they could never keep up with China’s largess but continued to make strategic investments in the Caribbean. There are some commodities in the region that China wants.

In August, a Chinese company, Complant, bought the last three government sugar estates in Jamaica and leased cane fields, for a total investment of $166 million. Last year, Jamaica for the first time shipped its famed Blue Mountain Coffee to China. The Jamaican government has also received several hundred million dollars in loans from China, including $400 million announced in 2010 over five years to rebuild roads and other infrastructure. “In order to be prosperous you need to build roads first,” said Adam Wu, an executive with China Business Network, a consulting group for Chinese businesses that has been making the case for China in several Caribbean countries.

Several analysts in the Caribbean say they believe that China eventually will emerge as a political force in the region, with so many countries indebted to it, at a time when the United States is perceived as preoccupied with the Middle East and paying little attention to the region. “They are buying loyalty and taking up the vacuum left by the United States, Canada and other countries, particularly in infrastructure improvements,” said Sir Ronald Sanders, a former diplomat from Antigua and Barbuda. “If China continues to invest the way it is doing in the Caribbean, the U.S. is almost making itself irrelevant to the region,” he added. “You don’t leave your flank exposed.” In some places, Chinese contractors or workers have stayed on, beginning to build communities and businesses.

So many have opened in Roseau, Dominica, that local merchants have complained about being squeezed out. immigration over the past century, but locals are now seeing more Chinese restaurants and shops, as well as other signs of a new immigrant generation. “I am second-generation Trinidadian-Chinese, and like most of us of this era, we have integrated very well in society, having friends, girlfriends, spouses and kids with people of other ethnicities,” said Robert Johnson-Attin, 36, a mechanical engineer now with his own successful business. “It’ll only be a matter of time before it happens with the Chinese coming in now.”

Here in the Bahamas, Tan Jian, the economic counselor at the Chinese Embassy, said he that believed “it’s only the start” of the Chinese presence across the Caribbean, casting it as one developing country using its growing economic power to help other developing ones. The Bahamian government, he said, “cannot afford to build huge projects by itself.” While the Chinese built the stadium, the Bahamas is responsible for utility hookups and the roads and landscaping outside it. The $35 million gift “is costing us $50 million,” said Mr. Maynard, the sports minister. “But at the end of the day it will pay for itself” by putting the Bahamas in position to host major sporting events and reap the tourism revenue that comes with that. For Baha Mar, the Chinese Export-Import Bank is financing $2.6 billion, nearly three-quarters of the cost, and China’s state construction company is a partner.

The Bahamas agreed to allow up to 8,000 foreign workers, most of them Chinese, to work on the project in stages, but it also required employment for 4,000 Bahamians, dampening concerns that Chinese workers were taking jobs. American companies will also take part in building and running it. Mr. Jian played down any economic competition with the United States, whose tourists, he asserted, stood to benefit from China’s presence in the Caribbean. The Chinese workers here live in barracks behind the project fences, largely shielded from public view. “We hardly know they are here,” said James Duffy, watching a track practice next to the stadium one recent afternoon, adding with a chuckle: “Except for the big things they build.”  

Karla Zabludovsky contributed reporting from Mexico City, Camilo Thame from Kingston, Jamaica, and Prior Beharry from Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago .


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X-Post from Island Business: A New Era of Geopolitics In The Region

Michael O’Keefe•


Last month, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Fiji. There has been much speculation about the purpose of the visit, but this needs to be contextualised so we can make sense of its significance.

The extremes of opinion waiver between arguing that the visit heralds a major shift in the foreign affairs of the Pacific to arguing that it was simply routine diplomacy. It was neither. We need to dig deeper. We need to ask Why Fiji [the South Pacific?]? Why Now?

An overarching answer to these questions is geopolitics and strategic change. Geopolitics relates to the intersection of geography and politics. It focuses on shifts in relative power and what we are witnessing is a larger global geopolitical contest being played out in the Pacific.

To-date most discussion of regional strategic affairs has focused on China’s growing interest and whether this equates to influence. This is an issue worthy of attention but not the focus here. Suffice to say, the era of crude chequebook diplomacy whereby China and Taiwan faced off in the Pacific over diplomatic recognition is over.

China is engaging the Pacific at all levels (diplomatic, economic, cultural) and is staking its claim to being a worthy partner, especially in the context of Australian and New Zealand isolation of, and disengagement from Fiji.

Michael O’Keefe

"The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power.

This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation.

The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region."

China’s growing interests in the region have not gone unnoticed in Washington and Canberra (and Moscow).
US President Barack Obama’s recent comments about the renewed US role in the Pacific century have highlighted the potential for strategic competition in the region the likes of which have not been seen since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Back then the issue was Soviet fishing agreements, which were seen as avenues for access for intelligence gathering in an area of primary strategic concern to the US and to its allies, Australia and New Zealand.
Fears over Soviet penetration in the region were proven to be exaggerated, but they did prompt a diplomatic reaction. The same is happening now but in the lead-up to the visit the Russian Foreign Minister himself highlighted that now it is Russia attempting to balance the US and China rather than being the main strategic competitor.

Why now? The most obvious answer to this question relates to global geopolitical changes. That is, that a rising China is challenging the US and that it is responding. Countries like Russia, South Korea and Indonesia see that their interests could be impacted and are taking action. This orthodox view is dealt with in-depth in the commentary so it won’t be a focus here.

The rest of this article focuses on issues closer to home.

It may also not be a coincidence that political instability in Fiji after the 1987 coup wrong footed the traditional metropolitan powers in relation to local support for protecting their strategic interests. At this stage, it was the potential for Soviet expansionism in an area that had hitherto been Australia and New Zealand’s patch.

Interestingly, at the time China also took note insofar as political change created opportunities for Taiwan to gain some headway, albeit briefly. Now it is arguable that China is benefitting from political change in Fiji and it is not only the Americans and their Australian and New Zealand partners that are taking note.

The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power. This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation. The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region.

This is a colonial legacy, but one which Fijian leaders from Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to the present have fostered. The hub may relate to the diplomatic missions that serve many Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum or Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the headquarters of major intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, or non government organisations in Suva, the University of the South Pacific etc.

The hub also relates to Suva as a major economic hub for exports, the trans-shipment of essential supplies, such as fuel, etc. Economics is often cited as a core strategic issue, but in perspective Pacific trade with any of the interested external powers is relatively small in comparison to their economic interests elsewhere.
Even the most generous predictions would not place the Pacific in the top 20 trading partners for the countries competing for influence in the region.

Furthermore, for the foreseeable future the potential for significant growth may be more illusory than real in all areas (such as mining seabed resources) except tourism which will maintain its traditional position as an area where the potential for growth can be realised. As such we can largely discount the economic angle at this stage, despite much commentary on the bauxite mining and fishing agreements.

However, PICS are right to be concerned over unsustainable economics in relation to mining or fisheries. It is the strategic aspect of geopolitics that provides the clearest explanation for Russia’s recent diplomatic manoeuvring.

Fiji gives a country or organisation access to the Pacific. It is an economy of scale, and for a country rediscovering the Pacific, such as Russia is now, it is essential to be on good terms with the Fijian government to reap the benefits of the hub. As such, the Foreign Minister’s meetings involved the Fijian government, but other PICs were invited to meet and attend diplomatic functions in Nadi.

Fiji’s ‘Look North’ policy has opened the door to greater cooperation. In this context Russia’s advances could be added to a long list of countries that have increased their profiles in the Pacific since 2006, not least of which is China, South Korea, Indonesia, the US and UAE. Discussions with other countries, and organisations, such as the Arab League are also underway.

Suva has also reasserted its leadership role. It has been suspended from the pre-eminent regional organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum, following the 2006 coup. However, it has effectively used the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) whose members include the larger PICs to forward its interests.
The MSG also highlights that there is an alternative to the PIF and one which is more relevant to Fiji’s interests than the other PICs.

During the Cold War the catch cry was “The Russians are coming! Run for the hills”. The concern over Russian diplomacy in the South Pacific is reminiscent of this sort of thinking. But context counts and the South Pacific of 2012 is not the South Pacific of 1980s.

Furthermore, the hub, Fiji, is not the Fiji of the 1980s either. There is a growing confidence in Fijian foreign affairs and the expectation is that the partnership and friendship posed by any country will be closely scrutinised through the lens of Fijian national interests.

The time when any great power would overtly influence Fijian diplomacy may be at an end, with obvious implications for traditional partners or new players on the block. There are dangers and vulnerabilities that come hand in hand with the opportunities to be gained from the greater attention that great powers are showing the Pacific.

Some of the distortions evidenced during the era of checkbook diplomacy come to mind, and this will be the issue in relation to recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There are already rumours of millions of dollars being spent to influence the votes of some PICs.

Furthermore, Russia’s main competitor in this regard, Georgia, has also been showing interest with increased aid and diplomatic representations. Russia has directly stated that Abkhazia is not the issue and Lavrov did not publicly raise it while visiting the Pacific, but this denial and Georgia’s interest should be treated as a signal of the opposite.

Any PICs building close relations would be factoring this into their engagement, especially considering Georgia broke off relations with Tuvalu over this issue last month. Global geopolitical reordering is playing out in the Pacific. The post-2006 diplomatic standoff has led to diplomatic opportunities. Fijian leaders are showing a new confidence by taking advantage of these opportunities and so too have many foreign powers that have hitherto shown little interest in the region.

Through Fiji’s leadership and role as a regional hub other PICs have also reaped the benefits of these developments. There are benefits and costs involved in this sudden interest, but PICs are showing greater confidence in viewing the benefits of cooperation through the lens of national interest.

Maintaining this focus will be their challenge as this trend intensifies in the years ahead.

• Dr Michael O’Keefe is a Senior Lecturer at La Trobe University & Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for Regional Affairs, University of Fiji.

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