Showing posts with label Fiji geo-politics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Fiji geo-politics. Show all posts

Thursday, September 01, 2011

Pacific Forum, Fiji & The Moral Zeitgeist.

Pacific Scoop article, highlighted the media "pre-briefing" on this week's Pacific Islands Forum 40th anniversary and high level meeting complete with some new guests and members, Australia's first female Prime Minister, Julia Gillard, Commonwealth Secretary General, Kamalesh Sharma. 

Notable inclusions are UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon and the EC President Jose Manuel Borosso, both of whom are earmarked to address the Forum leaders in a dedicated session, to address regional matters of concern to them- as if the re-occurring Middle-East conflicts, the current European Financial calamities are not enough for these distinguished individuals to deal with.

Although, UN Secretary General may use the recent renaming of Asia group to Asia-Pacific, as a good enough excuse to fly to New Zealand and maybe watch the Rugby World Cup, as well as escaping the heat from the leaked report about UN military observers in Libya; EC President may not have the same luxury of escaping from responsibilities of the cascading Eurozone debacle of debt, but may use the aspect of ACP-EU trade negotiations as one; a thorny issue which a recent SiFM post addressed.

Roman Grynberg On Pacific Islands Forum"
For the islands leaders, driven as they are by the immediate political and financial concerns, the Forum communiqué is largely irrelevant.
The main objective of the Forum meeting is to be seen there with the great and the good (and the not-so-good); to go to cocktail parties and avoid aggravating their paymasters in Canberra and Wellington.
[...]
As it stands, the Forum summit is hardly even part of the problem, just a reflection of a sad reality where Australia and New Zealand pretend to solve problems and islands leaders pretend to care."

While Fiji has been suspended from the Forum and will not be present at the 42nd meeting in New Zealand, there are already some precursors of contempt and cracks in the regional edifice, reinforced with neo-colonial underpinnings.

First, were recent remarks from a leader of a client state, Samoa's Prime Minister, Tuilaepa Sa’ilele Malielegaoi which appeared in Pacific Islands Report article.

Malielegaoi's abrasive remarks were diluted and rebuffed by comments from Roman Grynberg a former senior Forum official stating that, it was pointless for a forum without Fiji.
"It becomes a patent nonsense, and it becomes obvious once officials in Canberra and Wellington start thinking about it," said Mr Grynberg, who is now based in Africa.
"So until that matter is resolved, I honestly don't see how the forum will be capable of saying very much."
Grynberg had earlier punched holes squarely into sentiments raised by New Zealand's Prime Minister, John Key's speech at Auckland University in mid-August, which touted the importance of sustainable development, according to Pacific Scoop.
PINA article published the entirety of Grynberg's views. The excerpt of the Grynberg's opinion article:

Making the Forum accountable and honest

By Online Editor
12:18 pm GMT+12, 09/08/2011, Fiji

PIFS Executive in 2010
By Dr Roman Grynberg for Islands Business Magazine, August 201, www.islandsbusiness.com

For years journalists would berate me at the Pacific Islands Forum Secretariat for what they saw as the sheer uselessness of the annual leaders meetings and the empty promises they would make each year and then never do anything to implement.

Then one day, one of my many superiors at the Forum Secretariat asked me to review the various communiqués of the leaders’ summits and the results would have been funny if the reality of the yawning gap between what was promised and the facts on the ground were not so wide. The journalists were right!

If the over than 30 years of the Forum’s existence leaders had implemented half the commitments they had made, the Pacific islands would be the best run countries on earth. Alas, in general. neither is true and the commitments are rarely kept.

So why does it happen? The first reason is that the developed countries have an agenda at Forum meetings and they press it as hard as possible.

The agenda in Canberra has too often been negative—the AusAid bureaucrats and low level ministers who run Pacific policy would prefer if the islands just went away and didn’t bother them as they are not, with the possible exception of PNG, an important market or source of raw materials.

But since the Solomon Islands’ civil unrest over a decade ago, the sceptre of failed states with the possibility of hundreds of thousands of refugees has haunted Australian policy thinking.

Australia’s wealth is now linked inextricably to Asia and the islands are not even a small part of the formula. So at the Forum meeting, Australian officials are deeply concerned with governance, both political and economic, and the communiqué reflects their concerns.

For the islands leaders, driven as they are by the immediate political and financial concerns, the Forum communiqué is largely irrelevant.

The main objective of the Forum meeting is to be seen there with the great and the good (and the not-so-good); to go to cocktail parties and avoid aggravating their paymasters in Canberra and Wellington.

In the final analysis, the islands leaders know perfectly well that no-one at home is watching and no-one will ever bring them to book for not implementing their Forum promises.

After all, there is no election or accountability at a regional level and who in the islands actually reads the promises in any case?

On top of all that where the commitments do theoretically matter, the leaders always have the perfect defence that there was never the money from Canberra and Wellington to implement those commitments.

The last time I was at the Forum meeting in 2009, I made one of those moves you know will be part of a ‘career breaker’ and I tried to do something about this deplorable situation. I went to the executive and asked to call a staff meeting to see whether there was any way the Forum leaders could be made more accountable.

Reluctantly, those above me agreed and we called a general meeting on how we could better assure implementation. While most of the staff are good people, utterly committed to the islands as a whole, the executive was quietly aghast and either never saw or cared about the problem of implementation.

I had proposed two measures I felt were central to making the leaders’ summit and its communiqué a document of some meaning to the lives of the people of the South Pacific.

These suggestions included an independent and public review mechanism, perhaps every few years, to see how each country was actually implementing what it had promised and secondly, that there be a budget presented within 90 days of the Leader’s summit itemizing the actual cost of implementing the promises made and who was going to pay i.e. Canberra and Wellington.

These two measures would deflate the hubris of our leaders and make Canberra and Wellington think more than twice before getting Pacific islands leaders to make commitments which would have to be covered by real dollars.

My staff at the Forum politely laughed at me and said they would not waste their time preparing papers on a subject they knew the sycophants would never allow to leave the Forum gates. They were right of course and the matter died an unnatural death.

In September leaders will meet in Auckland to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the region’s paramount political institution. The Australians and New Zealanders will celebrate their continued dominance and unquestioned role as paymasters and hence scriptwriters for the region’s political agenda.

The islands leaders who will attend the Forum meeting have never paid heed to the concerns of the founding fathers of the Forum who in the early 1970s considered that including Australia and New Zealand would produce exactly these sorts of lamentable results. Just like the current generation, money and power got in the way of common sense and the right of free men to express their views.

At Auckland, the Forum leaders will celebrate their existence, make lofty promises yet again and waste another opportunity to be part of the solution to region’s growing list of problems.

As it stands, the Forum summit is hardly even part of the problem, just a reflection of a sad reality where Australia and New Zealand pretend to solve problems and islands leaders pretend to care.....PNS (ENDS)

• These are the personal views of Dr Grynberg who until 2009 was the Director of Economic Governance at the Forum Secretariat until he was removed.


Island Business article outlined that Fiji was using its back channels, calling for the current Forum chair, Neori Slade (also from Samoa) to step down, and be replaced with suitable candidate from Melanesia.

Fiji's parallel engagement of island leaders summit is starkly different in terms of the attendees and agendas. However, the high stakes aspect of these competing summits and geopolitical outcomes, is an entangled web of diplomatic and cultural relationships, which cannot be over stated.

Two outstanding articles that used Wikileaks cables undergirds a systematic pattern, orchestrated largely by Canberra and by connivance, Wellington.

WikiLeaks cables reveal Australian government divisions over Fijian junta

By Patrick O’Connor
1 September 2011
US diplomatic cables recently published by WikiLeaks have revealed sharp tactical divisions within the Australian Labor government over the Fijian military regime. In 2009, amid rising fears that China was gaining strategic ground in the region, Labor’s parliamentary secretary for Pacific Island affairs, Duncan Kerr, secretly urged Washington to pressure Prime Minister Kevin Rudd into abandoning his “hardline” stance and reaching an accommodation with the junta.

The cable describing the discussion between Kerr and US diplomatic officials, titled “Australia rethinking its Fiji policy”, was sent from Canberra on August 14, 2009 by the American ambassador to Australia, Daniel Clune. Classified “NOFORN” (not releasable to foreign nationals), it was sent to the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency, US embassies throughout the South Pacific as well as in Paris, and the US Pacific Command in Hawaii.


Under a subheading, “Diplomatic dead-end?” the cable reported: “With Fiji’s suspension from the PIF [Pacific Islands Forum] and imminent suspension from the Commonwealth, Kerr expressed concern that Australia will have ‘exhausted’ its diplomatic arsenal with no clear next step. He questioned the utility of gradually reducing engagement with Fiji, and appeared supportive of an idea by the GOA’s [government of Australia] High Commissioner in Fiji to conduct ‘a surprise gesture of goodwill’ towards the military regime.”

Under another subheading, “Searching for a way out,” the cable reported Kerr’s advice that junta leader Frank Bainimarama “cannot give up power as he would end up at the mercy of his enemies,” and that “the international community should find a safe way for him to step down.” Kerr warned that Bainimarama could be ousted by “less senior officers [who] are getting the taste of being in power”, and emphatically concluded that the junta leader will “either be shot or we’ll have to do business with him”.


After noting that “a decision to change course must ultimately come from Prime Minister Rudd”, Kerr “encouraged US ideas on how to address Fiji”. He urged Washington to “ask us the obvious questions” about what happens if Fiji’s suspension from the Commonwealth produces no results. In the cable, Ambassador Clune then commented: “Kerr’s request for the US to ask ‘the obvious questions’ appears to be an attempt to spur re-evaluation of Australia’s Fiji policy. It seems that the GOA is on cruise control toward increasing disengagement with Fiji, without achieving any desired effect.”


The extraordinary episode underscores the extent of the longstanding crisis confronting the Australian government in the South Pacific—and the cynicism of Canberra’s claims that it supports “democracy” in Fiji.

In December 2006, the Fijian military seized power in a coup. A US diplomatic cable sent shortly afterwards confirmed that then Australian prime minister John Howard considered a military intervention, but decided that an invasion was “not in Australia’s national interest”. The cable added that Howard “could not countenance Australian and Fijian troops fighting one another on the streets of Suva”. The Australian and New Zealand governments instead imposed diplomatic sanctions and moved to isolate Fiji internationally as a means of forcing a return to civilian rule.


Canberra and Wellington were never concerned for the democratic rights of ordinary Fijians. They instead feared that the coup would trigger political instability across the South Pacific, undermining their economic and strategic interests, and, above all, opening the door for China to gain ground. A US cable sent from Canberra in January 2008, noted that “Rudd is especially concerned with Chinese influence in the Pacific and sees Australian leverage ebbing thanks to massive Chinese aid flows.”

By 2009 it was clear to everyone that the sanctions regime was not advancing US-Australian interests. Bainimarama defied Canberra’s diktats and deepened ties with Beijing, receiving significant Chinese financial, diplomatic, and military support.


The Chinese government contemptuously dismissed Australia’s entreaties to toe the line on Fiji. US cables previously published by WikiLeaks revealed a highly unusual diplomatic incident in February 2009, when Beijing lied to Canberra about a visit to Fiji by Vice President Xi Jinping that involved the announcement of major new aid and investment projects (see “WikiLeaks cables reveal Chinese vice president’s secret visit to Fiji, in defiance of Australia”).


The affair clearly raised alarm bells both in Canberra and Washington. A rift within the Australian foreign policy establishment was evident with the publication in April 2009 of a report by the government-funded Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) think-tank that urged a rapprochement with Bainimarama. ASPI warned that sanctions had “pushed Fiji away from its traditional friends to others, notably China”. The latest round of WikiLeaks’ published cables now make clear that these tactical divisions extended right into Rudd’s cabinet.


Immediately after the 2006 coup in Suva, the US made clear to Australia that it would not sacrifice its independent interests in relation to Fiji. Canberra wanted Fijian soldiers barred from UN peacekeeping operations, to remove a lucrative source of income for the military and place greater pressure on the coup leaders. Washington refused to countenance this, because Fijian soldiers played a useful role in assisting its imperialist operations in the Middle East.


A US cable sent from Canberra on the day of the coup in Fiji described the issue of peacekeepers as a “US redline”. A US State Department official instructed Australian and New Zealand officials that there could be no “rush to remove Fiji’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations, noting the importance of Fiji to UN peacekeeping operations in Baghdad and elsewhere”. Another cable explained: “we are looking for steps that put pressure on Fiji but are not detrimental to larger US interests.”


The leaked cables have revealed that in September 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton invited Fiji’s UN representative to a meeting of Pacific Island officials in New York during a UN General Assembly summit. One cable refers to “Australian and New Zealand concerns” about the initiative, but the Fijian government apparently declined the invitation. Australian National Security Advisor Duncan Lewis told the US embassy in Canberra that the failure to accept Clinton’s invitation was a “blunder” on Fiji’s part, adding that he was not surprised that Bainimarama had “missed another opportunity”.


One year later, in September 2010, another US invitation was extended and this time accepted, with Fiji’s foreign affairs minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola speaking with Clinton and other Pacific leaders in an hour-long meeting in New York. Clinton told Kubuabola that the US wanted “dialogue and partnership with Fiji”, and the State Department subsequently indicated that they accepted Bainimarama’s proposed “road map” for elections in 2014.


This marked an apparent breach between Australia and the US on a key policy issue in the South Pacific. Recently, however, the US appears to have shifted back to support for sanctions and diplomatic isolation. Last June, a State Department delegation conducted a week-long tour of the western Pacific, but excluded Fiji. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell denied any differences with Canberra on their approach towards the junta.


The various diplomatic shifts no doubt reflect continued behind-the-scenes discussions between the Australian and American governments over how to forge a pliant administration in Fiji and sideline Beijing.

The ruthlessness of these calculations clearly emerges in the US cables that describe Australian moves to instigate an economic crisis in Fiji without causing a complete collapse that could backfire on Canberra.


In August 2009, Kerr told US officials: “We’ve made a cabinet-level decision that we don’t want to see Fiji move to a social and economic collapse.” The cable continued: “He [Kerr] said that Australia would be responsible for picking up a failed state, at a cost much higher than the GOA’s intervention in the Solomon Islands.” Another cable sent from Canberra in October 2009 reported: “Australia supports International Monetary Fund (IMF) engagement (with tough conditionality) sooner rather than later ‘when the inevitable fall comes’, so that people and processes are already in place to pick up the pieces.”


Earlier in 2009, according to one US cable, New Zealand’s foreign minister Murray McCully privately indicated that “perhaps things need to get much worse in Fiji before Fijians themselves decide to create the circumstances under which the international community can help things improve”.

What is apparent throughout these cables is the callous disregard for the plight of ordinary Fijian people as the US, Australia and New Zealand all manoeuvre to protect their economic and strategic interests in the South Pacific against rival China.


The end result of these protracted neo-colonial bullying in the Pacific region, is examined by Susan Merrell, which was published in Solomon Star.

Sex, lies and diplomatic cables; Wikileaks, SI and the Moti Affair

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With the leaking of embarrassing diplomatic cables, Susan Merrell asks whose best interests are really served by the continuing deployment of RAMSI in the Solomon Islands?

  They say there’s no such thing as objectivity, even in journalism – one person’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter.

Language is revealing.  No more so than in the recently released Wikileaks cables from the US Embassy in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea which must be proving to be a source of great embarrassment. 
The cables display a profound disrespect and contempt for the Solomon Islands’ government. 
The intemperate language suggests disdain.

Robert Fitts, the US Ambassador is the authorand, as there is no diplomatic US mission in Honiara, it is reasonable to assume that the US is using their ‘deputy in the Pacific’ – Australia as their source.

One cable, dated 22 September 2006, deals with the political situation in the Solomon Islands at that time. It was sent to Washington, Canberra, Wellington and Honolulu.

Under section headings “AN ODIOUS A/G [Moti]”, “AN ERRATIC PM [Sogavare] “BIRDS OF A FEATHER” and “AN UNPREDICTABLE PARLIAMENT”,the diplomatic cable slanders many prominent members of Solomon Islands’ political society including the then Prime Minister and members of his cabinet.

The arguably libellous accusations stand as justification for the writer to canvass ways to influence the then upcoming vote of ‘no confidence’ against the Prime Minister while maintaining an official position of not interfering in the political affairs of a sovereign nation.

Many of the assertions in the cable are, at best, widely inaccurate, suffering from egregious omissions - the assertions coming from a jaundiced and self-interested viewpoint.  At worst, there are lies and distortions of the truth.

The cable fires its first bullet at Julian Moti.

It’s widely known that Moti who had been appointed attorney general of the Solomon Islands just days before this cable was written has been fighting charges of child-sex tourism in the Australian courts since his arrest in Brisbane 2007. 

There’s a plethora of evidence that this charge was to remove Moti from political influence. With the release of this cable it has become even more evident.

The cable uses increasingly pejorative adjectives to describe Moti saying: “In a region strewn with dubious characters, Moti is particularly odious.” 

On what do they base this?The cable makes four accusations in support.

Firstly Fitt accuses Moti of, “In 1994 […] pressing the then Governor General to bring down a government which was trying to assert control over Malaysian/Chinese logging companies which had retained Moti.” 
Whereas, the truth of the matter is that Moti only ever once represented a logging company and this was in an industrial dispute. In this matter, he appeared with Dr Gavan Griffith, former Solicitor-general of Australia.

Moti’s position was, in fact, anti-logging, not pro-logging as the cable suggests and in this, he often found himself at odds with his political allies. 
In a sworn affidavit dated March 27, 2009 he states: “Notwithstanding my friendship with many leaders of the […] Government, I did disagree with a number of policy decisions made by the Government in relation to logging…” The year in question was 1995.

Secondly, referring to the charges of the alleged rape of a 13-year-old girl in Vanuatu in 1997, the cable says, “he [Moti] beat the rap” on a technicality, as if that was illegal or immoral while the cable studiously ignores the questionable actions of the prosecution in their desperation to have Moti removed from political influence in the Solomon Islands.
And questionable they have been. In a statement made on video three days before his death Mr Ariipaea Salmon, the father of Moti’s alleged victim slammed the “mighty Australian government’ for using his daughter to “take over a country [The Solomon Islands]”.

The Australian authorities were not deterred from prosecution even knowing that in 1997/1998 the alleged victim had lied in a sworn statement.

They even went as far as to obtain an indemnity against charges of perjury. Ariipaea Salmon claims that the family were coerced into co-operating with the Australian prosecution and their testimony coached.

Furthermore, as I write, the High Court of Australia is considering whether to grant Moti a permanent stay of prosecution because of an alleged abuse of process that had Australian authorities “conniving and colluding” in his illegal deportation in 2007.

Justice Heydon, one of seven judges hearing the appeal of former Attorney General Julian Moti, conceded that although Moti’s 2007 illegal deportation from the Solomon Islands was a decision of the Solomon Islands’ government, Australia failed to fulfil its mandated role (under RAMSI).
“We [Australia] went to the Solomon Islands in order to restore the rule of law,” he said. “What happened on 27 December [the illegal deportation] did not involve the Australian Government participating in a process of restoring the rule of law.”

As for the cable’s assertion that subsequent to the Vanuatu court case Moti was “…made unwelcome in Vanuatu.” 

This is simply wrong as Moti retained property interests in Vanuatu where the sometime lessee was the Vanuatu government. 

In an affidavit sworn by Moti on 3 June 2009, Moti speaks of visiting Vanuatu as late as March 2006 and meeting with two government ministers and other political affiliates. 

This scenario does not suggest Moti was “unwelcome”- in fact, quite the opposite.

Thirdly, the writer notes Moti’s nationalistic and anti Australian political stance, calling Moti “resentful”.

 The underlying assumption of the whole cable is that anything that is anti-Australian/RAMSI is wrong because the interests of the Solomon Islands should be subjugated to those of Australia/America.

Lastly, the cable expresses the fear that Moti’s first task would be to defend the two politicians, Charles Dausebea and Nelson Ne’e that were then in jail charged with inciting the riots that had their roots in the elections earlier that year. 

With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that both were acquitted of the charges when witnesses, paid by the prosecution to testify, failed to appear in court.

It was in the best interests of Australia/America to compromise Dausebea as according to the cable Dausebea was the only Solomon Islands’ politician that would take on RAMSI “head on.”

Moreover, in another Wikileaked cable of 20 April 2006, the same Robert Fitts writes “Some 180 Australian troops and police arrived in Honiara April 19.  Resident Americans tell us that troops did not deploy to the areas affected until the late hour and general exhaustion had quieted the havoc.”  Why didn’t they?

There were unsubstantiated rumours at the time that RAMSI deliberately let the riots happen.
 Certainly, the riots justified Australia sending even more troops to the Solomon Islands which was pure serendipity considering that yet another wikileaked cable from the same source dated 27 April 2006 contained a note saying: “…members of the most likely new government are indicating that it might reverse a number of Solomon Islands foreign policies, switch recognition from Taiwan to Beijing for example.”
 Their intelligence was correct and it explains much.  Chinese influence in the Solomon Islands would have been the worst-case scenario for Australian/American interests and it was under consideration by this government.

The cable’s next salvo is reserved for Manasseh Sogavare, then Prime Minister and the Solomon Islands’ parliament.

In this section no punches are pulled as it spells out what it believes to be the corrupt nature of Sogavare and how his political manoeuvrings, especially the push to negate RAMSI’s influence, had been designed to perpetuate that corruption.
The cable describes Sogavare as a “con” it calls his initiatives “loopy” and says that: “his [Sogavare’s] government earned a reputation for casual corruption that was notable even by Solomons standards.”

In the most disrespectful of language the cable describes the Solomon Islands cabinet as “odd ducks.”It says that although Foreign Minister, Paterson Oti talks responsibly, he, in practice, “…waddles along the same as the PM.”

The cable states the belief that the only reason that the Solomon Islands parliament wants to loosen its ties with RAMSI is in order to perpetuate corruption – to “…regain the freedom of the cookie jar…” 

Then ominously, the cable goes on to say that it’s “Time to speak”.

And why was it time to speak?  It was because the US wanted to influence the outcome of the upcoming vote of no confidence against the Sogavare government – to interfere in the affairs of a sovereign nation.
The endgame of these diplomatic maneuvers have been pointed out by an earlier SiFM post: "Islanders With A Dragon Tattoo" and a 2009 article written by Dev Nadkarni, published in India Weekender.



Club Em Designs

Thursday, January 13, 2011

The Embedded Point Of View- Fiji Friends & Neighbors



East Asia Forum website published an opinion article from Sandra Tarte of University of South Pacific, regarding Fiji's growing circle of Friends and the circumstances surrounding the geo-political axial shift.



The excerpt:

Fiji’s search for new friends

January 13th, 2011

Author: Sandra Tarte, USP, Suva

In 2010, Fiji marked 40 years of independence. Significantly, the Prime Minister, Commodore Voreqe Bainimarama, chose to celebrate the anniversary at the World Expo in Shanghai, rather than at home.

In many ways, this choice underscored the focus of Fiji’s leadership in 2010, which was to diversify and broaden international partnerships. Motivated by the need to deal with pressing economic problems at home and counter diplomatic sanctions that have isolated it from close neighbours Australia and New Zealand, and from the Pacific Islands Forum, Fiji adopted an increasingly proactive foreign policy in the past year.

This approach was matched by an evident willingness on the part of new and old friends to engage with Fiji and its government, notwithstanding the lack of progress towards democratic elections. This shift reflected a mix of opportunism, pragmatism and geo-political design (if not disquiet on the part of some at the shifting patterns of influence in the region).

Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September, Prime Minister Bainimarama described Fiji’s new foreign policy orientation as an integral part of his Government’s Strategic Framework for Change – the set of reforms that he was committed to implementing before Fiji would return to elected government in 2014. But the search for alternative foreign partners has also been borne out of necessity, as a way to counter the effects of Fiji’s suspension in 2009 from key regional and international groupings (the Pacific islands Forum and Commonwealth).

Although often dubbed Fiji’s ‘Look North Policy’, the foreign policy trend in 2010 was to collaborate with everyone and anyone. Fiji sought membership of the Non Aligned Movement and announced the setting up of three new embassies in 2011 – in Indonesia, Brazil and South Africa. It hosted a visit from a Russian delegation, led by the resident Ambassador in Canberra, which aimed ‘to find concrete areas of cooperation’. Fiji’s Prime Minister and Attorney General also took part in a first-ever Pacific SIDS (Small Island Developing States)-Arab League Summit, which was hosted by Abu Dhabi in June. This initiative appeared to be in appreciation of the support of Pacific island members of the United Nations for the United Arab Emirates’ bid to host the International Renewable Energy Agency. One outcome of this summit was a proposal to open an Arab League office in the Pacific (possibly in Fiji – which was recognised by the Abu Dhabi host as ‘an administrative, economic and geographical hub’ of the region.)

The Pacific-Arab League summit underscored the growing role in the United Nations of the Pacific-SIDS group, and the diminishing significance of the Pacific Islands Forum bloc (of which Australia and New Zealand are members). This appeared to be the direct, though probably inadvertent, consequence of Fiji’s suspension from the Forum. The impact of this shift for Australia was remarked upon when Canada lost a crucial vote for United Nations Security Council rotating membership.

By far the most frequent high-level traffic in 2010 was to China. In part this was due to the World Expo in Shanghai, as mentioned earlier, which was seen as a golden opportunity to promote Fiji’s products and raise its profile (mainly, but not only, to China). There were several so-called trade missions to China led by the Prime Minister, a visit by the Foreign Minister and a visit by the country’s President, at the invitation of the Governor of Ningxia Province. Although the visits appeared mainly exploratory and few concrete outcomes were announced, a number of future deals were mooted, including new arms procurement (to support Fiji’s peacekeeping operations) and Chinese investment in the expansion of the Government shipyard and slipway in Suva.

Not to be outdone, Japan included Fiji’s Foreign Minister in its first ever PALM Ministerial Interim meeting, held in October in Tokyo. (This meeting aimed to follow-up and review the outcomes of the Fifth Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting – PALM 5). The meeting also provided an opportunity for bilateral talks between the Fiji Foreign Minister and his Japanese counterpart, signaling a shift in policy by Japan towards closer engagement with Fiji.

The United States also announced a policy of more direct engagement with the Bainimarama Government in 2010, in line with its broader policy of ‘re-engagement’ with the Pacific islands. But there was little to show for this by the year’s end. Relations soured in the wake of the non-issuing of visas to senior Fiji government officials to attend international meetings, including at the United Nations. This reportedly prompted Prime Minister Bainimarama to suggest the relocation of the UN to China.

These diplomatic disputes with the US echoed tensions that continue to mar Fiji’s relations with its closest developed neighbors and trading partners – Australia and New Zealand. Despite some promising signs at the beginning of the year of a warming of ties, this failed to eventuate. The expulsion of Australia’s acting High Commissioner in July signaled a low-point in bilateral relations, with implications for regional politics.

The context of the diplomatic expulsion was reportedly Australia’s efforts to derail a meeting of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) in Fiji – and deny the Fijian Prime Minister the opportunity to assume chairmanship of the sub-regional group. Fiji had planned to turn the meeting into a broader MSG-Plus (including other Pacific island countries) and build the MSG into an alternative conduit for aid and diplomacy. The sudden cancellation of the meeting by MSG Chair (Vanuatu’s Prime Minister) was viewed by Fiji as a direct result of Australian and New Zealand pressure. But the situation was salvaged by turning the planned event into a politically successful ‘Engaging with the Pacific’ meeting at which Prime Minister Bainimarama played generous host and offered bilateral and regional assistance to his Pacific SIDS neighbors. A reconciliation ceremony in December subsequently served to heal the rift within the MSG between Fiji and Vanuatu.

While there remains support within the Fiji foreign affairs establishment for dialogue and engagement with Australia, New Zealand and the Forum, there is also a sense that time is running out. If Australia and New Zealand do not ‘restore ties’, so the argument goes, a generation of foreign affairs officers will emerge who, along with their counterparts in the Fiji Military Forces , will only know and want to ‘Look North’. Judging by events of the past year, Fiji’s realignment of its international relationships seems set to continue.

Dr Sandra Tarte is Director, Politics and International Affairs Program at the University of the South Pacific in Suva, Fiji.

This is part of a special feature: 2010 in review and the year ahead.

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A different take on the issue of Fiji, was a parting short from Lowy-Institute, Meyer Foundation Melanesia Program, where Jenny Hayward Jones interpreted her perceptions from a skewed prism.


The excerpt from Jones last post from Melanesian Program:

THE MYER FOUNDATION MELANESIA PROGRAM

What have I changed my mind about this year? China in the Pacific

By Jenny Hayward-Jones - 23 December 2010 11:41AM

I have for some time been relatively sanguine about the rise of China in the Pacific. I believed that, like most powers which engage with Pacific Island countries, China wanted a stable and prosperous Pacific region. Chinese trade, aid and investment in the Pacific were good if they created wealth and improved infrastructure. China's truce with Taiwan over the race for diplomatic recognition in the Pacific offered an opportunity for China to mature as a donor.

It is also vital for the Pacific to have access to a greater range of advice than that provided by Australia and New Zealand, and to have advice from other developing countries. China provides an alternative development model that offers some useful lessons for decision-makers in Pacific Islands.

But I am no longer convinced that China is a force for good in the Pacific:

Chinese infrastructure aid does not usually use local suppliers or employ many local citizens, thus constraining opportunities and creating seeds for anti-Chinese sentiment which has, in a number of countries, already resulted in racially-motivated violence.
Pacific Island nations are experiencing or will experience difficulties repaying Chinese loans, resulting in higher debt-to-GDP ratios and downgrading their credit ratings.
China has shown little interest in aid coordination and its methods of aid delivery could undermine the efforts of other donors in some Pacific countries.

The Fiji Government has invoked the Chinese model of development as justification for censoring the media and ruling by decree. This interpretation of the China model, particularly if replicated by other Pacific Island countries, has the potential to wind back progress across the region in governance and transparency.

China's inability to curb illegal Chinese immigration in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere, or to encourage Chinese companies to improve their relations with local communities or address Chinese organised crime, is likely to create more local resentment.

The rapid increase in China-Pacific Islands trade means that the two major trading partners (Australia and China) of most Pacific Island countries are strategic competitors, posing some potentially difficult choices for countries which benefit from the security umbrella provided by Australia.

China's desire to project a global presence through its economic might, diplomacy and its ability to project power into the 'second island chain' raises the possibility that it will come into conflict with US, French, Australian and New Zealand military interests in the Pacific.







It also appears that Meyer Foundation has established a different tack; moving away from the Melanesia Program which Jones was Director of, to the new sub-blog of "The Interpreter" titled "Interpreting The Aid Review".

Equally interesting is the role of Foundations, in the formation of Foreign Policy; heretofore demonstrated as a waste of resources and intellectual capacity.

Poised and seemingly benevolent these financial vehicles are, the capacity for these foundations to dictate what the policy priorities a nation undertakes makes one want to re-think, and review the proceeding steps, determining how far that logic train would extend to.

Another change in tack, also comes from Kevin Rudd, doing a fabulous P.R job in rescuing baggage from Brisbane homes, featured in an ABC video article. Suffice to say, the ABC reporter aided and abetted(even assisting in baggage handling) the PR campaign, that may be perceived as staged. Another embedded reporter?


(Video Posted below)




One should not dismiss, Rudd's ability to seize the window of opportunity, given the situation; since it was Rudd was just visiting troops in the Mid-East, according to the Foreign Minister's own Youtube channel.



Video of Rudd visiting troops and others(posted below):












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Monday, March 23, 2009

Mr. Rudd Goes To Washington

KEVIN Rudd will land in Washington today and encounter an atmosphere vastly different to that of a year ago when he first visited as Prime Minister. Then, George Bush was president, Barack Obama was fighting Hillary Clinton for the Democratic presidential nomination, and the global economic crisis was barely a blip on the radar.

Whether or not the issue of Fiji comes to the forefront of discussion is any one's guess. However the subject of the global economy will undoubtedly be the centre piece of the agenda, coupled with Australia's commitment to provide troops for the surge in Afghanistan.

Australian casualities have risen recently and whether the nation in general has an appetite for more will certainly factor in to the calculus; against the back drop of disdain, for any continuation of John Howard's policies.

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