Radio Australia article interviews former Chinese ambassador to Australia and Washington, Zhou Wenzhong, stating that Australia's stance on the US deployment in the Asia Pacific could be better explained.
Podcast (posted below)
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI) interview. Michael Horowitz talks about his recent
National Bureau of Asian Research piece entitled “How Defense Austerity
Will Test U.S. Strategy in Asia."
Podcast (posted below)
Western Pacific as the Western half of the Pacific Ocean has never been free of major
powers rivalry ever since the end of World War II. The Cold War in Europe got
extended to the Western Pacific which witnessed the United States and the Former
Soviet Union locked in a military tussle.
During
Cold War I the United States put into place a dual strategy for the forward
defence of Mainland USA, far deep into the Western Pacific. It comprised a
spider-web of bilateral security alliances with South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and
Philippines providing for US security guarantees against any Communist threat
from the USSR and China. Secondly, the United States entered into agreements
with these nations, excepting Taiwan, for hosting Forward Military Presence of
US Forces in their territories.
This US
security architecture has held firm ever since then despite the disintegration
of the USSR and the fading away of the Russian threat. Only the Philippines as
part of its China hedging strategy had withdrawn the facility of United States
using its naval and air force bases.
In the
decade when the USSR was in the last throes of disintegration, China had made
significant economic progress by kind courtesy of US and Japanese foreign direct
investments. In the Post -Cold War I Phase, China with a burgeoning economy had
carried out rapid military modernization and up- gradation with aspirations to
emerge as the dominant power in the region of the Western Pacific.
The China
Threat was therefore in the making in the 1990s and fully manifested itself in
the decade of the2000s. China in the pursuit of its great power aspirations had
unleashed unabashedly in the second decade of the 21st Century, what
can be termed as Cold War II comprising designation of Taiwan, Tibet, Xingjian
and the South China Sea as China’s ‘Core Interests” meriting China going to war
to protect its “Core Interests”. Military aggressiveness, armed interventions
and gunboat strategies started emerging from China.
Obviously,
the United States with entrenched strategic and security interests in the
Western Pacific could no longer be a passive spectator The China Threat
manifesting itself in multiple forms to its security and to those of its Allies
in the Western Pacific who shouldered and hosted the US security architecture in
this vital region.
The
security environment emerging in the Western Pacific has both regional and
global military implications. This also has regional and global economic
implications when one remembers that the global shift of economic power to Asia
has primarily arisen from China and Japan.
With the
above in mind, this Paper would like to focus on the following related issues:
Western Pacific: The Strategic Significance for the United States and China
Western Pacific: Notable Features of the Security Environment in 2013
Western Pacific Does Not Lend itself to Conflict Resolution
Future
Perspectives on Western Pacific Security Environment
Western
Pacific: The Strategic Significance for the United States and China
The
strategic significance of the Western Pacific for the United States and China
lies in the geographical configuration whose notable features are as under:
The
Western Pacific rests on the East Asia littoral comprising Russia, China and
Vietnam.
Parallel to the East Asia littoral the Western Pacific run a strategic
islands chain extending from the Korean Peninsula to the Indonesian
archipelago.
This
island chain virtually hems in the East Asia littoral and comprises Japan,
Taiwan and the Philippines. Each of these also having sovereignty over
outlying small islands which are now disputed by China.
The
Western Pacific comprises a number of seas. Starting from the North these
are the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea. Moving a bit
westwards is the Sea of Japan
The
strategic significance for the United States of this geographical configuration
of the Western Pacific emerges from the following military considerations:
The
United States is provided both an outer perimeter of defence of Mainland
United States and a springboard in close proximity to China for a military
intervention.
With a
combination of geographical proximity to Mainland China and the military
deployments of United States and its Allies, this permits a virtual
hemming-in of China in military terms.
In
this island chain configuration only a few corridors exist for the Chinese
Navy to breakout into the wider Pacific Ocean.
To
breakout of such a military gridlock China’s primary strategic priority should
have been to sow doubts on US reliability as a security guarantor of the
countries of the Western Pacific which in turn could unravel the US security
architecture. China succeeded temporarily in this direction in case of South
Korea and Philippines.
More
significantly are the Chinese claims to islands in the South China Sea and East
China Sea. This is not only determined by hydrocarbon reserves but also by the
military factor that these disputed islands in China’s possession would provide
China bases for deployment of its military assets as part of its area denial and
anti-access strategies against US naval and air power intervention.
Such
disputed islands which virtually lie astride vital sea lanes of commerce to
Japan and South Korea and Western United States could be strangulated by China
by deployment of long range anti-ship missiles on these disputed islands.
Western
Pacific: Notable Features of the Security Environment in 2013
The
Western Pacific in 2013 seems to resemble the Cold War I security environment.
The only difference being that the USSR stands replaced by China as the major
threat to Western Pacific security and stability.
Further,
unlike the USSR in Cold War I, which was set in a strategic tussle with only the
United States at the global level, China’s strategic tussle in Cold War II
manifests itself both at the global level in terms of seeking parity with the
United States and at the regional level with Japan , Vietnam and other ASEAN
countries.
In 2013 in
military terms, China by its own aggressive and posturing has generated security
disquiet in all Western Pacific countries and generating a palpable ‘China
Threat” perception.
The first
decade of the 21st Century witnessed The China Threat assuming
dangerous contours due to US military distractions in Afghanistan and Iraq,
leaving China to advance unrestrained in its military expansion.
Sensing
the strategic concerns generated by China in the Asia Pacific, the United States
made a riposte in the nature of the Obama Doctrine incorporating a US ‘strategic
pivot’ to Asia Pacific and ‘rebalancing’ of US military postures in Western
Pacific.
In 2013,
the security environment in Western Pacific seems to be marked by the following:
China’s military aggressiveness and assertiveness becoming noticeably marked
in the South China Sea with ASEAN countries and with Japan in the East China
Sea.
Chinese military brinkmanship is touching dangerous levels and adding to
flashpoints in the Western Pacific
More
than 30% of the colossal Chinese Defence Budget is now being devoted to
build-up of Chinese naval power and force-projection assets.
North
Korea as China’s military protégé and proxy for disruptive activities in the
Western Pacific is not being restrained by China
Countries in the region can be said to be engaged in military acquisitions
and modernisation as a consequence of the above.
Japan
as the pee competitor of China is now actively engaged in rebalancing its
defence postures, including amending its Peace Constitution.
The
United States has gone in for a Southward realignment of its military
deployments permitting better response times against any Chinese armed
conflict in the South China Sea.
Philippines is reconsidering opening the old US bases in its territory for
US reactivation
Reports also suggest that Vietnam may offer the Cam Ranh naval base to the
United States.
In overall
terms, such feverish military or military related activities suggest that the
Western Pacific security environment in 2013 is fast emerging as one pregnant
with explosive possibilities.
Western
Pacific Does Not Lend itself to Conflict Resolution
The
Western Pacific very much like Central Europe in Cold War I seems headed towards
congealed lines of confrontation, though this time it is more in the maritime
domain. Western
Pacific military confrontations are operating at two separate planes. The first
is the overall strategic tussle between the United States and China. China as
the revisionist power would gamble on brinkmanship to achieve its national
aspirations to be counted as a strategic co-equal of USA.
The second
level is of the United States as the status-quo power sustaining its existing
security architecture in the Western Pacific and now reinforcing and rebalancing
it. Basically it would involve that the United States stands by its security
guarantees to its Allies in the region against any armed conflict ensuing from
China on their territorial disputes. This would also include the commitment of a
US nuclear umbrella, in the event of a ‘China Threat’ emanating.
In the
first case, there is no ideological conflict or even any territorial dispute. It
is out and out power struggle which brooks no conflict resolution initiatives.
Can China as part of any conflict resolution initiative be advised to give up
its global aspirations? Can the United Sates be asked that it should now cede
strategic space in the Western Pacific to accommodate China's global
aspirations? The answer in both cases is ‘no’.
In the
second case too where US allies or its new strategic partners and friends are
involved in territorial disputes with China, the latter is not receptive to any
conflict resolution. China resorts to a subterfuge that any dialogue on disputes
can only be bilateral in nature. Inherent in any conflict resolution initiatives
is the involvement of mediators/regional organisations/multi-party mechanisms, a
fact that China is not willing to concede. On both
counts therefore the Western Pacific does not lend itself to any conflict
resolution.
Future
Perspectives on Western Pacific Security Environment
In terms
of perspectives, the Western Pacific security environment offers no scope for
optimism. On the contrary, unless there is slow-down or breakdown in the growth
of Chinese economy, China’s expanding military profile both conventional and
nuclear can be expected to grow.
China’s
resort to political and military brinkmanship is unlikely to cease in the coming
decades. Chinese nationalism is at an all-time high and is likely to grow as the
Chinese regime stokes nationalism to divert attention from China’s growing
domestic unrest and problems.
As China’s
military brinkmanship intensifies on territorial disputes, there is an
increasing likelihood of a US military intervention especially in the case where
Japan is involved. The US secretary of State and the US Defense Secretary have
publicly asserted to that effect.
While
China can be expected to step back from an all-out armed conflict involving the
United States, the reality that is likely to persist is that a Cold War template
will persist in the future in the Western Pacific.
Also what
needs to be noted that in terms of military perspectives any future conflict in
the Western Pacific would primarily be maritime in nature to begin with. Hence
the current race in the Western Pacific amongst all protagonists for build-up of
naval warfare capabilities and submarines.
Concluding
Observations
In the
Western Pacific intersect most intensely the strategic interests and power
tussle between the United States and China. Also intersecting within this
overall framework are the regional power rivalries between China and Japan and
between China and Vietnam and the Philippines on the South China Sea islands
disputes.
Increasingly, the United States would tend to get drawn in regional disputes
between US Allies and friends with China. The United States would not be allowed
the luxury of ‘strategic detachment’ from the prevailing Western Pacific
security environment. It would then run the risk of witnessing the unravelling
of its security architecture in the region
The United
States will ultimately have to resort a containment strategy against China in
the Western Pacific.
(
Subhash Kapila is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is
Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. Email:drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com)
Territorial disputes in the South China Sea have divided ASEAN and caused friction between China and the United States.But that's not the only place in the Asia-Pacific where the world's two biggest powers are competing for influence.
Later this month Pacific Island leaders will hold their annual forum in the Cook Islands.Both the US and China are sending powerful delegations and, for the first time, an American Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will attend.
Pacific correspondent Sean Dorney reports. (Video posted below)
In the days of the Cold War, the Pacific firmly belonged to the United States’ Pacific Fleet. The Pacific consisted, in the minds of US military strategists as a theatre, a wide expanse of ocean with a sprinkling of islands and dreamy islanders in grass skirts swaying on white sandy beaches like the coconut palms to the strum of ukuleles.
Simplistic, perhaps, but that is how the islander felt he was being treated.
If the US needed to dump highly toxic nuclear waste or test nuclear weaponry, or even transport nuclear arsenal through the region, it did not feel anybody deserved the courtesy of being informed.
The ANZUS Treaty collapsed as a direct result of this arrogant stance by the US.
But times are a-changing.
US influence in the region, while still very influential, is being challenged both militarily and economically by the rising might of China and India.
What does it all mean for little nations in the South Pacific like Papua New Guinea?
The first thing really is to wake up to the fact that this geopolitical game is being played.
So far it has been behind in these considerations, perhaps because quality and up to date advice at that global and regional level has not been going to government or if it has then it has been ignored.
Either way such ignorance or neglect is very costly as we shall see.
This country does not have a comprehensive national security policy which would take into account regional and global socio-economic-political-security realities and their implications on the nation.
A national security policy would tell Papua New Guinean politicians that the Ramu nickel/cobalt mine does not need to enjoy a 10-year tax holiday and other concessions running into tens of millions of kina that have been given away at tremendous future cost to this nation.
This mine is not merely a financial economic investment. It is also an extension of Chinese geo-political interests in the region.
...The first thing really is to wake up to the fact that
this geopolitical game is being played...
It has the blessing of the Chinese government. The benefits, while huge to PNG, are negligible to China but, through the company, that country has gained a foothold here.
Likewise, the massive investment by ExxonMobil, the US petroleum giant, in the PNG liquefied natural gas project. It too has received concessions which will in time appear as if our leaders have robbed the cradle, it has given away the wealth of future generations.
The US government has more than a passing interest in this project if the lead role played by the US credit agency in the financing of the project is any indication. It too would have happened and did not need the concessions.
Progressively, the people and governments in the region are coming more and more into focus as both China and the United States compete for strategic influence and control.
The US is moving its Okinawa military base to Guam. The United States has stepped up its commitment to work with its Pacific Island partners with the second visit to the region by the US assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Kurt M. Campbell, and the Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Cecil Haney, with an interagency delegation.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton will, for the first time, attend a South Pacific Forum annual meet in the Cook Islands later this month.
US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta announced in Singapore last weekend that by 2020, the greater part of the American naval forces – including six aircraft carrier battle groups as well as a majority of the navy’s cruisers, destroyers, Littoral Combat ships and submarines – will be stationed in the Asia-Pacific.
Following a visit to PNG, Australia and New Zealand by the Chinese vice-premier last year, Clinton did exactly the same.
China seeks, it appears, nothing less than an historic shift in the Asia-Pacific balance of power.
For a long time it has been contained in the confines of its territorial boundaries but with increasing economic might, the temptation is natural to break the strangle hold the might US Pacific Fleet has enjoyed in this region since World War II.
It will want to break out and protect the sea lanes of South China and South East Asian seas.
Last year alone, almost US$6 trillion in trade was plied along the sea
routes off South Korea, Japan, China and Vietnam, while half of all global trade passed through the Indian Ocean.
A crisis in either body of water would affect the entire world economy.
PNG might not contribute to a crisis were that to occur but it stands to gain by being conscious of what goes on in the wider world rather than be inward looking all the time.
Over the past two weeks, American military commanders and strategic
analysts, undoubtedly acting in close consultation with the Obama
administration, have publicly criticized the size of Australia’s defense
budget.
The criticisms amount to an open intervention into
Australian politics, seeking to pressure the minority Labor government
to boost military spending in order to ensure that Australian forces can
serve as a credible partner in the US preparations for a confrontation
with China in the Asia-Pacific region.
The Labor government has
already clearly aligned itself with the US. In 2009, it released a Defense White Paper, which named China as a potential threat for the
first time, and announced that Australia would spend over $100 billion
on new ships, aircraft and other military hardware during the next two
decades.
That alignment was intensified after Julia Gillard was
installed as prime minister in mid-2010. The Obama administration
tacitly backed the ousting of her predecessor, Kevin Rudd, in an
inner-party political coup as he was regarded as being insufficiently in
tune with Washington’s confrontational approach to China.
WSWS
"
Obama administration’s concentration of US military power in the Asia-Pacific
“is not an opportunity for a free ride by anybody—not Japan, not Australia, or anybody else."
In
November 2011, Gillard and President Barack Obama announced agreements
to develop key staging bases for US air, sea and marine operations in
northern and western Australia, requiring major upgrades to ports and
airbases. Earlier this year, plans were unveiled to develop the Cocos
Islands in the Indian Ocean as a base for US drone aircraft, also
necessitating hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure
development.
The US-Australia agreements form one component of
the US “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific. The Obama administration has sought
to cement alliances, strategic partnerships and basing arrangements with
a number of countries in Asia, with the intention of encircling China.Washington
is now sending a blunt message to Canberra that having committed to the
US, it must meet the cost of ramping up the size and capabilities of
its armed forces.
On July 13, the head of US Pacific Command,
Admiral Samuel Locklear, told journalists after meeting Gillard in
Canberra that he was “concerned” that Australian military spending was
well below the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) standard of 2
percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Locklear stated: “There are
many nations that don’t meet that from time to time, and so it’s not for
me to comment on how the Australian people decide to do it, but I would
hope that in the security environment that we are in that there is a
long-term view of defense planning that has the proper level of
resources behind it.”
Locklear’s comments were the first public
US reaction to the Labor government’s decision, revealed in its May
budget, to cut $5.5 billion from defence spending over the next four
years, as part of its efforts to meet the demands of the financial
markets to return the budget to surplus. He focused on one of the most
expensive planned Australian defence acquisitions—a new fleet of 12
submarines that could significantly contribute to US-led operations to
block China’s access to the crucial sea-lanes between the Indian and
Pacific Oceans. The fleet could cost as much as $30 billion.
The
US admiral declared: “If you’re going to build a submarine force, you
can take years to figure out how to make that cost effective and get
what you need out of it… I would hope that as the Australians work
through that, that they recognize and contemplate this.” The US
ambassador in Canberra, Jeffrey Bleich, had stated in February that the
US would be prepared to sell or lease Australia a fleet of American
nuclear submarines to ensure that the Australian Navy had a war-fighting
capability that Washington viewed as “crucial to security.” In May,
however, the Labor government made no decision about how the new
submarines would be financed. Instead, it deferred the acquisition for
two years, pending another review of possible options. It also deferred
for several years the purchase of some F-35 Joint Strike Fighters.
According
to Australian media reports, Admiral Locklear’s criticisms of
Australian military spending were repeated on July 17 during a
Washington meeting between Duncan Lewis, the head of the Australian
Defence Department, and his Pentagon counterparts. The issue was
publicly canvassed the next day by Richard Armitage, an assistant
secretary of state under the Bush administration and prominent strategic
analyst.
Armitage bluntly told the annual Australian American
Leadership Dialogue in Washington on July 18: “Australia’s defense
budget is inadequate. It’s about Australia’s ability to work as an ally
of the US. I would say you’ve got to look at 2 percent of GDP.” In an
interview with the Australian, he said the Obama
administration’s concentration of US military power in the Asia-Pacific
“is not an opportunity for a free ride by anybody—not Japan, not
Australia, or anybody else.”
In an indication of the White House’s involvement, the Australian observed: “Armitage is willing to say what is widely said off the record in Washington.”
Opposition
Liberal leader Tony Abbott, in Washington for the Leadership Dialogue
and to cultivate support for his party from the US establishment,
endorsed these criticisms when addressing the right-wing think-tank, the
Heritage Foundation. Abbott condemned Labor’s spending cuts, which
reduced defence from 1.8 percent of GDP in last year’s budget to 1.56
percent, saying this was the lowest level since 1938. “That is quite a
concern,” he declared, “as we do not live in a benign environment, we do
not live in benign times.”
Several Australian commentators
echoed US demands last weekend endorsing the call for the military
budget to be increased to at least 2 percent of GDP. That figure would
amount to more than $30 billion a year or $6 billion more than the
current allocation.
Sydney Morning Herald political
editor Peter Hartcher, focused on increased Chinese military spending
and growing tensions over the conflicting territorial claims between
China and other states in the South China and East China Seas. “It is a
time of rising risk of war, even if only by accident,” he wrote. Australian
foreign editor Greg Sheridan wrote that Washington had interpreted the
Australian budget cuts as “an ominous erosion of capacity in the US
alliance system within Asia” in conditions where regional tensions could
lead to conflict.
Right-wing pundit Piers Akerman declared in the Sunday Telegraph:
“The US is saying bluntly that Australia is not pulling its weight on
defense and that the implications of letting down the side in this
manner are enormous and long-ranging.”
The US intervention over
the Australian defense budget demonstrates that Washington’s
confrontational stance against China, embraced by the Gillard
government, necessarily means a stepped-up assault on the social and
democratic rights of the working class, as well as the danger of a
catastrophic war.
Amid the worsening global economic crisis,
greater military spending can be paid for only by drastic austerity
cutbacks to social programs and infrastructure, particularly in
health care, education and welfare. If Gillard baulks, the next
intervention from Washington may well be behind-the-scenes support for
ousting her as prime minister.
Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter said after his meetings with
Guamanian and military leaders over the past two days, he is more
convinced than ever that Guam has a central role to play in the
strategic rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region.
The deputy secretary left Guam today en route
to Japan, the next stop on his 10-day Asia-Pacific tour that will
continue with visits to Thailand, India and South Korea. "The insights I was able to gather during
this visit [to Guam] reinforce the department's optimism that our plan
is achievable and in line with our strategic priority of maintaining
security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region," Carter said.
A
senior defense official traveling with the deputy secretary told
American Forces Press Service on background that during the Guam visit
Carter wanted to convey to Guamanian leaders his optimism that the
planned Marine Corps relocation from Okinawa "is in a much better place
than it was even six months ago."
The processes involved in implementing the
plan, including coordination with the Japanese government and
Congressional authorization, "all seem to be coming together," the
official said.
Carter discussed a number of issues with
Guamanian leaders including Governor Eddie Baza Calvo and Congresswoman
Madeleine Bordallo. During those meetings, the official said, Carter
spoke about the steps involved in the planned Marine Corps buildup on
Guam.
Current plans call for moving roughly 4,800
Marines to the island, rather than the 8,000 originally projected, the
official noted. About two-thirds of those who relocate to Guam will do
so on a rotational basis, which means a smaller permanent-party presence
and thus a smaller number of accompanying family members than earlier
planned, he explained. A smaller Marine presence means less military
construction of community-support facilities such as schools and
childcare centers will be needed on Guam, the official said.
The Marines will need land for cantonment,
housing and training sites, including live-fire weapons training, the
official said. Previous environmental impact studies have determined
enough federally-owned land and undeveloped acreage is available on Guam
to support training, housing and headquarters requirements, he added. "The reason we have to do a supplemental
environmental impact study, kind of counter-intuitively, is that because
the footprint will be smaller, some areas that were not looked at with
the bigger footprint have to be studied to see if they are possible,"
the official said.
Carter took a helicopter tour of possible
sites today. The official said defense leaders are working now to place
Marine Corps facilities where they will cause the least possible
inconvenience to the island's residents.
"We don't want to set up a situation where
Marine cantonment is on the far end of the island, with the live-fire
training on the opposite end of the island, therefore creating a lot of
additional traffic on the local roads," he added.
Sites for air combat element operations,
waterfront operations, and non-live-fire training have already been
identified in previous studies and won't change, the official noted. "The Marine aviation element is going to go
on the north ramp at Andersen [Air Force Base], the waterfront
operations will be at Apra Harbor [Naval Station], and Andersen south
will be used for non-live-fire training," he said.
"[Carter] also made the point that the Marine
Corps buildup is only part of the story for the military on Guam," the
official said. "We have significant activities at Andersen Air Force
Base and Apra Harbor [Naval Base] that also demonstrate the strategic
nature of Guam."
Guam is the westernmost part of the United States and also part of Asia, the official noted. "[There is] a special strategic meaning to having American territory out here in Asia," he added. The official said that during meetings with
Carter, Calvo and Bordallo raised topics including visa-waiver approval
for Chinese tourists and National Guard funding.
The governor also expressed concern about the
impact the Marine Corps relocation will have on Guam's infrastructure,
the official said. "He made the point that the people of Guam
are strongly supportive of this move," the official added. "They're
patriotic Americans, but they are concerned that their infrastructure
deficiencies are also addressed as part of this realignment."
The governor specifically mentioned fresh
water, waste water, and power supply and distribution as sensitive areas
in the island's infrastructure, the official said. He added that Calvo
also noted positive developments in port improvements and defense access
roads, both of which are largely federally funded.
In response to the governor's concerns, the
official said, Carter explained additional environmental studies are
planned to determine what effect a smaller Marine force will have on the
island, and what new sites for relocation might support the decreased
"footprint" required to support those Marines. Those studies will "delay
significant construction for a couple of years," the official said.
The deputy secretary's visit demonstrates
U.S. leaders' determination to develop strategic rhetoric into reality
here in the Pacific, the official said. "He's here not only to convey that message,
but to hear from the people out here, throughout his trip, on what the
rebalance means to them, and make sure we do it right," the official
added. Carter also met with U.S. military leaders on
Guam during his visit, the official said, and listened to their
concerns relating to the strategy shift.
Navy Rear Adm. Paul Bushong, Air Force Brig.
Gen. Steve Garland, and other Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force leaders
stationed on Guam shared their perspectives on service priorities there
with the deputy secretary, the official said.
LaRouchePAC video analysis of the Pacific geopolitics orientation and South America, currently unfolding . Posted date: July 6th 2012.
Video (posted below)content description:
A clear line has been drawn between the Transatlantic nations that seek to hold on to their bankrupt system, and the pro-development Pacific oriented nations that seek genuine progress. Russia and China have recently begun allying with kindred interests in South America to seek new development agreements.
That the Pacific islands region will be the theater of action in the next
big global race for geopolitical hegemony is not a question of if as
much as it is of when. And that when may be soon. Once it breaks out,
the race could stay a cold war for a long time with all sorts of
posturing from all parties, or it could escalate into a full blown
battle. No matter how it finally turns out, the next big theatre for the
big powers’ global machinations will be the Pacific and its epicenter
could well be Fiji’s capital, Suva.
At
the turn of the millennium, this twenty first century was touted as the
Century of Asia/Pacific. The promise was great: the Pacific Rim
countries’ confidence brimmed, powered by their blitzing growth rates;
the Asian tigers were on a roll; and the Pacific islands were redrawing
the extent of their sovereign oceanic territories as new mineral
discoveries were being made on land and the seabed.
The
first decade of this century saw sustained forays by the Asian giants
into the Pacific islands region, establishing new outposts in tiny
islands nations, helping build infrastructure and doling out loans and
grants with a firm eye on the vast natural resources that the islands
are thought to possess. All this happened as the Pacific islands’
traditional western world partners were progressively downsizing their
long-held commitments to the islands.
Throughout
the first decade of this century, China had a fairly open run of the
Pacific Oceanic region. It upped its financial assistance and
infrastructure building programmes around the region in schemes and
arrangements that were different from the ones Pacific islands
governments were used to when such assistance came from Western friends.
Pacific
islands leaders spoke approvingly of China’s ‘no strings attached’
approach to aid, in marked contrast to the West’s more structured and
highly conditions-based manner of dealing with assistance programmes.
This was enticement enough for most Pacific islands countries to happily
get into bed with China for several ‘development’ initiatives in return
for poorly documented (at least in the media) concessions in tapping
natural resources and fisheries.
Islands Business
"
China has played its game in the Pacific cleverly. It has employed what is commonly termed as ‘soft power’ to win influence. It has extended the hand of unconditional friendship and one cannot say there has been coercion or threats of any sort. That is one of the reasons why its influence has grown so rapidly over such sweeping swathes of the Pacific—under the radar as it were.
Meanwhile, the United States was busy with its endless war mongering in the Middle East for the better part of the past two decades[...]
China rebuilt its embassy into a bigger facility in Fiji, the US decided to follow suit almost immediately.
Both countries realise the strategic, geopolitical importance of Fiji, just as colonial powers in bygone eras had.
"
Simultaneously,
political developments like those in Fiji forced the leadership to
evolve strategies like Fiji’s ‘Look North’ policy where almost every new
realm of economic and developmental activity became closely aligned to
China, Korea and several other countries of the Pacific Rim, gaining
precedence over traditional ties to Australia and New Zealand.
China
has played its game in the Pacific cleverly. It has employed what is
commonly termed as ‘soft power’ to win influence. It has extended the
hand of unconditional friendship and one cannot say there has been
coercion or threats of any sort. That is one of the reasons why its
influence has grown so rapidly over such sweeping swathes of the
Pacific—under the radar as it were.
Meanwhile,
the United States was busy with its endless war mongering in the Middle
East for the better part of the past two decades and all but ignored
China’s growing influence in the Pacific islands region. As if awoken
suddenly from a deep slumber, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made
a knee jerk statement during one of her Pacific whistle stop tours a
few years ago that the US would not “cede” territory to
anybody—obviously implying it wouldn’t take China’s machinations in the
region lying down.
As
the world now progresses towards the middle of this century’s second
decade, it is becoming increasingly apparent that this is the Century of
the Asia/Pacific for many more reasons than those that were touted at
the turn of the millennium. And some of these reasons are undoubtedly a
cause for worry—not just for the region but also for the world.
China
has already begun protesting against the US planned joint exercises in
the Pacific this year that involves some 22 nations including several of
the Pacific Rim, including Australia and New Zealand and even distant
powers like Russia. China has pointedly been excluded from these
exercises that will include a range of nuclear submarines besides other
sophisticated naval hardware and armaments.
China
is also dealing with a number of more regional geopolitical and
territorial problems— particularly the one involving the Philippines in
the South China Sea. The Philippines has a strong US connection for
historical reasons. This is one instance of how these local problems
have the potential to polarise the region across the two superpowers
vying for the region’s favours.
The
joint naval exercises are obviously a bold and firm statement directed
at China that the US wants to make—that it is well and truly means
business in the region. In including the 22 nations in its exercises
including South Korea and Japan, it has thumbed its nose at the Asian
superpower. In fact, the US started this sort of posturing when it
rebuilt its embassy in Fiji’s capital, Suva.
In
ages gone by, kings and emperors announced their hegemony by building
towers and monuments on the territories they conquered. In modern times,
countries can’t conquer and can’t build towers and monuments. Instead,
they build embassies in the countries they want to win favour from to
help them expand their influence. So when China rebuilt its embassy into
a bigger facility in Fiji, the US decided to follow suit almost
immediately.
Both
countries realise the strategic, geopolitical importance of Fiji, just
as colonial powers in bygone eras had. In any aggression that takes
place in the Pacific Ocean in the near future, Fiji will undoubtedly be
catapulted into the centre stage because of this.
What
has begun as benign posturing could quite easily escalate into a cold
war but could a cold war result in a full-blown conflict? Consider this:
the arms industry is the engine of the US economy. With action in the
Middle East all but over, there are few places left for war mongering.
The
Pacific Ocean is an extremely suitable candidate to kick-start the arms
industry and pull the country out of the recession. The development of a
whole new suite of weapons suited for vast stretches of ocean would be a
challenge worth pursuing and investing in. And thanks to the sparseness
of the population, collateral damage would be negligible.
Fanciful
though this may sound, the possibility can scarcely be discounted.
Unfortunately for the Pacific islands and their citizens, they have
already been reduced to pawns. Geopolitics may well grow to be a more
pressing worry than the ravages of climate change.
In the 1957 published book “The Colonizer and the Colonized”, Albert Memmi wrote:”The calcified colonized society is therefore the consequences of two processes having opposite symptoms: encystment originating internally and a corset imposed from the outside.”
The UN decolonization process was succinctly reported in a Seattle Times article, authored by Associated Press correspondent, Anita Snow, who examined a controversial subject that may not make its way to the UN Security Council, any time soon. However, the exotic locations being adjudicated in the UN decolonization process; could invariably be a petri dish for future crisis.
The Caribbean region and the Pacific share some similarities. Apart from both being geographical classified as islands; they both share a remarkable sameness in their colonization story and some of their colonial masters.
Wayne Madsen's recent opinion article: Rumblings from the Caribbean
addressed the Caribbean context for decolonization:
“The Caribbean states, witnessing the economic prowess of Brazil and the nationalistic fervor of Venezuela, Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua, see a chance to break free from decades of domination by the United States and European colonial powers intent on keeping their toeholds in the Caribbean region”.
Ostensibly, the Pacific region has a similar situation, with regards to the colonial powers maintaining their vice-lock grip on the political economy; as well as controlling defense related aspects and the rights to the vast maritime natural resources within these same territories.
Left to Right: Visit to the Fiji
Mission in New York by the Ulu-o-Tokelau. Joe Suveinakama, General
Manager Tokelau National Public Service, Ambassador Peter Thomson of the
Fiji Mission, Ulu-o-Tokelau Aliki Kalolo, Ambassador Bernadette
Cavanagh of the New Zealand Mission. (Image: MoI)
Recently in the UN Special Committee on Decolonization , draft resolutions were introduced by Fiji's UN representative Peter Thompson,
with regards to New Caledonia and Tuvalu, currently being administered by France and New Zealand respectively. Also Fiji had supported Argentina's resolution to address the aspect of Falkland/Malvinas in the UN committee of 24,
administering the issues of decolonization.
The Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), dominated by the Trans-Tasman cousins could be running the same operating system to that of, the Organization of American States (OAS).
Madsen alluded to the Modus Operandi in the Caribbean with respect to the decolonization process:
The European colonial powers are attempting to ensure the continuation of their colonial holdings in the Caribbean by resorting to either increasing their domination over “self-governing” territories or formulating new colonial arrangements between the mother countries and various island dependencies in the Caribbean.
There have been similar styled grumblings in the Pacific region, on the obnoxious manner in which Australia and New Zealand have unilaterally controlled the policies of PIF.
Former PIF Director of Financial Governance, Dr. Roman Grynberg , highlighted the stacked deck in the PIF, in a opinion article “Who owns the Forum”:
Who sets the Forum agenda? In the Forum as in all international bodies, a draft agenda for every meeting is sent out to all members and they must all agree.
In reality in most cases only Australia and New Zealand have the capacity to review these documents and make substantive comments and hence they very largely set the Forum's agenda.
Grynberg's remarks could well be viewed as an insider's assessment of the machinations within the PIF. Other external points of view from PIF member states are equally scathing. One such perspective:
PNG’s foreign affairs and trade minister Sam Abal alleges that the development of an AfT (Aid for Trade) mechanism has been deliberately stalled by PIFS because it goes against the beliefs of PIFS’ biggest donors—Australia and New Zealand.
“In 2009, the PACPS discussed at length the development of a suitable mechanism to fund and manage trade-related aid flows into the region. However, PIFS has actively stalled and discouraged any progress in this area in many cases,” he states.
“It is Papua New Guinea’s view that the Aid for Trade negotiations in the EPA have stalled because it is inconsistent with Australia and New Zealand’s (ANZ) position in the PACER Plus negotiations,” Abal alleges.
Grynberg asserts a poor outlook for the future of PIF:
“Things will only change with the circumstances. In the last generation it was France which silenced the islands. The present culture of silence in the Forum stems from the nature of the relationship with Australia and New Zealand. It is perverse and will never lead to a healthy relationship. There may yet come a generation of Pacific island leaders who have a genuine vision and intestinal fortitude to lead their countries and the region.”
Other background chatter in the Pacific region, also revolve around the contentious issue of colonization.
The metaphor of Corset in the context of colonization, as outlined by the Author, Albert Memmi, is manifested by the present slogan of 'America's Pacific Century'.
The US secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta was requested by the Governor of the Commonwealth of North Mariana Islands (CNMI)
to renegotiate some of the land lease agreements, that were issued to the
US Department of Defense.
In light of the new pivot cum re-balancing of the U.S naval forces to Asia-Pacific region, the areas of concerns raised by the CNMI Governor, may just receive some attention it justly deserves. Or will the CNMI Governor's concerns be relegated to the non priority bin for another 35 years?
Perhaps the larger question, in CNMI would revolve around the issue of seeking their independence from being an appendage to Pax Americana, like other Anglophone nations in the South Pacific.
Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom: it is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves. William Pitt 1759-1806
In October 9th 2008, New Caledonia's FLNK party leader, Roch Wamytan's statement to the UN's Fourth committee of the 63rd General Assembly session, reflected similar themes:
France does not want Independence for our country and is doing its utmost to prevent our country from achieving sovereignty. Both right and left-leaning political regimes, with a few minor differences, agree on one thing: everything must be done to keep New Caledonia within the French and European fold in the name of their higher interests.
After the MSG summit in Fiji, held in April, Wamytam-now President of the New Caledonia Congress also extended an invitation to the MSG to host a summit in New Caledonia. In a Radio Australia web article, New Zealand academic, Bill Hodge derided that decision:
Well there's two big issues, first of all you have a party or a political grouping behaving as if it's a sovereign” [...]So the thing itself is an illustration of a party acting up as if it's the sovereign, as if it's the government, which it is not. Secondly, I think that's an objection on the grounds of principle and Paris may well have an objection.
Unsurprisingly, a French Senator and former Defense Minister
Jean-Pierre Chevenement, recently was quoted in a PINA web article and emphasized the need for France to “consolidate its position in the Pacific”
and shore up its partnership with Australia, as a hedge against the sphere influence of China.
Fiji appears to be the lone maverick voice in the region, actively undermining the neo-colonialistic agendas in the Pacific region.
Fiji Prime Minister, Voreqe Bainimarama as current chair of the Melanesia Spearhead Group (MSG) was due to travel to New Caledonia,
to assess and monitor the progress of the 1998 Noumea accords.
However, due to a myriad of issues from the non availability of visas (that have to processed in France) and internal politics in New Caledonia, the trip has been deferred.
It is without a doubt, that the Colonial Powers in the Pacific and the Trans-Tasman cousins are increasingly wary of Fiji’s regional influence and close ties with China, as well as Fiji's expanding diplomatic relations in its 'Look North' initiative.
Fiji had established diplomatic relations with Kazakhstan, hosted Russia's Foreign Minister, a delegation from North Korea, joined the Association of South East Asian Nations group (ASEAN) and most recently hosted a high level delegation from Iran bearing an invitation from Iran's President, to the Non-Alignment-Movement (NAM) summit in Tehran, in August.
However, Fiji's new friends have caused some angst because of their incontrovertible success in being a non-conformist, opponent to the war addiction and unbridled crony capitalism, largely endorsed and supported by Anglo-American and European political elites.
An opinion article published in The Diplomat online magazine, illustrates such insular rhetoric and reductionist hubris existing in many Western bloc Capitals; which practically objects, opposes and despises any rising counter-balance to the Western bloc.
A significant counter point to The Diplomat opinion article, was presented in a Global Research TV video, which interviews Dr. Chandra Muzaffar, President of the International Movement for a Just World andanalyses a wide variety of issues including the emerging BRICS nations, the crisis in Syria, and the implications of Washington's policy shift to the Asia-Pacific region . (Video posted below).
Since Fiji' joined the NAM, its rolodex of friends is expanding considerably and rapidly, far beyond the strait jacket induced list of the Commonwealth group. It is also undeniable, that the trajectory of the ' Look North' Foreign Policy adapted by Fiji, succeeded in raising many eyebrows in the Western capitals.
A plausible narrative is emerging- Bainimarama's intestinal fortitude is a refreshing difference both domestically and internationally; a stark contrast from the 'go-along-to get-along' malleable lapdog politicians in island states, who have been co-opted as convenient vassals for the old Colonial order and by extension the Western bloc.
