X-Post from Island Business: A New Era of Geopolitics In The Region

Michael O’Keefe•


Last month, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Fiji. There has been much speculation about the purpose of the visit, but this needs to be contextualised so we can make sense of its significance.

The extremes of opinion waiver between arguing that the visit heralds a major shift in the foreign affairs of the Pacific to arguing that it was simply routine diplomacy. It was neither. We need to dig deeper. We need to ask Why Fiji [the South Pacific?]? Why Now?

An overarching answer to these questions is geopolitics and strategic change. Geopolitics relates to the intersection of geography and politics. It focuses on shifts in relative power and what we are witnessing is a larger global geopolitical contest being played out in the Pacific.

To-date most discussion of regional strategic affairs has focused on China’s growing interest and whether this equates to influence. This is an issue worthy of attention but not the focus here. Suffice to say, the era of crude chequebook diplomacy whereby China and Taiwan faced off in the Pacific over diplomatic recognition is over.

China is engaging the Pacific at all levels (diplomatic, economic, cultural) and is staking its claim to being a worthy partner, especially in the context of Australian and New Zealand isolation of, and disengagement from Fiji.

Michael O’Keefe

"The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power.

This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation.

The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region."

China’s growing interests in the region have not gone unnoticed in Washington and Canberra (and Moscow).
US President Barack Obama’s recent comments about the renewed US role in the Pacific century have highlighted the potential for strategic competition in the region the likes of which have not been seen since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Back then the issue was Soviet fishing agreements, which were seen as avenues for access for intelligence gathering in an area of primary strategic concern to the US and to its allies, Australia and New Zealand.
Fears over Soviet penetration in the region were proven to be exaggerated, but they did prompt a diplomatic reaction. The same is happening now but in the lead-up to the visit the Russian Foreign Minister himself highlighted that now it is Russia attempting to balance the US and China rather than being the main strategic competitor.

Why now? The most obvious answer to this question relates to global geopolitical changes. That is, that a rising China is challenging the US and that it is responding. Countries like Russia, South Korea and Indonesia see that their interests could be impacted and are taking action. This orthodox view is dealt with in-depth in the commentary so it won’t be a focus here.

The rest of this article focuses on issues closer to home.

It may also not be a coincidence that political instability in Fiji after the 1987 coup wrong footed the traditional metropolitan powers in relation to local support for protecting their strategic interests. At this stage, it was the potential for Soviet expansionism in an area that had hitherto been Australia and New Zealand’s patch.

Interestingly, at the time China also took note insofar as political change created opportunities for Taiwan to gain some headway, albeit briefly. Now it is arguable that China is benefitting from political change in Fiji and it is not only the Americans and their Australian and New Zealand partners that are taking note.

The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power. This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation. The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region.

This is a colonial legacy, but one which Fijian leaders from Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to the present have fostered. The hub may relate to the diplomatic missions that serve many Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum or Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the headquarters of major intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, or non government organisations in Suva, the University of the South Pacific etc.

The hub also relates to Suva as a major economic hub for exports, the trans-shipment of essential supplies, such as fuel, etc. Economics is often cited as a core strategic issue, but in perspective Pacific trade with any of the interested external powers is relatively small in comparison to their economic interests elsewhere.
Even the most generous predictions would not place the Pacific in the top 20 trading partners for the countries competing for influence in the region.

Furthermore, for the foreseeable future the potential for significant growth may be more illusory than real in all areas (such as mining seabed resources) except tourism which will maintain its traditional position as an area where the potential for growth can be realised. As such we can largely discount the economic angle at this stage, despite much commentary on the bauxite mining and fishing agreements.

However, PICS are right to be concerned over unsustainable economics in relation to mining or fisheries. It is the strategic aspect of geopolitics that provides the clearest explanation for Russia’s recent diplomatic manoeuvring.

Fiji gives a country or organisation access to the Pacific. It is an economy of scale, and for a country rediscovering the Pacific, such as Russia is now, it is essential to be on good terms with the Fijian government to reap the benefits of the hub. As such, the Foreign Minister’s meetings involved the Fijian government, but other PICs were invited to meet and attend diplomatic functions in Nadi.

Fiji’s ‘Look North’ policy has opened the door to greater cooperation. In this context Russia’s advances could be added to a long list of countries that have increased their profiles in the Pacific since 2006, not least of which is China, South Korea, Indonesia, the US and UAE. Discussions with other countries, and organisations, such as the Arab League are also underway.

Suva has also reasserted its leadership role. It has been suspended from the pre-eminent regional organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum, following the 2006 coup. However, it has effectively used the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) whose members include the larger PICs to forward its interests.
The MSG also highlights that there is an alternative to the PIF and one which is more relevant to Fiji’s interests than the other PICs.

During the Cold War the catch cry was “The Russians are coming! Run for the hills”. The concern over Russian diplomacy in the South Pacific is reminiscent of this sort of thinking. But context counts and the South Pacific of 2012 is not the South Pacific of 1980s.

Furthermore, the hub, Fiji, is not the Fiji of the 1980s either. There is a growing confidence in Fijian foreign affairs and the expectation is that the partnership and friendship posed by any country will be closely scrutinised through the lens of Fijian national interests.

The time when any great power would overtly influence Fijian diplomacy may be at an end, with obvious implications for traditional partners or new players on the block. There are dangers and vulnerabilities that come hand in hand with the opportunities to be gained from the greater attention that great powers are showing the Pacific.

Some of the distortions evidenced during the era of checkbook diplomacy come to mind, and this will be the issue in relation to recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There are already rumours of millions of dollars being spent to influence the votes of some PICs.

Furthermore, Russia’s main competitor in this regard, Georgia, has also been showing interest with increased aid and diplomatic representations. Russia has directly stated that Abkhazia is not the issue and Lavrov did not publicly raise it while visiting the Pacific, but this denial and Georgia’s interest should be treated as a signal of the opposite.

Any PICs building close relations would be factoring this into their engagement, especially considering Georgia broke off relations with Tuvalu over this issue last month. Global geopolitical reordering is playing out in the Pacific. The post-2006 diplomatic standoff has led to diplomatic opportunities. Fijian leaders are showing a new confidence by taking advantage of these opportunities and so too have many foreign powers that have hitherto shown little interest in the region.

Through Fiji’s leadership and role as a regional hub other PICs have also reaped the benefits of these developments. There are benefits and costs involved in this sudden interest, but PICs are showing greater confidence in viewing the benefits of cooperation through the lens of national interest.

Maintaining this focus will be their challenge as this trend intensifies in the years ahead.

• Dr Michael O’Keefe is a Senior Lecturer at La Trobe University & Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for Regional Affairs, University of Fiji.

Club Em Designs

X-Post- 36th Parallel Weekly Analysis: Commodities Boom widens PIF Rift.

In order to understand political dynamics, underlying economic factors often need to be considered. The growing rift within the Pacific Island Forum between the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) and the Polynesian Leaders Group (PLG) is one such instance.

The metals boom preceded the minerals boom, both of which have been paralleled by  ongoing interest in discovering new sources of energy, oil and natural gas specifically. Once metals markets were consolidated, investment flows turned to mineral resource extraction and towards exploring previously inaccessible sources of oil and natural gas. Rising prices for fuel and mineral commodities in an era of technological innovation has pushed capital investment into previously unexploited areas of the globe, including the South Pacific. Under highly competitive market conditions, Asian capital has joined the quest and accelerated the pace of primary resource investment even where it remains a secondary market player. The race to secure market share in these commodities is well and truly on.


Against that backdrop  Commodore Voreqe Baimimarama travels this week to Vanuatu in his capacity as Chairman of the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) , a sub-group of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) regional organization that encompasses most Pacific Island States, including Australia and New Zealand. Created in 1999, the MSG has recently been rivaled by the 2010 creation of the Polynesian Leader’s Group (PLG), which aggregates eight members of the PIF.

Unlike the PLG, the MSG has an established institutional structure and programmatic agenda, increasingly  dominated by Fiji due to its diplomatic importance and the relative underdevelopment of or political instability in other member states (New Caledonia, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu).The MSG contains a multilateral trade agreement between the its members, and because of historical investment interest in resource extraction in the sub-group (forestries and fisheries as well as minerals), it has seen the bulk of regional foreign investment in the last two decades. The ExxonMobil-led liquefied natural gas project in the PNG is one sample of that ongoing interest, now pushed into newly exploitable areas.

Polynesia has begun to experience the impact of the global energy and mineral rush. Whereas MSG members have a number of land and seabed mineral exploitation contracts within their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), only recently have PLG nations begun to see significant investment in land mining, and fewer have seabed exploitation agreements (one, Nauru, has secured a license to exploit seabed resources in international waters). Many of the companies involved in developing the PLG region for mineral extraction are already in the MSG, so the economies of scale they bring to negotiations with small Polynesian states provides them with good leverage when negotiating agreements. As in the case of MSG members, these contracts are not bound by regulatory vehicles embedded in regional trade agreements such as PACER and PICTA (on regional architecture, see here).

36th Parallel Analysis

"Fiji is the strongest partner with the MSG, that antagonism has spilled into MSG diplomacy vis a vis the Antipodean states and has seen the sub-group prioritize its relations with Asian partners as a balance to Western patronage relationships (which is based more on developmental aid than investment).
[...]The sanctions and suspension regime has done little to hurt the Baimimarama regime but have pushed both Fiji and the MSG more firmly into an Asian-centric diplomatic orbit, accentuating the cleavage within the PIF (which the MSG sees as too compliant with Australian and New Zealand diplomatic interests)."

The PIF is an observer of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) negotiations involving the US, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Singapore, Peru, Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia.  Japan, South Korea and Canada have also expressed desire to join the TPPA. Should the TPPA be ratified, increased trade volumes within the region are expected to grow even if the PIF does not become a full member itself. However, discussion has begun within the MSG about emphasizing bi- and multilateral trade with the so-called BRIC emerging economies: Brazil, Russia, India and China. None of these are party to the TPPA and yet are among the fasting growing economies in the world. They are, in fact, emerging great powers, gradually supplanting traditional Western powers as the motor force of the global economy.

China already has an established economic footprint within the MSG and its diplomatic presence, the largest in the PIF region, has grown  commensurate to the size of its investments. Russia and Fiji have just signed economic cooperation agreements, and Indian venture capital has made footholds there as well.

This trend has begun to be seen in PNG and the Solomons. Should the move to emphasize trade and investment between the MSG and BRICs lead to higher levels of commerce with the latter, the impact will significantly increase the investment gap between the MSG and PLG. Given its larger membership and smaller resource base, PLG benefits from an eventual TPPA will be much more diffuse than in the MSG with or without the BRIC connection. The more the BRIC-MSG connection comes into play, the less the MSG will need to be part of the TPPA and other pan-Pacific trade agreements. Should that happen, the MSG will begin to outweigh the PLG influence within the PIF, which opens the possibility of  an MSG-Australia/New Zealand confrontation within the PIF because the Antipodean states do not want the PIF to be dominated by Fijian interests.

As a result of the 2006 coup that brought Commodore Baimimarama to power, Fiji is currently suspended from the PIF and Commonwealth, and has been the subject of sanctions by Australia, New Zealand, the US and European Union. In response, Fiji has strengthened its ties to non-traditional partners such as China, something that gives it more flexibility in its foreign relations. Although the US has  softened its stance regarding the Baimimarama regime and its timetable for 2014 elections, the impasse continues with the Commonwealth, EU, Australia and New Zealand. Because Fiji is the strongest partner with the MSG, that antagonism has spilled into MSG diplomacy vis a vis the Antipodean states and has seen the sub-group prioritize its relations with Asian partners as a balance to Western patronage relationships (which is based more on developmental aid than investment).

Respecting the concept of national sovereignty, Asian economic partners are less concerned about Western notions of good governance, transparency, labor market conditions and environmental impact and more focused on returns on investment. This approach has been successfully used by Western companies operating within the MSG. The sanctions and suspension regime has done little to hurt the Baimimarama regime but have pushed both Fiji and the MSG more firmly into an Asian-centric diplomatic orbit, accentuating the cleavage within the PIF (which the MSG sees as too compliant with Australian and New Zealand diplomatic interests).

Against this backdrop, Baimimarama’s inspection visit before the 19th MSG conference later  this month provides him with the opportunity to set the agenda for this year’s discussions and to solidify Fijian interests within the group. Contentious topics such as granting both Indonesia and Western Papua observer status in the MSG (given Indonesian occupation of  Western Papua) are likely to be downplayed in favor of a consensus on strengthening ties with non-Western states and solidifying the MSG’s pre-eminent position within the PIF, at the expense of the PLG (and the much smaller Micronesian States Chief Executives Group).
Consolidating his position as leader of the MSG reinforces Baimimarama’s position at home, where in the face of Western demands that he keep to a timetable leading to open elections in 2014 he can point to demonstrable gains in terms of Fijian influence in regional politics as well as increases in Asian capital investments in that country (even if the country has experienced negligible net growth in the last decade). Bolstered by such events, the Baimimarama regime may feel confident enough to delay or cancel the elections, which will have major implications for the PIF.

The rift within the PIF  is evident in increased MSG demands that Fiji be included in any PIF trade discussions (such as PACER Plus). Whichever the approach adopted by the PIF Secretariat (inclusion of Fiji on matters of trade or its ongoing suspension), the division between the MSG and PLG is likely to widen in 2012. Boosted by the influx of foreign investment in minerals and energy exploitation, the MSG is in a position to make demands within the PIF that it previously could not. Given the failure of the sanctions regime, the inclusion of Fiji in future trade talks (the next PIF forum is in late August) could be a way of incrementally restoring it to full membership status while allowing Canberra and Wellington to save face (recent reports suggest that Australia and New Zealand are already re-considering the issue of Fijian sanctions). The ball is in the MSG court, with Fiji controlling the MSG play.

Summary PIF stability score is 5 (medium), the MSG score is 7 (good) and the PLG is 2 (low). (Stability score is ranked 1-10 on a range extending from none to full institutional capability and enforceable authority over time).

Futures Forecast: Sharpened differences between the MSG and PLG within the PIF will lead to an institutional weakening of the latter.

Club Em Designs

Bob Carr and Australia's Foreign Policy 2.0

News of the constitutional consultations have prompted many view points. One such perspective from Jenny Hayward Jones, speaks of the alignment of stars:

For the first time in some years, the stars may be aligning for a change in the relationship: Bob Carr's appointment as Australian Foreign Minister and a constructive and positive announcement from Commodore Bainimarama this morning on a constitutional consultations process create an opportunity.

Bob Carr was alluded to have "softened Australia's stance on Fiji", in an article by News Corp owned, Adelaide publication- "The Advertiser"

The excerpt of article:

Carr softens Australia's stance on Fiji

• by: Ian McPhedran and Steve Lewis
• From: The Advertiser
• March 07, 2012 11:00PM
• 5 comments

Bob Carr will extend an olive branch to Fijian dictator Frank Bainimarama, above, during talks in New Zealand. 

 

BOB Carr will begin to reverse six years of hard-line Labor policy against the government of Fijian dictator Frank Bainimarama.

Mr Carr will offer an olive branch to the military strongman, who seized power in the small Pacific island nation after a military coup in 2006.
The new Foreign Affairs Minister will travel to New Zealand tomorrow to meet NZ Prime Minister John Key to discuss Fiji's banning from the Pacific Islands Forum in 2009.

Incentives for Fiji are likely to include lifting some of the "sticks" against the regime, including the forum's ban on the junta - and some reversal of Australian sanctions set up in the wake of the coup.
These include a blanket ban on the supply, sale or transfer to Fiji of arms and related material, the provision of technical advice, assistance or training, a financial service or financial or other assistance to Fiji related to military activities or  any activity that involves the sale or supply of any export-sanctioned goods to Fiji.

The package also bars entry or transit through Australia for Fijian citizens declared by the Foreign Minister, such as members of the military junta, their families and other supporters of the Fijian regime.
The New Zealand talks would focus on common regional interests in the Pacific Islands Forum, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands and Pacific maritime surveillance.

In the span of several days and since meeting the New Zealand Foreign Minister, Murray McCully, the conciliatory approach many expected from Carr, has since reversed as reported in a Radio Australia article. 

The excerpt:

Carr rejects talk of softening Fiji stance

By New Zealand correspondent Dominique Schwartz

 

Posted March 09, 2012 20:26:46

Foreign minister designate Bob Carr has rejected media reports that he is planning to soften Australia's hard stance against Fiji. Mr Carr was speaking in Auckland after holding informal talks with his New Zealand counterpart Murray McCully.
Mr Carr said he had noted Friday's announcement by Fiji's military leader Frank Bainimarama about planned public consultation over a new constitution. Both Mr Carr and Mr McCully greeted the announcement with caution and said time would tell if the Fiji's rulers were truly moving towards democratic elections.

The former New South Wales premier also says he will be seeking more information from the ACTU about the human rights situation for workers in Fiji. Mr Carr says he wants to further investigate claims that any union official who speaks out against the interim government still risks life imprisonment. "Certainly one of the tests we'd consider in the future is the right of organisation in the workplace," he said. "That's a fundamental human right. I'd expect to have more conversations with unionists, in particular the ACTU."

Mr Carr said his hour-long discussion with Mr McCully about the region was wide-ranging and helpful. He will meet prime minister John Key on Saturday morning. It is his first overseas trip since being named the replacement for Kevin Rudd. He is due to be sworn in as a senator and foreign minister on Tuesday.

It is becoming increasingly apparent that many observers waiting for Bob Carr to change policy on Fiji were in for a major disappointment. Since becoming Foreign Minister, Carr has demonstrated a unique ability to flip-flop, like his initial opposition to the R2P operation in Libya, brokered by his predecessor Kevin Rudd.

Many that had withheld judgment on Carr ever since his appointment as Foreign Minister, will be soon making  up their minds. SiFM is among them. 

Club Em Designs

X-Post-Foreign Policy In Focus: Vacuuming Up the Pacific's Resources

By Arnie Saiki, March 5, 2012

The 11^th round of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations is currently taking place in Melbourne, Australia. Although negotiators have agreed to the broad outlines of the TPP agreement, a new trade issue has created a snag in the process: the inclusion of investor-state dispute settlement provisions. Australia has refused to accept the investor-state dispute settlement, and U.S. industry associations are urging President Barack Obama to overcome these objections. These investor-state dispute settlement provisions have been included in U.S. investment treaties and trade agreements with more than 50 countries, and there are over 2,500 of these accords currently on record. These provisions, however, give advantages to large economies and can cripple small island states like Pacific Island nations.

Obama describes the TPPA as a "a trade agreement for the 21st century" that improves on and rectifies the past problems in U.S. trade and investment treaties and trade agreements with more than 50 countries, and there are over 2,500 of these accords currently on record. These provisions, however, give advantages to large economies and can cripple small island states like Pacific Island nations.

Nine countries are currently negotiating the TPPA:the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile, Peru, Brunei, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Japan is in preliminary talks, and Canada and Mexico are looking to join. Although the negotiations are being held in secret, leaked documents confirm that the TPPA is a “NAFTA on steroids.” Contrary to democratic practice, the documents connected to the negotiations will remain secret for four years after being signed or dismissed.

Arnie Saiki

"For most Pacific Island countries (PICs), trade has been a series of disadvantageous agreements with larger economies that negotiate access to island resources. The PICs have remained economically tethered to larger economies despite attempts at small-island integration by sub-regional institutions like the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) or the more progressive Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). Just last year, a new sub-regional group called the Polynesian Leader’s Group challenged the MSG, which had made waves by advocating participation in an alternative economic system."

The United States is leading the negotiations and has a great deal of influence over the outcome of the agreement, which covers a vast range of subject matters, including tariffs on goods, trade in services, labor and the environment, telecommunications, and intellectual property. For Pacific Islands, however, the investor rights chapters may offer the greatest challenge to Pacific Island environmental resources.
The small Pacific Island economies are not formally a part of the TPPA negotiations and yet they are tethered to the larger economies of Australia, New Zealand, Chile, France, and the United States. Pacific Island countries are also not member economies of APEC (the economic regional forum that spawned the TPPA). They participate only as observers through the Pacific Island Forum, which facilitates the neo-liberal economic agenda through a basket of sub-regional agreements like the Pacific Island Countries Trade Agreement (PICTA). Still, larger economies pay considerable attention to the Pacific Island countries because of their resources, like fisheries, precious metals, and minerals, as well as their strategic value as military outposts and waterways.

Pacific Trade

Throughout Oceania, native peoples separated by thousands of miles share similar cultural and often linguistic bonds. Long before contact with the west, Pacific peoples not only were connected by the currents of their ocean homes but had established trans-pacific navigational routes, trade, and for the most part a sustainable relationship with their environmental resources.
For most Pacific Island countries (PICs), trade has been a series of disadvantageous agreements with larger economies that negotiate access to island resources.

The PICs have remained economically tethered to larger economies despite attempts at small-island integration by sub-regional institutions like the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) or the more progressive Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). Just last year, a new sub-regional group called the Polynesian Leader’s Group challenged the MSG, which had made waves by advocating participation in an alternative economic system. By joining with a bloc like the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), Pacific Islands might do better than the neoliberal programs advocated by PIF.

In comparison with other emerging economies, Pacific Islands have poor performance records. Much of the blame rests on the neo-liberalism of regional institutions like the ADB and APEC. Since the late 1990s, an increase in aid-based relationships has not only stunted the development of many island peoples but also provided a dumping ground for overstock and consumer detritus. Although private investment has had some success in developing traditional farm and fishery practices, these projects are dependent on funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the EU, the World Bank, and U.S. and Australian aid organizations.

In a 2006, the ADB examined small island states among the developing member economies, suggesting that isolated and vulnerable economies remain under economic stress as a result of their governments’ inability to guarantee the basic security of their people.

In 2008, as a response to its self-funded study, the ADB worked with international partners to deliver infrastructure services in the Pacific to streamline private-sector investment to industrial sectors like energy, water, waste, security, and telecommunications, as well as mining, cash crops, and fisheries. The Pacific Region Infrastructure Facility (PRIF) is one such organization.
Privatization is the latest vehicle for the exploitation of island resources. But these international investment projects, along with the bilateral investment treaties that support them, have yet to provide any long-term sustainable cultural or environmental benefit to small island economies.

 Impact of the TPPA

Embroiled in a decades-long struggle for independence from Chile, Rapa NuiTPPA that Chile signed in 2005. Since joining the TPPA, Rapa Nui has been fighting a tidal wave of development proposals for mining projects, airfields, ports, casinos, and hotels. These projects, which would irreparably change a UN World Heritage site, primarily benefit the Chilean government and the investment regime. For example, through the transnational Transoceanica Holdings, international investors funded the development of the Hotel Hanga Roa on land belonging to the Hitorangi clan. In 2010, as the Hanga Roa prepared to open, members of the clan occupied the hotel. Rapa Nui erupted in violence when Chilean President Sebastián Piñera sent navy cruisers and hundreds of armed security forces to end the unarmed protests.

In recent discussions around the TPPA, little attention has focused on how a regional “Asia-Pacific” free-trade agreement will actually impact Pacific Islands. But some recent examples of investments in the region are quite revealing. In Papua New Guinea, Canada’s Nautilus Minerals has launched a new deep seabed-mining project called Solwara 1. Large deposits of gold, silver, nickel, copper, manganese, and other rare-earth minerals are buried deep in the seabed, and the method for extracting these minerals – basically vacuuming up the seabed onto a barge – has only recently been developed.

Little is known about the deep seabed, and no conclusive environmental study has been completed. But the life that thrives in this unusual environment is sulfur-based rather than oxygen-based. When the sludge is extracted onto a barge, it is then separated from the commodity metals and minerals and then dumped back into the ocean. The impact of this sulfuric sediment absorbed by fish or reefs is unknown. However, sulfuric changes in the environment negatively affect oxygen-based plants and animals, as people living with vog (volcanic smog) know all too well.

After the International Seabed Authority changed the regulations for deep seabed mineral extraction, Nautilus acquired even more international investment to lease large tracts of deep seabed in Fiji, Tonga, the Solomon Islands, and New Zealand. These changes have prompted other Canadian, U.S., and Australian mining companies to lease seabed areas in the Exclusive Economic Zones of many other Pacific Island Countries. This mining deregulation, which has resulted from agreements like the TPPA, will likely push ocean biodiversity closer to what the International Programme on the State of the Ocean describes as “irreversible, catastrophic change.”

Consider also the case of Endeavor Mining, which recently offered the Cook Islands government a partnership proposal worth $1 billion over three-and-a-half years for mineral and mining rights to the seabed resources. Typically, since Endeavor is also an independent merchant bank focusing on the global natural resources sector, it will likely offer investors a package of financial incentive benefits that will reward investors at the expense of a state whose 2009 GDP was just short of $200 million.

If made responsible for cleanup in the event of accidents, island governments and taxpayers could be liable for any financial losses. As a result, Cook Islanders might find themselves in an ecological catastrophe and mired in debt. Additionally, to qualify for loans to pay back this debt, multilateral lending institutions may well insist on austerity measures that would lead to further deregulation. Locked into a variety of competing investor agreements, the Pacific islands will find themselves in a race to the bottom, both economically and environmentally.

If the investor-rights “chapter 11” provisions in NAFTA provide any clues about how the TPPA will privilege international investor agreements over government regulations, the Pacific Islands will be opened up to tremendous resource exploitation. Environmental regulations are all that protect the fragile biodiversity of the region. And the costs associated with the despoliation will largely fall on the shoulders of Pacific islanders themselves. The corporations will reap the profits; the Pacific Islands will have to pay the long-term bill.

Looking Beyond the TPP

The average GDP of the smaller developing Pacific islands is around $350 million, with the exception of Fiji, whose annual GDP is around $3.5 billion, and Papua New Guinea at around $9.5 billion (for perspective, New Zealand’s GDP is around $125 billion). There is a tremendous gap between the combined GDP of the islands and the value of the resources exploited from these countries.

This gap represents a strategic imperative for Pacific island economies to integrate along the lines of sustainable trade and sensible environmental regulations. The TPPA is certainly not an equitable integration scheme.

Rather, this NAFTA of the Pacific is like tossing a shark in a fish tank. The TPPA will give even less room for PICs to negotiate positive environmental regulations or manage to accrue social or economic benefits from their natural resources.

Pacific Islanders need to be part of the negotiating process to ensure they are at least able to integrate their commodity resources, since they are critically unequipped to develop their economies to scale with the larger economies. They also need to create a regional regulatory agency that can independently manage the various trade and investment agreements. Without democratic input and democratic control, the TPPA will vacuum up all the resources of the Pacific and leave a poisoned ocean in its wake.

Arnie Saiki is the writer/director for Statehood Hawaii/Imipono Projects. He coordinated the Moana Nui 2011 conference in Honolulu with Pua Mohala I Ka Po and the International Forum on Globalization. He is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

Recommended Citation:

Arnie Saiki, "Vacuuming Up the Pacific's Resources" (Washington, DC: Foreign Policy In Focus, March 5, 2012)

Further Reading :

Pacific warned of hidden dangers in Obama's new TPP push (Radio Australia)

The Trans-Pacific Partnership-A New Paradigm Or Wolf In Sheep's Clothing?

Economists Issue Statement on
Capital Controls and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement

TPP-The NAFTA of the Pacific

 How Brazil Challenged Europe and Won.

Taxonomy of Dolls and Mutants (Radio Lab)

SiFM post on seabed mining:

http://stuckinfijimud.blogspot.com/2008/04/rush-to-mine-pacific-seabed-fiji.html

SiFM post on TPP and America's Pacific Century Pivot:

http://stuckinfijimud.blogspot.com/2011/11/americas-pacific-century-pivot.html

Club Em Designs

Bob Carr and Australia's Foreign Policy.

Bob Carr looks at Julia Gillard [Image source: ABC]

Babasiga post highlights the appointment of Bob Carr as Australia's Foreign Affairs Minister.

Radio Australia article suggests that the new incumbent will focus on the Pacific region, after being neglected by Carr's predecessor.

Lowy Institute's blog "The Interpreter", addressed the content of Bob Carr's blog and some of the perceived view points, the nascent Foreign Minister holds with regards to Foreign Policy.

All things considered, it would be naive at best for the Pacific region to expect a sudden change in DFAT and its abysmal track record under Rudd's tenure. WSWS article underscored Rudd's uncanny ability to self promote:

US Ambassador McCallum wrote a scathing cable, describing the APC idea as “hastily rolled out, with minimal consultations.” He continued: “Rudd seems to be in a hurry not only to demonstrate Australia’s regional influence as a ‘middle power’, but also to begin to establish his legacy

SiFM also addressed the same concerns in a numerous posts- here , here and here.

The capability of Carr is not in question, however, the Pacific region will soon determine whether a new chapter in Australian Foreign Affairs has indeed been opened.

Club Em Designs

X-Post- Scoop: A New Containment Policy In The South Pacific

Friday, 24 February 2012, 11:45 am

A Word From Afar –
By Paul G. Buchanan
 
One of the interesting aspects of the leaked emails between Foreign Minister Murray McCully and MP Johns Hayes, a former diplomat, is the latter’s mention of the need to “resist” China’s growing presence in the South Pacific. With that simple advice Mr. Hayes has revealed a much larger issue, one that undoubtedly has been discussed at length with New Zealand’s major allies, Australia and the US. The issue is how to contain China. 

Along with nuclear deterrence, “containment” was at the heart of Western approaches to the Cold War. The strategy of containment was to resist and counter-balance Soviet influence in the Third World, including the South Pacific. New Zealand had a significant role in the application of anti-Soviet containment in the South Pacific, and its diplomatic, military and intelligence assets were used to that end. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, there followed a decade of relatively benign neglect of the South Pacific by traditional Western patrons, who cast their geostrategic gaze elsewhere and prioritized accordingly.

Into that breach stepped the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which used phenomenal economic growth to expand its sphere of influence throughout the Western Pacific basin and beyond. As an emerging great power China must fuel its growth via the importation of raw materials from new investment markets, and must extend its influence (and deploy force) along the sea lines of communication through which these imports flow (with the South Pacific now being a major corridor between South American and Australasian investment and trade with the Chinese mainland).

In the South Pacific, China’s interest has been manifest in the use of “chequebook diplomacy” to provide aid and investment unencumbered by “good governance” and transparency requirements upon which most Western aid and investment is based. Besides winning friends in the Pacific Island Community (PIC) with this practice, the PRC also encourages Chinese migration to the region as a source of semi-skilled and skilled labour (most of the Chinese-funded infrastructure development projects in the South Pacific require the use of Chinese rather than local labour).

Resident Chinese communities now constitute important segments of the merchant and investor classes in places like Fiji, Tonga and the Solomon Islands, where they are suspected by Western intelligence agencies of engaging in human intelligence collection on behalf of the homeland.
To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics).

Chinese navy surface vessels now make regular port calls throughout the South Pacific, and its submarines are reported to make 6-10 deployments per year deep into Southern waters, often tailing a growing Chinese fishing fleet that has on-shore processing facilities throughout the region and which is suspected of providing cover for Chinese signals intelligence monitoring.
It was not until the mid 2000s that the US and its South Pacific allies reacted to this trend. Since then, the US has shifted its strategic priority away from Europe and towards East Asia, including moving the bulk of its naval assets to the Pacific. The US has re-opened aid and trade missions in the PIC, and most importantly, has solidified and expanded its security ties with Australia and New Zealand (including the November 2011 “Wellington Declaration” whereby New Zealand was restored as a full security partner of the US after years of tension stemming from its 1985 non-nuclear decision).

Paul G. Buchanan


"To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics)

[...]In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode."

The twist in this tale is that both Australia and New Zealand have become increasingly dependent on trade with the PRC, which has caused them to pay much diplomatic lip service to the concept of mutual interest with the PRC and given an increasingly Asian focus to their respective foreign policies.
However the reality, as indelicately phrased by Mr. Hayes, is that not only the US but also Canberra and Wellington fear the emergence of China in the South Pacific because its rise has the potential for supplanting the US-led alliance as the dominant regional player. Thus the strengthening of trilateral security ties between them and the expansion of their bi- and multi-lateral diplomatic overtures (mostly couched in the language of developmental aid) within the context of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and South Pacific Community (SPC). Along with EU engagement with the PIC (now on the wane), the diplomatic re-emphasis is designed to counter-balance Chinese influence and restore a pre-eminent Western orientation in the PIC.

All of this involves a mix of “hard” and “soft” power (using military, diplomatic and economic instruments) in order to engage in the “smart” use of aggregated Western influence in the face of Chinese regional inroads. If nothing else, renewed Western involvement in the South Pacific raises the economic and diplomatic costs to the Chinese of maintaining their position, which in turn diverts resources that otherwise could be directed elsewhere. The South Pacific Chinese containment strategy, in other words, is directed at “rolling back” Chinese regional influence.

In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode.
For Australia, with its mineral resources coveted by the Chinese and an association with the US that is seeing it gradually replace the UK as the US’s major military ally, the issue of containing China’s South Pacific ambitions can be justified as being one born of strength and self-interest: the Chinese need Australia’s resources more than they need a confrontation with it, and alliance with the US is set to make Australia a global military and diplomatic player in the years to come. Australia’s interests extend far beyond its immediate vicinity, so the South Pacific containment strategy is one piece in a larger geopolitical strategy in which it holds significant leverage vis a vis the PRC. China can live with that.

For New Zealand the situation is different. Revelation of the Chinese containment strategy in the South Pacific places New Zealand on the horns of a Melian dilemma: as a small island state caught in the middle of an incipient great power struggle, it has attempted to balance the two by increasingly trading with the PRC while renewing its security ties to the US. But New Zealand has no strategic leverage on the PRC, and is more dependent on Chinese trade and investment than vice versa. Thus the situation may become untenable for New Zealand the more its commitment to containing the PRC is made apparent in light of increasing tensions between the two great powers in the Western Pacific. In that event it will be forced to choose sides rather than suffer the fate of Melos, whose neutrality in the Peloponnesian Wars was rewarded by its invasion and sacking by the Athenians.

In the New Zealand version of this dilemma, the choice will be between trade and security, at which point the commitment to South Pacific containment will receive its sternest test. New Zealand’s hedge against this dilemma is ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multinational trade and investment compact involving the US that excludes the PRC and which is currently under negotiation. The TPP is the economic component of the China containment strategy, as it is designed to link the most important East and South Asian economies with Antipodean and Western Hemisphere partners. The PRC understands the fence-ringing thrust of the TPP within the larger geostrategic context, and has objected, without success, to its exclusion.

Should the TPP be ratified and entered into force, potential loss of Chinese trade and investment could be compensated y the increase in trade and investment between TPP partners. That is a theoretical gain rather than a certain one given the multiplicity of actors and issues involved. It also does not factor the Chinese response, which could be to redouble its efforts to cement a sphere of influence in the South Pacific. If that were to occur, tensions can be expected to rise on both sides of the containment “fence.”
Given the uncertainties involved and its weak position vis a vis the PRC, New Zealand’s support for the US-led South Pacific Chinese containment strategy can therefore be considered a delicate balancing act that potentially has as much of a downside as it does an upside.

Club Em Designs

X-Post from Grubsheet: #56 KEVIN RUDD’S PACIFIC NEGLECT

By Graham Davis

– February 25, 2012Posted in: All

Frank Bainimarama ( photo: Graham Davis )

Frank Bainimarama – Fiji’s prime minister and the current chair of the four-nation Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) – has joined the chorus of criticism of Kevin Rudd in advance of Monday’s leadership vote in Australia, accusing him of having neglected the Pacific as foreign minister. He said Canberra’s lack of attention to the region – and especially its policy of shunning Fiji – had weakened Australian influence in the Pacific and had created a vacuum that bigger powers were moving to fill. Countries such as China and Russia were building relations with the smaller island states and strengthening their presence in Australia’s backyard. “They should be worried but they’re not”, he said. “ I don’t think they are taking it very seriously”.

In an interview with Grubsheet in Suva, Commodore Bainimarama revealed that both the United States and New Zealand had broken ranks with Australia and had renewed their official contacts with Fiji, severed after his coup in December 2006. No Australian diplomat or minister has had a formal meeting with the Fijian leader in the intervening five years in protest at the removal at gunpoint of the elected government of Laisenia Qarase, which Bainimarama claimed was racist and corrupt. Yet the United States no longer has such qualms, evidently concerned that Australia’s continuing hard-line stance has driven the Fijian leader into the arms of the Chinese.

Contact resumed : Frankie Reed 
( Photo: US State Dept) 

The American ambassador in Suva, Frankie Reed, has resumed regular contacts and a team of FBI agents has been in the Fijian capital training local police. “We have no problems with our relationship with the United States”, Bainimarama said. “The American ambassador came to see me and attends all our functions. She’s friendly and our relationship is good”. While the Fijian leader is banned from Australia – along with anyone associated with his regime – he was granted an open visa to visit the US last September and had engagements in Connecticut, Florida and Tennessee. “It seems odd that I am welcome in the world’s greatest democracy and not Australia and NZ but I’ve come to accept it”, he said.

In the case of New Zealand, Commodore Bainimarama said the renewed level of engagement was more modest. The travel bans on him and members of the regime remained but unlike Mr Rudd, the NZ foreign minister, Murray McCully, had been in contact with Fiji’s foreign minister, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola. “I think the Kiwis are more understanding than the Australians. I don’t really know why but there’s a large number of Fijians in NZ and I think they’ve put pressure on them to talk to us”. “I see representatives of some of the world’s biggest democracies – the Americans, the Indians, the Indonesians, the Japanese, the South Koreans and the French but not Australia. It doesn’t make sense”, he said.

"Increasing acceptance"(photo: Graham Davis)

While the Fijian leader declined to speculate on why American policy had changed beyond agreeing that an “about face” had taken place, concern has been expressed in Washington about Beijing’s ambitions in the region and especially its close ties with Fiji. Describing China as a “friend” which had given Fiji “about $200-million in soft loans”, Commodore Bainimarama said Australia only had itself to blame for the increasing Chinese presence in the region. “They are giving us support politically because everyone has withdrawn. They have recognised our sovereignty, which is very important for us”, Bainimarama said.
The Fijian leader said Mr Rudd had been noticeably absent from regional capitals during his 17 months in the foreign affairs portfolio. He had made only one foray into the region, a single weekend trip to Papua New Guinea last October. “We have never seen him around the smaller Pacific island nation states”, Bainimarama said. “He’s complained about everyone coming here but hasn’t come here himself.”

Sergey Lavrov in Nadi (photo: Jet newspaper)

The Fijian leader contrasted Mr Rudd’s lack of interest with the recent visit to Fiji by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who made the first ever journey to the region by a senior Russian official. He said that unlike Australia, Russia appeared to recognised the growing importance of the smaller island states and wanted closer ties. “Maybe he (Lavrov) thinks everyone has backed off and this part of the world needs assistance”, he said. During his visit to Nadi at the beginning of the month, Mr Lavrov held talks with Commodore Bainimarama and other Pacific leaders who are members of a new voting bloc at the United Nations that Fiji has played a major role in forging – the eleven member Pacific Small Island  Developing States ( PSIDS).

Graham Davis On Grubsheet

"Describing China as a “friend” which had given Fiji “about $200-million in soft loans”, Commodore Bainimarama said Australia only had itself to blame for the increasing Chinese presence in the region[...]
The Fijian leader contrasted Mr Rudd’s lack of interest with the recent visit to Fiji by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, who made the first ever journey to the region by a senior Russian official. He said that unlike Australia, Russia appeared to recognised the growing importance of the smaller island states and wanted closer ties
[...]The Fijian leader accused Australia and NZ of driving a wedge through the Pacific by playing Polynesian countries off against their Melanesian neighbours. He described the Samoan leader, Tuilaepa Malielegao, as an “Aussie and Kiwi puppet” for his continuing attacks on Fiji."

The Fijian leader castigated Mr Rudd’s junior minister for the Pacific, Richard Marles, for having expressed concern that Russia was exploiting small states in the Pacific and was engaged in chequebook diplomacy. “He (Marles) is a hypocrite. He’s talking about chequebook diplomacy? Hasn’t he been giving money to the Pacific island nations in the last five or ten years?” Commodore Bainimarama denied that Mr Lavrov had offered Fiji and the other PSIDS countries financial assistance to recognise its puppet governments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia – territory also claimed by Georgia. “He gave Fiji a donation to help us with our flood appeal but that was it”.

"Hypocrite" - Richard Marles (Photo: DFAT)

Australia cut off ties with Fiji after Commodore Bainimarama’s 2006 coup and imposed a set of “smart sanctions” – including travel bans – in support of its demand for an immediate return to democracy. The Fijian leader has steadfastly refused to comply, insisting instead on a new constitution to remove racial inequality, followed by elections in 2014 based on one man one vote. Previous elections in Fiji have been weighted in favour of the indigenous majority.

As foreign minister, Mr Rudd resolutely ignored pleas to re-engage with Fiji, including from two influential foreign affairs think tanks, the Lowy Institute and the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI). Last year, the head of the Lowy Institute’s Melanesian program, Jenny Hayward-Jones, also accused Mr Rudd of neglecting the region and called for re-engagement to encourage Fiji to stick to its promise to restore democracy in 2014.

Commodore Bainimarama said Australian policy towards Fiji under Kevin Rudd was governed by “pride, not good policy”.“ He has personalised it, the way he called me a pariah and a dictator. He is a very ambitious politician and it’s been clear that he wanted to be prime minister again”. Describing Mr Rudd as the “main impediment” to better relations with Australia, Commodore Bainimarama said Canberra had continued to insist on an immediate election in Fiji even though it could never be truly democratic without fundamental reforms. “We are beginning work in a couple of weeks on a new constitution. We are not going to have elections tomorrow. We’re not going to have elections next year. We’re going to have elections when we’re ready and that will be before September 2014, as I’ve said all along”.

Commodore Bainimarama said his election as chairman of the Melanesian Spearhead Group after Australia succeeded in having Fiji suspended from the Pacific Islands Forum – the other major regional grouping  -showed that Canberra was out of touch with sentiment in the region. The MSG encompasses 95 per cent of Pacific islanders, living in its member states of   Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu plus the Kanaks of New Caledonia. “Only Canberra and Wellington see me as an outcast”, Commodore Bainimarama said. “Nobody else does”.

Prefers another Queen's man, Tony Abbott (Photo: Graham Davis)

The Fijian leader accused Australia and NZ of driving a wedge through the Pacific by playing Polynesian countries off against their Melanesian neighbours. He described the Samoan leader, Tuilaepa Malielegao, as an “Aussie and Kiwi puppet” for his continuing attacks on Fiji. Tuilaepa has accused Commodore Bainimarama of “lying” about his intention to return to democracy in 2014 and said he was “leading everyone down the cassava patch”.

The Fijian leader said he was not willing to trade insults with his Samoan counterpart but it was clear that he was doing the bidding of Australia and NZ. “It seems that every time he runs out of money, somebody winds him up and he plays to their tune. He goes “Fiji is no good, there’s a lot of problems in Fiji”. I don’t know why he spends a lot of time rubbishing Fiji but I have no time to be thinking about him”, he said.
Commodore Bainimarama said that while he “didn’t want to get involved in Australian domestic politics”,

Fiji’s best hope for a change in Australia’s attitude rested with Tony Abbott winning the next election. “I understand that Abbott is more understanding of the situation than Kevin Rudd and his team. And, yes, I would think there may be a change in policy.” Commodore Bainimarama agreed that Tony Abbott’s reputation as a sportsman and champion boxer meant that he was more likely to get on with him. “I would love him to bring about some change in policy, in the way we conduct our business. Yes, I will try to reach out to him if he wins. He’s welcome in Suva at any time”.

A shorter version of this article has appeared in News Limited papers in Australia, including Sydney’s Daily Telegraph.


Club Em Designs

X-Post- Harvard Political Review: Papua New Guinea’s Great Power Conflict

By John F.M. Kocsis

In one of the coming decades’ most important developments, tensions between the United States and China have begun to escalate on a whole host of new fronts. Prospects for the presidency have soared to new heights of monetary nationalism, the Obama administration has announced plans to station 2,500 marines in the Pacific, and Chinese diplomats have turned up the heat on American allies in the South China Sea.

As in all great rivalries, China and America both have proxies whom they support, provided the junior partners act in their interest.  One such proxy nation is Papua New Guinea, the resource-rich Pacific nation whose domestic political instability has made it a surprising focus of American and Chinese geopolitical maneuvering.

John F.M. Kocsis

"As in all great rivalries, China and America both have proxies whom they support, provided the junior partners act in their interest[...]
A surface-level reading of this scenario focuses on an internal struggle within government leadership over political control and resources, a common occurrence in developing nations. However, a broader and perhaps more accurate view of the situation requires putting it in terms of American and Chinese interests[...]
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admonished Somare for getting too close to his neighbor to the north. She warned of a “resource curse,” insinuating that he would fail as leader if he lacked commitment to good governance, transparency, and accountability. Clinton has taken a Kissinger-esque stand when it comes to the nation, urging the U.S. Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, “Let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in and let’s just talk straight, realpolitik[...]"

Of potential flashpoints for conflict in the Pacific arena, Papua New Guinea is generally less studied than its regional counterparts, such as the Philippines and Vietnam.  New Guinean history is primarily viewed through the lens of Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel.  This ignores the island’s long history on the world stage.  A battleground between Allied and Japanese forces in World War II, the country was restored to Australian ownership at the campaign’s end.  Sir Michael Somare, a perennial leader of Papua New Guinea, finally won his people independence in 1975 – but ever since, the Melanesian state has been fraught with conflict.

Despite recent military developments, Papua New Guinea is ostensibly in the throes of a petty constitutional crisis.  Sir Michael Somare, in his fourth nonconsecutive role as prime minister until this past August, has returned from his convalescence in Singapore claiming to be the country’s rightful legislative chief.  The person serving in that position now, Peter O’Neill, toppled the placeholder Somare who appointed in August and was voted by the parliament as the rightful prime minister.  The small nation’s supreme court ruled that because Somare left for heart surgery with full intention to reclaim his seat, he is legally entitled to the role of prime minister. By and large, parliament disagrees – and Papua New Guinean ministers strongly support the new prime minister, Peter O’Neill.  This vehement disagreement at the highest levels of government led to a mutiny attempt to remove O’Neill and restore Somare.

The rebellion was successful at first.  Hired by Michael Somare, the Indonesian colonel Yaura Sasa and his troops seized control of the military barracks in Port Moresby, the capital, and captured Brigadier-General Francis Agwi, the Commander of the PNG Defense Force.  After days of escalation, soldiers surrendered their weapons on January 30.  They promised to stand down instead of facing prison time.  The colonel was jailed but later released on the grounds that he was merely operating under government commands.  The government of Sir Michael Somare, which the Supreme Court deemed legitimate, had, after all, executed the order.

A surface-level reading of this scenario focuses on an internal struggle within government leadership over political control and resources, a common occurrence in developing nations. However, a broader and perhaps more accurate view of the situation requires putting it in terms of American and Chinese interests.  Papua New Guinea is an attractive destination for investors due to its untapped 22.6 trillion cubic feet in natural gas, not to mention its copper and gold wealth.  Exxon Mobil is working on a $15.7 billion liquefied natural gas project that should due to be completed in 2014.  The China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) is developing China’s largest overseas mining investment, a $1.6 billion attempt to exploit 140 million tons of nickel.

As is typical of situations in which foreign investment is involved, outside nations require government compliance in forging ahead with their designs.  China had an easy time injecting itself in the nation when Somare was in charge.  The once and perhaps future prime minister supported Chinese interests in his Environment Act, which amended the law so that landowners could no longer contest damaging activities on their land – a move that authorized the MCC’s plan to dump toxic mine waste into the Bismarck Sea.  This provision was repealed by the O’Neill government, which claimed to look out for both the environment and the rights of its constituents.

The acts of Peter O’Neill are not necessarily so principled.  While Somare instituted a “look north” policy during his tenure, O’Neill has increasingly conducted his primary business with Julia Gillard and her Labor government in Australia.  Sir Michael Somare saw China as the country to emulate.  He invited members of the People’s Liberation Army to train the Papua New Guinea Defense Force.  He also established a program for PNG officers to undertake military training in the People’s Republic of China for up to three years.  Historically, since Papua New Guinean independence, training aid had been under the aegis of Australia, New Zealand, and the United States.  In the past couple of months, O’Neill has attempted to revert to those days, inviting Australian troops back to the island.

Last spring, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton admonished Somare for getting too close to his neighbor to the north. She warned of a “resource curse,” insinuating that he would fail as leader if he lacked commitment to good governance, transparency, and accountability.  Clinton has taken a Kissinger-esque stand when it comes to the nation, urging the U.S. Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, “Let’s put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in and let’s just talk straight, realpolitik.” She bluntly claimed that China is trying to “come in under us” regarding “Papua New Guinea’s huge energy find.” As if there was any doubt, she strongly asserted, “We are in a competition with China.”

U.S. diplomats aren’t the only ones to recognize the recent skirmish’s implications on the Chinese-American divide.  Resentful PNG citizens have circulated text messages claiming, “The Somare regime existed through Asian mafia’s funding.” Papua New Guinea has experienced the rapid rise in Chinese immigrants to which the entire Pacific region has become accustomed.  Nativist anti-Chinese riots ulcerated in 2009; accordingly, most citizens strongly prefer America to China. However, as America’s unipolar moment fades into a period of increased Chinese assertiveness, it is not hard to imagine a future of Chinese dominance in Papua New Guinea.  Pacific Islanders might not like their new neighbors, but many established politicians have a tendency to get along with Beijing just fine.  As China’s aggression continues, its influence is unlikely to go anywhere but up. .

Club Em Designs

X-Post: Strategic Culture-Checkbook Diplomacy Doesn’t Apply to the United States

Wayne MADSEN | 07.02.2012 | 15:29

The United States, Australia, and New Zealand and their ally in Tbilisi, Mikheil Saakashvili, are upset that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently visited Fiji. The fear from Washington, Canberra, Wellington, and Tbilisi was that Lavrov was going to offer Fiji lucrative financial assistance in return for the South Pacific nation’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The two countries broke away from Georgia, triggering a war between Georgia and Russia in 2008

While the Obama administration is cautioning Fiji about recognizing the independence of the two secessionist republics in return for economic aid from Moscow, something Washington calls Taiwan-style “checkbook diplomacy,” it is more than happy to reward other countries with special incentives if they recognize the independence of America’s creation in the Balkans that was severed from Serbia, Kosovo.

The United States has complained, along with its two surrogate “sheriffs” in the Pacific region – Australia and New Zealand – that Russia’s offer of economic perks to Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu, three nations that have never managed to fully break free of Western colonialist dictates, resulted in those nations’ decisions to recognize the independence of Abkhazia. While Vanuatu recognized only Abkhazia during a government crisis in Port-Vila, the Vanuatu capital, Nauru and Tuvalu recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Previously, only Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognized the two breakaway nations, with Washington charging that Russia offered military and other deals to Nicaragua and Venezuela in return for their recognition of the two emergent nations.

Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd lived up to the Australian Labor Party’s total subservience to the United States by calling for transparency in Russia’s dealings with the South Pacific states. Yet Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies to the small Pacific nations has often been based on secret intelligence agreements between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, including the signals intelligence alliance between the three nations that makes the diplomatic communications of the South Pacific states and all telecommunications in the South Pacific subject to eavesdropping by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).

Georgia has argued that the cases of Abkhazia/South Ossetia and Kosovo are un-related. However, the United States has cajoled a number of nations into recognizing Kosovo, the latest being Ghana. In return for recognition, Washington has granted countries recognizing the organized crime-imbued regime in Pristina, the Kosovo capital, with the same sort of perks that the United States has accused Russia of providing the South Pacific and Latin American states that have recognized Abkhazia/South Ossetia. While the United States condemns the “checkbook diplomacy” practiced for years by Taiwan and China to gain and swap diplomatic recognition from mostly poor and small nations, it has practiced the same sort of “checkbook diplomacy” with regard to Kosovo.

A State Department cable divulged by WikiLeaks points to the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy and how Washington has pressured countries into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia by exerting pressure directly or via its allies.

On February 22, 2010, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Quito, Ecuador cited the visit by the Abkhazian Vice Foreign Minister to Quito and referred to U.S. concern that Ecuador’s Multilateral Affairs Under Secretary Arturo Cabrera had met the Abkhazian official in preparation for the announcement of diplomatic relations. The cable states:

“Cabrera said that the MFA too was surprised by the Vice Foreign Minister's visit, and indicated that nothing materialized from it. He gave the impression that he considered it unlikely the GOE would recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia as independent states, although he did not say so directly. Cabrera also informed us that the issue was handled by Bilateral Affairs rather than his office. When the opportunity arises, the Embassy will raise the issue also with the MFA's Bilateral Affairs office.”

Previously, on January 26, 2010, the U.S. embassy in Peru ensured that a Peruvian official would raise Washington’s objections with Ecuador over Abkhazia/South Ossetia at a South American defense meeting:

“Charge raised reftel points regarding the Government of Ecuador's potentially recognizing the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with MFA Under Secretary for the Americas Ambassador Javier Leon January 25. Leon said he planned to travel to Ecuador this week for a UNASUR meeting of Vice Ministers of Defense, and would raise the issue with his GOE [Government of Ecuador]
counterparts at that time.”

Wayne Madsen

"The fear from Washington, Canberra, Wellington, and Tbilisi was that Lavrov was going to offer Fiji lucrative financial assistance in return for the South Pacific nation’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "

The same day, the U.S. embassy in Chile tried to use Chile to pressure Ecuador not to recognize the two secessionist nations but with little success:

“Poloff [Political Officer] delivered reftel demarche to Eduardo Schott, Deputy Director for European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Schott was unaware of Ecuador's potential decision to recognize the independence of the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He will consult with colleagues about the possibility of raising the issue with Ecuador. He said that Chile is comfortable sharing its reasons for not recognizing the regions, but other countries are free to make their own decision.”

Nauru’s decision to recognize Abkhazia/South Ossetia was seen as a “comedy” according to a December 16, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi:

“Georgian officials downplayed the significance of Nauru's apparent December 14 recognition of Abkhazia's "independence," which Russia reportedly encouraged with an offer of $50 million to the island nation. Although officials are discussing with Australian counterparts whether the recognition is actually final, Reintegration Minister Yakobashvili joked in public about Russia's apparent purchase of the recognition, calling it a "comedy," while Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria told us privately the step was not so important, even if it was true. The relaxed approach represents a welcome shift from Georgia's more manic reaction to previous recognitions by Venezuela and Nicaragua, an approach that we have actively encouraged with our Georgian counterparts. Georgia has also recognized and expressed appreciation for successful U.S. efforts to discourage additional recognitions from Latin American countries . . .”

Perhaps the most draconian use of U.S. pressure regarding recognition of Abkhazia / South Ossetia was the pressure Washington, London, and Paris applied on four poor African states, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, that signaled a willingness to establish relations with the secessionist states. The information is contained in a September 1, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi. The relevant sections of the cable are as follows:

“Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called in the U.S. and UK ambassadors August 31 to request urgent assistance on two matters. First, the Georgians learned that four African countries -- Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali -- are seriously considering recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Georgians want help dissuading them from doing so . . . Vashadze told the ambassadors that the Georgian Embassy in Paris learned from the Quai d'Orsay that Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Mali were seriously considering taking the step of recognition. He considered this information quite reliable. He expressed great concern that such a step would undermine many of Georgia's diplomatic successes over the past year. He was especially concerned that Russia will orchestrate an announcement of these recognitions at the UN General Assembly, saying that such announcement would be an absolute catastrophe, especially if it occurred when President Saakashvili was in New York. ”

The four African nations were pressured into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

Other leaked State Department cables illustrate Washington’s pressure on various nations, including Spain, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Zambia, Guatemala, South Africa, Brunei, Djibouti, and even the tiny Maldives through the same sort of financial incentives and diplomatic “sweeteners” Washington accused Russia applying on the South Pacific states in return for recognition of Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

When it comes to hypocrisy, there is no greater world center for it than the U.S. Department of State. However, thanks to the leaks of State Department cables, the hypocrisy of the State Department and the Obama administration in foreign policy can be read in their own words.

Club Em Designs

X-Post from Grubsheet: The Politics of Hate

 Most countries have laws that prevent religious and racial vilification. Most responsible media outlets – including those on the internet – excise comments designed to inflame religious and racial hatred.  Read more - THE POLITICS OF HATE

X-Post Whale Oil:The job ad the Law Society banned

by Whaleoil on February 4, 2012

I contacted Christopher Pryde, the Director of Public Prosecutions in Fiji via email. I asked about the ad that the NZ Law Society banned and the details of the position. His reply:

There is only one at this stage but it is fairly high level. I had intended to advertise some more junior posts in a few weeks. I’m still always interested in hearing from anyone who might be interested in working in the office.

This position, as with my position and all positions in the office are non-political which means we look only at whether there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable prospect of conviction in court. As Director, the decision to prosecute (or withdraw charges) is mine alone and I receive no directions from any government minister and certainly not the military.

Here is the job ad the NZ Law Society banned:

The Job Ad the NZ Law Society banned


The Job Ad the NZ Law Society banned

The Jet article

NZ Law Society refuses Fiji ads

The New Zealand Law Society (“NZLS”) has refused to allow the Fijian Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) to advertise legal positions in its magazine, Law Talk.

An email to the Office of the DPP this morning (3.2.12), said “The New Zealand Law Society Board has decided unanimously that the NZLS will not accept advertisements for legal positions in Fiji under the current interim military regime”.

The Director of Public Prosecutions, Mr Christopher Pryde, said it was unfortunate that the NZLS was involving itself in politics and preventing New Zealand lawyers from hearing about job vacancies in Fiji.

He said: “It is unfortunate that New Zealand lawyers are being denied the opportunity to decide for themselves whether they wish to take up legal positions in Fiji. By refusing to allow us the right to advertise, the NZLS is effectively censoring what New Zealand lawyers know about Fiji.”

The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions in an independent office and the Director of Public Prosecutions has the sole responsibility for criminal prosecutions in Fiji. This is without recourse to any Government minister, including the Attorney-General. The Office in that regard is non-political.

Mr Pryde said he remains concerned that the NZLS continues to have an inaccurate picture of the Fijian situation, in particular of the judiciary and the courts. “People charged with offences by the Police need to be prosecuted through the courts. What shall we do with people charged with rape or robbery or murder? Send them to New Zealand?” Mr Pryde said.

“My invitation to the NZLS still stands. They are welcome to visit Fiji and meet and talk to anyone without restriction so that they can obtain for themselves a first-hand appraisal of things in Fiji. In the meantime, we would appreciate the NZLS allowing lawyers to decide things for themselves and allow us the right to advertise,” he said.

Club Em Designs

Russian Foreign Affairs Minister Touches Down In Fiji.

 

Russian Federation’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov  and

Fiji Foreign Affairs Minister Ratu Inoke Kubuabola (Images: MoI)

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov arrived in Fiji on Wednesday to pay his country's first high- level visit to the Pacific island nation. Braving heavy storms, Lavrov was warmly welcomed by Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama with a traditional ceremony. 

Lavrov expressed his thanks and pleasure for the Fijian " hospitality" and "warm welcome", saying "as far as I understand, during my words with Mr. Prime Minister, this ritual goes back to ancient times when the natives of the island met sailors coming from far away. We have felt the sincerity of your hearts in this ritual. It will be forever enshrined in our memory."

Lavrov will meet individually with Bainimarama and his Fijian counterpart Ratu Inoke Kuabuabola on ways of promoting economic cooperation between the two nations. "I look forward to very interesting and meaningful and promising talks today on the hospitable land of Fiji," Lavrov said.

Story: China Radio International 

Club Em Designs