X-Post-Grubsheet: #99 SMALL COUNTRY, BIG VOICE

 By Graham Davis

– June 22, 2012Posted in: All

Fiji chairs the UN General Assembly (Photo: UN)

The sight of Fiji’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Peter Thomson, chairing the General Assembly is yet another reminder that although Fiji is a relatively small country, it punches way above its weight. This week, Peter has been Acting President of the General Assembly, conducting the everyday business of the UN from the famous podium that has produced some of  history’s most memorable images – from Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat waving his pistol to Soviet leader Nikita Kruschev banging his shoe. Along with hundreds of speeches from everyone from Che Guevara to Nelson Mandela, from the Queen to Frank Bainimarama.

Thirsty work: Peter Thomson (l) with his Fiji Water within reach (Photo:UN)

It was especially apt that with Ambassador Thomson in the chair, the General Assembly considered reports about the financing of UN peacekeeping operations. This is what really makes Fiji an indispensable member of the club of nations – its ability and willingness to provide troops to wear the UN blue beret in some of the world’s toughest places. All Fijians owe a great debt to the men and women of the military who’ve given their unstinting service – and sometimes their lives – to improving the lives of ordinary people in the Middle East and elsewhere by protecting them from conflict. And for sending the money they earn home to help support their communities in Fiji.

Fijian UN peacekeepers ( photo: UN)

It’s made heroes in the most unlikely places of tough but softly spoken people from island villages on the far side of the world. And it’s given a country of which many would otherwise never have heard gratitude and respect.  Yes, Fiji gets an important source of revenue from its peacekeeping operations. But it remains one of the few nations able and willing to put its troops in the firing line to defend the UN ideal of collective responsibility for all the world’s people.

Ambassador Semesa Sikivou (r) with UN Secretary General U Thant in 1970 ( Photo: UN)

Graham Davis

" Peter has worked tirelessly for the country’s interests, shifting the axis of its global relationships from its traditional western allies to a policy of being “a friend to all”. He has spearheaded the Bainimarama government’s Look North Policy, launched formal diplomatic relations with more than three dozen countries and organised its membership of the Non Aligned Movement[...]

Fiji gain the benefit of lining up with some of the biggest players of the Asia Pacific region, the global powerhouse of the 21st century. And it has moved these countries out from under the skirts of their “big brothers” Australia and New Zealand, which belong to an entirely separate UN bloc – the Western European and Others Group. "

Peter Thomson is the latest in a long line of Fijians who’ve represented the country in New York, starting with the late Semesa Sikivou at the time of independence in 1970. He has had a remarkable personal and professional history. The son of Sir Ian Thomson– one of the most respected administrators of the colonial era who stayed on to head the sugar industry and Air Pacific – Peter began his career as a district officer in Fiji and was then a diplomat in Tokyo and Sydney. He was Permanent Secretary for Information when – with a pistol on the table – Sitiveni Rabuka forced him to write the formal announcement of the first coup of 1987. Then, after he became permanent secretary to the then governor-general, Ratu Sir Penaia Ganilau, Peter became a target of ethno-nationalist extremists in the second coup of the same year. He was tracked down and thrown into a prison cell for several days before being forced to leave the country altogether.

Peter effectively spent more than 20 years in exile, first in New Zealand and then Australia, where he became a successful writer and authored Kava in the Blood, a compelling account of his life in Fiji. Then out of the blue three years ago came a call from Frank Bainimarama’s office. Would he agree to represent Fiji at the UN?

Ambassador Peter Thomson with UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon ( Photo:UN)

Would he ever. Grubsheet – an old friend – recalls the immense satisfaction for Peter in being recalled to represent his country of birth. It was as if his life had come full circle, the lifting of a two-decade long punctuation mark in his career of service to Fiji.

In New York, Peter has worked tirelessly for the country’s interests, shifting the axis of its global relationships from its traditional western allies to a policy of being “a friend to all”. He has spearheaded the Bainimarama government’s Look North Policy, launched formal diplomatic relations with more than three dozen countries and organised its membership of the Non Aligned Movement. He has vigorously pursued Fiji’s interests in such areas as tackling global warming and rising sea levels, preserving the maritime environment and, of course, the peacekeeping operations that are so important to the country’s economy and prestige. And he has played a vital role in batting off attempts by Australia and New Zealand to have Fiji excluded from those operations as punishment for the 2006 coup.

Frank Bainimarama addresses the UN (Photo:UN)

Even more importantly, perhaps, Peter has taken steps to fundamentally lift Fiji’s status in the global community. He was a prime mover in the formation of the UN voting bloc known as the Pacific Small Island Developing States (PSIDS), which gives Pacific nations a far bigger voice in global affairs by acting in concert. PSIDS has succeeded in joining the Asian Group at the UN, which is now officially known as the Asian and Pacific Small Island Developing States Group. This means countries like Fiji gain the benefit of lining up with some of the biggest players of the Asia Pacific region, the global powerhouse of the 21^st century. And it has moved these countries out from under the skirts of their  “big brothers” Australia and New Zealand, which belong to an entirely separate UN bloc – the Western European and Others Group.

The strategic importance of such a re-alignment cannot be overstated. It certainly underlines a fundamental truth about life in the global village for small nations like Fiji. They may not have the ability to project the same power and influence as their bigger neighbours. But in the UN system, it’s numbers, not brawn, that really counts, except for the five permanent members of the Security Council, who enjoy powers of veto. Every other nation gets just one vote. And that is certainly exercising the minds of the Australians right now as they mount a global campaign to get a temporary Security Council seat. Given Canberra’s present hostility towards Fiji, it certainly cannot expect to get Fiji’s support.

An effective foreign minister: Ratu Inoke Kubuabola ( Photo:UN)

Peter Thomson, of course, is a cog in the wheel of Fiji’s international relationships, albeit a big one. His ultimate boss, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola  has been a successful foreign minister and the two enjoy a close relationship as they work with other ambassadors and diplomatic staff to further Fiji’s international ties. And they, in turn, have the confidence of the Prime Minister, Frank Bainimarama, who’s become an effective advocate himself both for Fiji and the region in global forums – most recently at the environment summit in Brazil. However much the regime’s critics might decry Commodore Bainimarama’s penchant for globe-trotting, a small country’s loudest voice will always come from its leader and lower-level representation rarely has the same impact. It’s simply a fact of life that for Fiji to be heard, the Prime Minister needs to travel widely to properly put its case.

His Excellency in his previous incarnation as an author (Photo: Peter Thomson)

It was Bainimarama who hand picked Peter Thomson for the UN job. Their fathers had known each other in the 1960s when Thomson Senior was Commissioner Western and Bainimarama Senior was the region’s Supervisor of Prisons. Almost half a century on, Grubsheet is pleased to have played a minor part in re-establishing the connection when – after an interview with the Prime Minister- we talked about the old days in the West and I mentioned that Peter and I got together regularly in Sydney to talanoa about Fiji. Bainimarama’s eyes lit up and while he didn’t say so at the time, he evidently began mulling over the possibility of using Peter in some senior role.

Soon afterwards, Peter began a private mission – financed by veteran Fiji businessmen Mark Johnson and Dick Smith – to try to bridge the gap between Fiji and its Australian and NZ critics. He went to Port Moresby to enlist the support of the PNG leader, Sir Michael Somare, and the initiative produced the first meeting of the respective parties for some time.

That was in 2009. Three years on and Ambassador Thomson is chairing the United Nations General Assembly. It’s a triumphant personal story, the Kai Valagi (European) civil servant removed at gunpoint and forced to leave Fiji now sitting as moderator and adjudicator at the pinnacle of global affairs. But it’s also one of the triumphs of Bainimarama’s determination to use the best people- irrespective of race – to present Fiji’s face to the world. To see my old mate sitting there on the UN podium – Fiji Water bottle by his side – fills me with pride, as it surely must others who hope that Fiji’s best days as a united, prosperous, multiracial nation lie ahead.


Club Em Designs

X-Post- Scoop: A New Containment Policy In The South Pacific

Friday, 24 February 2012, 11:45 am

A Word From Afar –
By Paul G. Buchanan
 
One of the interesting aspects of the leaked emails between Foreign Minister Murray McCully and MP Johns Hayes, a former diplomat, is the latter’s mention of the need to “resist” China’s growing presence in the South Pacific. With that simple advice Mr. Hayes has revealed a much larger issue, one that undoubtedly has been discussed at length with New Zealand’s major allies, Australia and the US. The issue is how to contain China. 

Along with nuclear deterrence, “containment” was at the heart of Western approaches to the Cold War. The strategy of containment was to resist and counter-balance Soviet influence in the Third World, including the South Pacific. New Zealand had a significant role in the application of anti-Soviet containment in the South Pacific, and its diplomatic, military and intelligence assets were used to that end. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, there followed a decade of relatively benign neglect of the South Pacific by traditional Western patrons, who cast their geostrategic gaze elsewhere and prioritized accordingly.

Into that breach stepped the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which used phenomenal economic growth to expand its sphere of influence throughout the Western Pacific basin and beyond. As an emerging great power China must fuel its growth via the importation of raw materials from new investment markets, and must extend its influence (and deploy force) along the sea lines of communication through which these imports flow (with the South Pacific now being a major corridor between South American and Australasian investment and trade with the Chinese mainland).

In the South Pacific, China’s interest has been manifest in the use of “chequebook diplomacy” to provide aid and investment unencumbered by “good governance” and transparency requirements upon which most Western aid and investment is based. Besides winning friends in the Pacific Island Community (PIC) with this practice, the PRC also encourages Chinese migration to the region as a source of semi-skilled and skilled labour (most of the Chinese-funded infrastructure development projects in the South Pacific require the use of Chinese rather than local labour).

Resident Chinese communities now constitute important segments of the merchant and investor classes in places like Fiji, Tonga and the Solomon Islands, where they are suspected by Western intelligence agencies of engaging in human intelligence collection on behalf of the homeland.
To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics).

Chinese navy surface vessels now make regular port calls throughout the South Pacific, and its submarines are reported to make 6-10 deployments per year deep into Southern waters, often tailing a growing Chinese fishing fleet that has on-shore processing facilities throughout the region and which is suspected of providing cover for Chinese signals intelligence monitoring.
It was not until the mid 2000s that the US and its South Pacific allies reacted to this trend. Since then, the US has shifted its strategic priority away from Europe and towards East Asia, including moving the bulk of its naval assets to the Pacific. The US has re-opened aid and trade missions in the PIC, and most importantly, has solidified and expanded its security ties with Australia and New Zealand (including the November 2011 “Wellington Declaration” whereby New Zealand was restored as a full security partner of the US after years of tension stemming from its 1985 non-nuclear decision).

Paul G. Buchanan


"To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics)

[...]In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode."

The twist in this tale is that both Australia and New Zealand have become increasingly dependent on trade with the PRC, which has caused them to pay much diplomatic lip service to the concept of mutual interest with the PRC and given an increasingly Asian focus to their respective foreign policies.
However the reality, as indelicately phrased by Mr. Hayes, is that not only the US but also Canberra and Wellington fear the emergence of China in the South Pacific because its rise has the potential for supplanting the US-led alliance as the dominant regional player. Thus the strengthening of trilateral security ties between them and the expansion of their bi- and multi-lateral diplomatic overtures (mostly couched in the language of developmental aid) within the context of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and South Pacific Community (SPC). Along with EU engagement with the PIC (now on the wane), the diplomatic re-emphasis is designed to counter-balance Chinese influence and restore a pre-eminent Western orientation in the PIC.

All of this involves a mix of “hard” and “soft” power (using military, diplomatic and economic instruments) in order to engage in the “smart” use of aggregated Western influence in the face of Chinese regional inroads. If nothing else, renewed Western involvement in the South Pacific raises the economic and diplomatic costs to the Chinese of maintaining their position, which in turn diverts resources that otherwise could be directed elsewhere. The South Pacific Chinese containment strategy, in other words, is directed at “rolling back” Chinese regional influence.

In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode.
For Australia, with its mineral resources coveted by the Chinese and an association with the US that is seeing it gradually replace the UK as the US’s major military ally, the issue of containing China’s South Pacific ambitions can be justified as being one born of strength and self-interest: the Chinese need Australia’s resources more than they need a confrontation with it, and alliance with the US is set to make Australia a global military and diplomatic player in the years to come. Australia’s interests extend far beyond its immediate vicinity, so the South Pacific containment strategy is one piece in a larger geopolitical strategy in which it holds significant leverage vis a vis the PRC. China can live with that.

For New Zealand the situation is different. Revelation of the Chinese containment strategy in the South Pacific places New Zealand on the horns of a Melian dilemma: as a small island state caught in the middle of an incipient great power struggle, it has attempted to balance the two by increasingly trading with the PRC while renewing its security ties to the US. But New Zealand has no strategic leverage on the PRC, and is more dependent on Chinese trade and investment than vice versa. Thus the situation may become untenable for New Zealand the more its commitment to containing the PRC is made apparent in light of increasing tensions between the two great powers in the Western Pacific. In that event it will be forced to choose sides rather than suffer the fate of Melos, whose neutrality in the Peloponnesian Wars was rewarded by its invasion and sacking by the Athenians.

In the New Zealand version of this dilemma, the choice will be between trade and security, at which point the commitment to South Pacific containment will receive its sternest test. New Zealand’s hedge against this dilemma is ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multinational trade and investment compact involving the US that excludes the PRC and which is currently under negotiation. The TPP is the economic component of the China containment strategy, as it is designed to link the most important East and South Asian economies with Antipodean and Western Hemisphere partners. The PRC understands the fence-ringing thrust of the TPP within the larger geostrategic context, and has objected, without success, to its exclusion.

Should the TPP be ratified and entered into force, potential loss of Chinese trade and investment could be compensated y the increase in trade and investment between TPP partners. That is a theoretical gain rather than a certain one given the multiplicity of actors and issues involved. It also does not factor the Chinese response, which could be to redouble its efforts to cement a sphere of influence in the South Pacific. If that were to occur, tensions can be expected to rise on both sides of the containment “fence.”
Given the uncertainties involved and its weak position vis a vis the PRC, New Zealand’s support for the US-led South Pacific Chinese containment strategy can therefore be considered a delicate balancing act that potentially has as much of a downside as it does an upside.

Club Em Designs

X-Post: Strategic Culture-Checkbook Diplomacy Doesn’t Apply to the United States

Wayne MADSEN | 07.02.2012 | 15:29

The United States, Australia, and New Zealand and their ally in Tbilisi, Mikheil Saakashvili, are upset that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently visited Fiji. The fear from Washington, Canberra, Wellington, and Tbilisi was that Lavrov was going to offer Fiji lucrative financial assistance in return for the South Pacific nation’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The two countries broke away from Georgia, triggering a war between Georgia and Russia in 2008

While the Obama administration is cautioning Fiji about recognizing the independence of the two secessionist republics in return for economic aid from Moscow, something Washington calls Taiwan-style “checkbook diplomacy,” it is more than happy to reward other countries with special incentives if they recognize the independence of America’s creation in the Balkans that was severed from Serbia, Kosovo.

The United States has complained, along with its two surrogate “sheriffs” in the Pacific region – Australia and New Zealand – that Russia’s offer of economic perks to Nauru, Vanuatu, and Tuvalu, three nations that have never managed to fully break free of Western colonialist dictates, resulted in those nations’ decisions to recognize the independence of Abkhazia. While Vanuatu recognized only Abkhazia during a government crisis in Port-Vila, the Vanuatu capital, Nauru and Tuvalu recognized both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Previously, only Russia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela recognized the two breakaway nations, with Washington charging that Russia offered military and other deals to Nicaragua and Venezuela in return for their recognition of the two emergent nations.

Australian Foreign Minister Kevin Rudd lived up to the Australian Labor Party’s total subservience to the United States by calling for transparency in Russia’s dealings with the South Pacific states. Yet Australia’s and New Zealand’s policies to the small Pacific nations has often been based on secret intelligence agreements between the United States, Australia, and New Zealand, including the signals intelligence alliance between the three nations that makes the diplomatic communications of the South Pacific states and all telecommunications in the South Pacific subject to eavesdropping by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA).

Georgia has argued that the cases of Abkhazia/South Ossetia and Kosovo are un-related. However, the United States has cajoled a number of nations into recognizing Kosovo, the latest being Ghana. In return for recognition, Washington has granted countries recognizing the organized crime-imbued regime in Pristina, the Kosovo capital, with the same sort of perks that the United States has accused Russia of providing the South Pacific and Latin American states that have recognized Abkhazia/South Ossetia. While the United States condemns the “checkbook diplomacy” practiced for years by Taiwan and China to gain and swap diplomatic recognition from mostly poor and small nations, it has practiced the same sort of “checkbook diplomacy” with regard to Kosovo.

A State Department cable divulged by WikiLeaks points to the hypocrisy of U.S. foreign policy and how Washington has pressured countries into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia by exerting pressure directly or via its allies.

On February 22, 2010, a cable from the U.S. embassy in Quito, Ecuador cited the visit by the Abkhazian Vice Foreign Minister to Quito and referred to U.S. concern that Ecuador’s Multilateral Affairs Under Secretary Arturo Cabrera had met the Abkhazian official in preparation for the announcement of diplomatic relations. The cable states:

“Cabrera said that the MFA too was surprised by the Vice Foreign Minister's visit, and indicated that nothing materialized from it. He gave the impression that he considered it unlikely the GOE would recognize South Ossetia or Abkhazia as independent states, although he did not say so directly. Cabrera also informed us that the issue was handled by Bilateral Affairs rather than his office. When the opportunity arises, the Embassy will raise the issue also with the MFA's Bilateral Affairs office.”

Previously, on January 26, 2010, the U.S. embassy in Peru ensured that a Peruvian official would raise Washington’s objections with Ecuador over Abkhazia/South Ossetia at a South American defense meeting:

“Charge raised reftel points regarding the Government of Ecuador's potentially recognizing the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia with MFA Under Secretary for the Americas Ambassador Javier Leon January 25. Leon said he planned to travel to Ecuador this week for a UNASUR meeting of Vice Ministers of Defense, and would raise the issue with his GOE [Government of Ecuador]
counterparts at that time.”

Wayne Madsen

"The fear from Washington, Canberra, Wellington, and Tbilisi was that Lavrov was going to offer Fiji lucrative financial assistance in return for the South Pacific nation’s recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "

The same day, the U.S. embassy in Chile tried to use Chile to pressure Ecuador not to recognize the two secessionist nations but with little success:

“Poloff [Political Officer] delivered reftel demarche to Eduardo Schott, Deputy Director for European Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Schott was unaware of Ecuador's potential decision to recognize the independence of the Georgian separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He will consult with colleagues about the possibility of raising the issue with Ecuador. He said that Chile is comfortable sharing its reasons for not recognizing the regions, but other countries are free to make their own decision.”

Nauru’s decision to recognize Abkhazia/South Ossetia was seen as a “comedy” according to a December 16, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi:

“Georgian officials downplayed the significance of Nauru's apparent December 14 recognition of Abkhazia's "independence," which Russia reportedly encouraged with an offer of $50 million to the island nation. Although officials are discussing with Australian counterparts whether the recognition is actually final, Reintegration Minister Yakobashvili joked in public about Russia's apparent purchase of the recognition, calling it a "comedy," while Deputy Foreign Minister Bokeria told us privately the step was not so important, even if it was true. The relaxed approach represents a welcome shift from Georgia's more manic reaction to previous recognitions by Venezuela and Nicaragua, an approach that we have actively encouraged with our Georgian counterparts. Georgia has also recognized and expressed appreciation for successful U.S. efforts to discourage additional recognitions from Latin American countries . . .”

Perhaps the most draconian use of U.S. pressure regarding recognition of Abkhazia / South Ossetia was the pressure Washington, London, and Paris applied on four poor African states, Burundi, Guinea-Bissau, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali, that signaled a willingness to establish relations with the secessionist states. The information is contained in a September 1, 2009, cable from the U.S. embassy in Tbilisi. The relevant sections of the cable are as follows:

“Foreign Minister Grigol Vashadze called in the U.S. and UK ambassadors August 31 to request urgent assistance on two matters. First, the Georgians learned that four African countries -- Burundi, Central African Republic, Guinea-Bissau, and Mali -- are seriously considering recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and the Georgians want help dissuading them from doing so . . . Vashadze told the ambassadors that the Georgian Embassy in Paris learned from the Quai d'Orsay that Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), Guinea-Bissau, and Mali were seriously considering taking the step of recognition. He considered this information quite reliable. He expressed great concern that such a step would undermine many of Georgia's diplomatic successes over the past year. He was especially concerned that Russia will orchestrate an announcement of these recognitions at the UN General Assembly, saying that such announcement would be an absolute catastrophe, especially if it occurred when President Saakashvili was in New York. ”

The four African nations were pressured into not recognizing Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

Other leaked State Department cables illustrate Washington’s pressure on various nations, including Spain, Bangladesh, Mauritius, Zambia, Guatemala, South Africa, Brunei, Djibouti, and even the tiny Maldives through the same sort of financial incentives and diplomatic “sweeteners” Washington accused Russia applying on the South Pacific states in return for recognition of Abkhazia/South Ossetia.

When it comes to hypocrisy, there is no greater world center for it than the U.S. Department of State. However, thanks to the leaks of State Department cables, the hypocrisy of the State Department and the Obama administration in foreign policy can be read in their own words.

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