Fiji Defense Officials In China Visit.

Fiji's Minister for Defense,National Security and Immigration, Joketani Cokanasiga is currently on an official visit to China , along with the RFMF Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Mohammed Aziz and the Navy Commander, John Fox, in addition to other Government officials, as reported by Fiji TV One news segment (video posted below) and corroborated by Fiji Sun article.

The visit to China, is a follow up to the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for Defense Closer Cooperation and Technical Assistance, jointly signed by People's Republic of China and Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) in late August 2013.

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X-Post :Thesmith - In the South Pacific, Chinese Economic Development Continues

There is a paradigm shift happening in the Asia Pacific that is energising the region in a slow but clear way. For the foreseeable future at least, many of the Pacific’s smaller states are set to continue their trend of relying on larger power patrons for funding while developing stronger ties with each other, creating something of a Pacific network.

Chinese President Xi Jinping Meets Fijian Prime Minister

Source: CCTV




President Xi meets Fiji prime minister 

BEIJING, May 29 (Xinhua) -- President Xi Jinping said Wednesday that China is ready to strengthen communication and cooperation with Fiji and other Pacific Island nations.

 [Chinese President Xi Jinping (3rd R) meets with Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama (4th L) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, May 29, 2013. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)] Chinese President Xi Jinping (3rd R) meets with Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama (4th L) at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, capital of China, May 29, 2013. (Xinhua/Huang Jingwen)

Xi made the remarks while meeting with visiting Fijian Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama in the Great Hall of the People. Xi said China believes that all countries are equal members of the international community and should respect and treat each other as equals. Xi said China treasures its friendship with Fiji, respects the development path chosen by its people and will continue to provide assistance to Fiji within its capacity.

Xi said China appreciates Fiji's support regarding issues related to China's core interests. Xi said both sides should deepen cooperation in agriculture, forestry, fishery, transportation, telecommunications, mining, infrastructure development and tourism. He said both sides should promote cultural exchanges and contacts, especially among young people. He said he hopes both sides can step up coordination on multilateral and Pacific Island issues.

Xi said China supports Fiji's requests regarding energy security, climate change and the protection of maritime resources, adding that China is ready to further advance its relations with Fiji. Xi said Pacific Island nations are an important part of the Asia-Pacific region, adding that the region cannot achieve development and prosperity as a whole without the development of Pacific Island nations.

Xi said China supports Pacific Island nations in playing an equal part in international affairs, enhancing development and realizing sustainable growth. Bainimarama said China has provided invaluable support for Fiji and brought benefits for its residents, adding that he hopes to learn from China's success and step up cooperation with China. Bainimarama is the first Pacific Island nation leader to visit China since China's new leadership came into power.

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Top-level Chinese delegation visits Fiji

A four-day top level Chinese delegation by visited Fiji late last month in an effort to strengthen relations with the small Pacific island state and to counter efforts by the Obama administration to undermine Beijing’s influence in the region. (Read more)

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X-Post: Gateway House- The Geo-strategic Pacific Islands

By Tevita Motutalo

Source: Gateway House

Traditionally, the South Pacific islands have been considered strategically insignificant. However, the need for resources, and the geopolitical shift towards Asia-Pacific have prompted nations to realize that these small island states control large resource-rich ocean areas and are increasingly geostrategic.

“Five trillion dollars of commerce rides on the (Asia-Pacific) sea lanes each year, and you people are sitting right in the middle of it.”

(USPACOM chief Admiral Samuel Locklear, Pacific Island Forum, Cook Islands, 2012.)

From August 27 - 31, leaders from countries as far afield as India, China and the U.S. converged on the tiny Aitutaki Island in the South Pacific to meet members of the 16-country Pacific Island Forum. The need for resources and geopolitical rebalancing has raised the profile of the region so much that, for the first time, a U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, attended the Forum — a clear demonstration that the U.S. is serious about its Pacific “pivot” to Asia.

The reason is China. In March last year, Clinton told the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee about the region: “Let’s just talk straight realpolitik. We are in a competition with China. China is in there every day in every way, trying to figure out how it’s going to come in behind us, come in under us.”

Last weekend, U.S. Defence Secretary Leon Panetta passed by New Zealand reinforcing Clinton’s Forum debut, and China’s Secretary of National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo returned from Fiji after inking several economic cooperation pacts with the military government there including Chinese assistance for cultural and educational development and teaching the Chinese language in the Fijian national curriculum.

According to Wu, Sino-Fijian trade was worth $ 172 million last year, up from 34% in the year prior.
India’s delegation to the Forum was high profile, led by Minister of State for External Affairs E Ahamed. Apart from resources, and strategic positioning, the Pacific also controls a relatively large number of votes in international fora, and India is keen to secure support for its bid for a seat for the United Nation’s Security Council.

But one of India’s strongest allies in the region wasn’t invited – Fiji. A key item on the Forum’s agenda was whether or not to readmit Fiji. Fiji has been central to Indian interests in the region. Following the 2006 coup, at the urging of Australia and New Zealand, sanctions were brought against Fiji and, whilst also suspended from the Forum in 2009. When India attempted to assist, it was warded off by Canberra. Consequently, the Fijian regime fell in deep with the remaining alternative active player in the region, China, one of the biggest investors in the region thereby receiving generous economic and military cooperation from Beijing.

The sanctions are of PIF-origin, and as China is not a member of the Forum, it is not bound to obey. These sanctions, issued by Australia, New Zealand, and the EU, resulted in the reduction of their aid assistance, a restriction on visas or transit for any member of the Fijian regime, and of course on trade.

The welfare of the more than 300,000 Fijian Indians in Fiji, and more amongst the Pacific states, is a core interest for India: a united, stable region decreases complications for region’s bloc support for India.
Fiji’s continued suspension is fragmenting the region. Isolated, Fiji shepherded a more consolidated, mineral-rich, Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG)- though created in 1983 it remained docile within the Forum until, following Fiji’s lead, it was formalised in 2007 taking on a “Look North” foreign policy cline.

This sub-regional grouping includes the majority ethnic Melanesian nations of Fiji, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, and is backed by China (which has built the MSG secretariat in Vanuatu). In response, last year, as relations continued to deteriorate, New Zealand by proxy, helped create a competing “Polynesian Leaders Group.” comprised of majority ethically Polynesian nations.

This use of racial politics – the attempt to pit against each other the normally friendly Melanesians and Polynesians – was spurred and sponsored by Australia and New Zealand because it seemed to suit their short-term political goals. Instead, it is creating regional instability, something that ultimately benefits China. China itself is also bringing volatility to the region, with increasing cases of crime and drug and human trafficking linked to Chinese nationals.

Australia and New Zealand can reverse this trend. Just before and since after this year's Forum, both country’s leaders have started echoing reintegration of Fiji into regional bloc, lifting sanctions, and also even further to incentivize positive developments that will lead to elections in 2014, as promised by the Bainimarama government. The U.S. understands the implications and, before the Forum, expressed its expectation that Fiji be reinstated into the Forum. In spite of wide support, Australia and New Zealand blocked the move.

This raises questions about the priorities of some policy makers in Australia and New Zealand. They cite two reasons for the continued marginalisation of Fiji:

1. If Fiji relations are normalised, it may grow as a more important regional political and economic hub (given its central location even now most of the regional organisations’ headquarters are located in Suva), challenging Canberra and Wellington’s role as the go-to places for Pacific investment and regional insight.
2. While most in Wellington and Canberra undoubtedly value their strong relationship with the West, some policy-makers seem to be tempering that with a desire to have stronger economic and—as a result increasingly political–ties with China.

The second point is raising the most concerns in global capitals. Recently, former Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating called on the U.S. to “share” the Pacific with China. And New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister Bill English declared that “Australia is a province of China, and New Zealand is a suburb of Australia.”

While Australia’s stated reason for the exclusion of Fiji from the Forum is its abolition of democracy, some influential figures in Canberra seem to have no problem engaging with even more autocratic governments that, unlike Fiji, have no plans to reintroduce democracy. In August, for example, Keating justified engagement with China by writing: “If we are pressed into the notion only democratic governments are legitimate, our future is limited to action within some confederation of democracies.”

Australian and New Zealand foreign policy is going through an internal civil war, with one side willing to sacrifice values and the trust of its traditional allies for the perception of economic gain from China (Wikileaks exposed that Australia pushed Nauru to derecognise Taiwan in favour of Beijing), and the other solidly part of the West.

Myopic and petty regional policies of Fiji’s marginalisation threw the door wide open for, and only benefits, China. Challenges to the region are heightening and so apparent, the U.S. now has to intervene directly to try to reinvigorate a West-friendly Pacific. Clinton declared the region “strategically and economically vital and becoming more so,” yet “big enough for all of us.” But her presence was signal intent to counter Chinese inroads. Beijing already assumes it has neutered Australia (and, presumably, doesn’t even bother about New Zealand).

 An editorial in the state-run People’s Daily—on 30^th August in response to the US’s aircraft carrier presence at the Forum—stated that, in the Pacific, “The U.S. may have evaluated that Australia alone is no longer enough to hold China at bay.”

 For all the inroads created by inept policies in Fiji, Wu is reported to have taken a swipe at sanctions imposed on Fiji, and with a symbolic gesture, as guarantor of Fijian national interests, will oppose countries that are trying to “bully” Fiji. It effectively means China does not owe Australia and New Zealand any favours for misplacing their cards. Secondly, as China thinks its interests are linked with those of the island countries, this gives China opportunities for wide justification to intervene in South Pacific security – especially given the expectation afforded to it as a global power.

The divisive politics on show at the Forum need to stop. A first step, something that India can assist with, is welcoming Fiji back to the family, and helping it through its democratisation.

Tevita Motulalo is a Researcher at Gateway House: Indian Council on Global Relations. He is the former Editor of the Tonga Chronicle. He is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in geopolitics at Manipal University.


Related: The visit to Fiji of H.E. Wu Bangguo - Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress of the Peoples Republic of China (video posted below)

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X-Post from Island Business: A New Era of Geopolitics In The Region

Michael O’Keefe•


Last month, the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov visited Fiji. There has been much speculation about the purpose of the visit, but this needs to be contextualised so we can make sense of its significance.

The extremes of opinion waiver between arguing that the visit heralds a major shift in the foreign affairs of the Pacific to arguing that it was simply routine diplomacy. It was neither. We need to dig deeper. We need to ask Why Fiji [the South Pacific?]? Why Now?

An overarching answer to these questions is geopolitics and strategic change. Geopolitics relates to the intersection of geography and politics. It focuses on shifts in relative power and what we are witnessing is a larger global geopolitical contest being played out in the Pacific.

To-date most discussion of regional strategic affairs has focused on China’s growing interest and whether this equates to influence. This is an issue worthy of attention but not the focus here. Suffice to say, the era of crude chequebook diplomacy whereby China and Taiwan faced off in the Pacific over diplomatic recognition is over.

China is engaging the Pacific at all levels (diplomatic, economic, cultural) and is staking its claim to being a worthy partner, especially in the context of Australian and New Zealand isolation of, and disengagement from Fiji.

Michael O’Keefe

"The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power.

This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation.

The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region."

China’s growing interests in the region have not gone unnoticed in Washington and Canberra (and Moscow).
US President Barack Obama’s recent comments about the renewed US role in the Pacific century have highlighted the potential for strategic competition in the region the likes of which have not been seen since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s.

Back then the issue was Soviet fishing agreements, which were seen as avenues for access for intelligence gathering in an area of primary strategic concern to the US and to its allies, Australia and New Zealand.
Fears over Soviet penetration in the region were proven to be exaggerated, but they did prompt a diplomatic reaction. The same is happening now but in the lead-up to the visit the Russian Foreign Minister himself highlighted that now it is Russia attempting to balance the US and China rather than being the main strategic competitor.

Why now? The most obvious answer to this question relates to global geopolitical changes. That is, that a rising China is challenging the US and that it is responding. Countries like Russia, South Korea and Indonesia see that their interests could be impacted and are taking action. This orthodox view is dealt with in-depth in the commentary so it won’t be a focus here.

The rest of this article focuses on issues closer to home.

It may also not be a coincidence that political instability in Fiji after the 1987 coup wrong footed the traditional metropolitan powers in relation to local support for protecting their strategic interests. At this stage, it was the potential for Soviet expansionism in an area that had hitherto been Australia and New Zealand’s patch.

Interestingly, at the time China also took note insofar as political change created opportunities for Taiwan to gain some headway, albeit briefly. Now it is arguable that China is benefitting from political change in Fiji and it is not only the Americans and their Australian and New Zealand partners that are taking note.

The political situation in Fiji may provide opportunities for engagement for the Chinese or Russians but for all powers. Fiji has strategic significance beyond its political or economic power. This is the oft-cited ‘hub of the Pacific argument’. The ‘hub’ argument deserves close scrutiny because it is mentioned so regularly and often without explanation. The point is that historical trends have been based on geography and have left Fiji at the centre of diplomatic, economic and educational interaction and cooperation in the region.

This is a colonial legacy, but one which Fijian leaders from Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara to the present have fostered. The hub may relate to the diplomatic missions that serve many Pacific Islands Countries (PICs), regional organisations such as the Pacific Islands Forum or Secretariat of the Pacific Community, the headquarters of major intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN, or non government organisations in Suva, the University of the South Pacific etc.

The hub also relates to Suva as a major economic hub for exports, the trans-shipment of essential supplies, such as fuel, etc. Economics is often cited as a core strategic issue, but in perspective Pacific trade with any of the interested external powers is relatively small in comparison to their economic interests elsewhere.
Even the most generous predictions would not place the Pacific in the top 20 trading partners for the countries competing for influence in the region.

Furthermore, for the foreseeable future the potential for significant growth may be more illusory than real in all areas (such as mining seabed resources) except tourism which will maintain its traditional position as an area where the potential for growth can be realised. As such we can largely discount the economic angle at this stage, despite much commentary on the bauxite mining and fishing agreements.

However, PICS are right to be concerned over unsustainable economics in relation to mining or fisheries. It is the strategic aspect of geopolitics that provides the clearest explanation for Russia’s recent diplomatic manoeuvring.

Fiji gives a country or organisation access to the Pacific. It is an economy of scale, and for a country rediscovering the Pacific, such as Russia is now, it is essential to be on good terms with the Fijian government to reap the benefits of the hub. As such, the Foreign Minister’s meetings involved the Fijian government, but other PICs were invited to meet and attend diplomatic functions in Nadi.

Fiji’s ‘Look North’ policy has opened the door to greater cooperation. In this context Russia’s advances could be added to a long list of countries that have increased their profiles in the Pacific since 2006, not least of which is China, South Korea, Indonesia, the US and UAE. Discussions with other countries, and organisations, such as the Arab League are also underway.

Suva has also reasserted its leadership role. It has been suspended from the pre-eminent regional organisation, the Pacific Islands Forum, following the 2006 coup. However, it has effectively used the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) whose members include the larger PICs to forward its interests.
The MSG also highlights that there is an alternative to the PIF and one which is more relevant to Fiji’s interests than the other PICs.

During the Cold War the catch cry was “The Russians are coming! Run for the hills”. The concern over Russian diplomacy in the South Pacific is reminiscent of this sort of thinking. But context counts and the South Pacific of 2012 is not the South Pacific of 1980s.

Furthermore, the hub, Fiji, is not the Fiji of the 1980s either. There is a growing confidence in Fijian foreign affairs and the expectation is that the partnership and friendship posed by any country will be closely scrutinised through the lens of Fijian national interests.

The time when any great power would overtly influence Fijian diplomacy may be at an end, with obvious implications for traditional partners or new players on the block. There are dangers and vulnerabilities that come hand in hand with the opportunities to be gained from the greater attention that great powers are showing the Pacific.

Some of the distortions evidenced during the era of checkbook diplomacy come to mind, and this will be the issue in relation to recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There are already rumours of millions of dollars being spent to influence the votes of some PICs.

Furthermore, Russia’s main competitor in this regard, Georgia, has also been showing interest with increased aid and diplomatic representations. Russia has directly stated that Abkhazia is not the issue and Lavrov did not publicly raise it while visiting the Pacific, but this denial and Georgia’s interest should be treated as a signal of the opposite.

Any PICs building close relations would be factoring this into their engagement, especially considering Georgia broke off relations with Tuvalu over this issue last month. Global geopolitical reordering is playing out in the Pacific. The post-2006 diplomatic standoff has led to diplomatic opportunities. Fijian leaders are showing a new confidence by taking advantage of these opportunities and so too have many foreign powers that have hitherto shown little interest in the region.

Through Fiji’s leadership and role as a regional hub other PICs have also reaped the benefits of these developments. There are benefits and costs involved in this sudden interest, but PICs are showing greater confidence in viewing the benefits of cooperation through the lens of national interest.

Maintaining this focus will be their challenge as this trend intensifies in the years ahead.

• Dr Michael O’Keefe is a Senior Lecturer at La Trobe University & Adjunct Associate Professor at the Centre for Regional Affairs, University of Fiji.

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X-Post- Scoop: A New Containment Policy In The South Pacific

Friday, 24 February 2012, 11:45 am

A Word From Afar –
By Paul G. Buchanan
 
One of the interesting aspects of the leaked emails between Foreign Minister Murray McCully and MP Johns Hayes, a former diplomat, is the latter’s mention of the need to “resist” China’s growing presence in the South Pacific. With that simple advice Mr. Hayes has revealed a much larger issue, one that undoubtedly has been discussed at length with New Zealand’s major allies, Australia and the US. The issue is how to contain China. 

Along with nuclear deterrence, “containment” was at the heart of Western approaches to the Cold War. The strategy of containment was to resist and counter-balance Soviet influence in the Third World, including the South Pacific. New Zealand had a significant role in the application of anti-Soviet containment in the South Pacific, and its diplomatic, military and intelligence assets were used to that end. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War, there followed a decade of relatively benign neglect of the South Pacific by traditional Western patrons, who cast their geostrategic gaze elsewhere and prioritized accordingly.

Into that breach stepped the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which used phenomenal economic growth to expand its sphere of influence throughout the Western Pacific basin and beyond. As an emerging great power China must fuel its growth via the importation of raw materials from new investment markets, and must extend its influence (and deploy force) along the sea lines of communication through which these imports flow (with the South Pacific now being a major corridor between South American and Australasian investment and trade with the Chinese mainland).

In the South Pacific, China’s interest has been manifest in the use of “chequebook diplomacy” to provide aid and investment unencumbered by “good governance” and transparency requirements upon which most Western aid and investment is based. Besides winning friends in the Pacific Island Community (PIC) with this practice, the PRC also encourages Chinese migration to the region as a source of semi-skilled and skilled labour (most of the Chinese-funded infrastructure development projects in the South Pacific require the use of Chinese rather than local labour).

Resident Chinese communities now constitute important segments of the merchant and investor classes in places like Fiji, Tonga and the Solomon Islands, where they are suspected by Western intelligence agencies of engaging in human intelligence collection on behalf of the homeland.
To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics).

Chinese navy surface vessels now make regular port calls throughout the South Pacific, and its submarines are reported to make 6-10 deployments per year deep into Southern waters, often tailing a growing Chinese fishing fleet that has on-shore processing facilities throughout the region and which is suspected of providing cover for Chinese signals intelligence monitoring.
It was not until the mid 2000s that the US and its South Pacific allies reacted to this trend. Since then, the US has shifted its strategic priority away from Europe and towards East Asia, including moving the bulk of its naval assets to the Pacific. The US has re-opened aid and trade missions in the PIC, and most importantly, has solidified and expanded its security ties with Australia and New Zealand (including the November 2011 “Wellington Declaration” whereby New Zealand was restored as a full security partner of the US after years of tension stemming from its 1985 non-nuclear decision).

Paul G. Buchanan


"To this can be added the expansion of diplomatic and military ties between the PRC and PIC nations, to the point that the PRC has the largest diplomatic presence in the region (its embassy in Suva is the largest in the PIC) and has established military-to-military ties with countries such as Fiji (in part to take advantage of the strained ties between the Bainimarama regime and its Antipodean critics)

[...]In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode."

The twist in this tale is that both Australia and New Zealand have become increasingly dependent on trade with the PRC, which has caused them to pay much diplomatic lip service to the concept of mutual interest with the PRC and given an increasingly Asian focus to their respective foreign policies.
However the reality, as indelicately phrased by Mr. Hayes, is that not only the US but also Canberra and Wellington fear the emergence of China in the South Pacific because its rise has the potential for supplanting the US-led alliance as the dominant regional player. Thus the strengthening of trilateral security ties between them and the expansion of their bi- and multi-lateral diplomatic overtures (mostly couched in the language of developmental aid) within the context of the Pacific Island Forum (PIF) and South Pacific Community (SPC). Along with EU engagement with the PIC (now on the wane), the diplomatic re-emphasis is designed to counter-balance Chinese influence and restore a pre-eminent Western orientation in the PIC.

All of this involves a mix of “hard” and “soft” power (using military, diplomatic and economic instruments) in order to engage in the “smart” use of aggregated Western influence in the face of Chinese regional inroads. If nothing else, renewed Western involvement in the South Pacific raises the economic and diplomatic costs to the Chinese of maintaining their position, which in turn diverts resources that otherwise could be directed elsewhere. The South Pacific Chinese containment strategy, in other words, is directed at “rolling back” Chinese regional influence.

In places like Fiji, application of the containment strategy may be a case of too little too late, as China has cemented its relationship with the Bainimarama regime. But elsewhere, even in countries with a strong Chinese presence such as Papua New Guinea, the Western alliance is in full containment mode.
For Australia, with its mineral resources coveted by the Chinese and an association with the US that is seeing it gradually replace the UK as the US’s major military ally, the issue of containing China’s South Pacific ambitions can be justified as being one born of strength and self-interest: the Chinese need Australia’s resources more than they need a confrontation with it, and alliance with the US is set to make Australia a global military and diplomatic player in the years to come. Australia’s interests extend far beyond its immediate vicinity, so the South Pacific containment strategy is one piece in a larger geopolitical strategy in which it holds significant leverage vis a vis the PRC. China can live with that.

For New Zealand the situation is different. Revelation of the Chinese containment strategy in the South Pacific places New Zealand on the horns of a Melian dilemma: as a small island state caught in the middle of an incipient great power struggle, it has attempted to balance the two by increasingly trading with the PRC while renewing its security ties to the US. But New Zealand has no strategic leverage on the PRC, and is more dependent on Chinese trade and investment than vice versa. Thus the situation may become untenable for New Zealand the more its commitment to containing the PRC is made apparent in light of increasing tensions between the two great powers in the Western Pacific. In that event it will be forced to choose sides rather than suffer the fate of Melos, whose neutrality in the Peloponnesian Wars was rewarded by its invasion and sacking by the Athenians.

In the New Zealand version of this dilemma, the choice will be between trade and security, at which point the commitment to South Pacific containment will receive its sternest test. New Zealand’s hedge against this dilemma is ratification of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multinational trade and investment compact involving the US that excludes the PRC and which is currently under negotiation. The TPP is the economic component of the China containment strategy, as it is designed to link the most important East and South Asian economies with Antipodean and Western Hemisphere partners. The PRC understands the fence-ringing thrust of the TPP within the larger geostrategic context, and has objected, without success, to its exclusion.

Should the TPP be ratified and entered into force, potential loss of Chinese trade and investment could be compensated y the increase in trade and investment between TPP partners. That is a theoretical gain rather than a certain one given the multiplicity of actors and issues involved. It also does not factor the Chinese response, which could be to redouble its efforts to cement a sphere of influence in the South Pacific. If that were to occur, tensions can be expected to rise on both sides of the containment “fence.”
Given the uncertainties involved and its weak position vis a vis the PRC, New Zealand’s support for the US-led South Pacific Chinese containment strategy can therefore be considered a delicate balancing act that potentially has as much of a downside as it does an upside.

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X-Post: Strategic Culture Foundation :- China – USA: Struggle for Control of Pacific.

China – USA: Struggle for Control of Pacific

Vladislav GULEVICH (Ukraine) | 10.01.2012 | 00:00

Asia - Pacific region is attracting the increasing attention of Western politicians against the backdrop of Chinese growing military and economic might. For instance the US influence had been indisputable until recently but today China’s intensifying efforts to raise its profile in the geostrategic area is something seen with the naked eye. US analysts sound the alarm saying the Chinese simply “pick up” the countries the US administration failed to build relationships with.  No doubt the Washington’s many years old human rights rhetoric, grown to become a foreign policy dogma, failed it. By ostracizing the ruling regimes in the Asia – Pacific for their incompatibility with “democratic values” in the US perception, it has involuntarily pushed them into China’s embrace. That’s the way it happened in case of Myanmar (Burma). Till the USA criticized the Myanmar leadership for lack of freedom the Chinese promoted their interests there while cooperating with the powers that be of this poorest country at all levels. The Myanmar’s economy and infrastructure received from China dozens of billion of US dollars, about the same amount was rendered as military aid. Myanmar President U Thein Sein’s visit to China in 2011 became an evident prove of the growing bilateral cooperation. Then the China’s leadership said very important things about Beijing and Rangoon sharing strategic vision of international problems, the fact that couldn’t go unnoticed by the White House and not put it on guard.  The Myanmar’s geographic position has an important military strategic advantage – common border with India, China. Thailand and Laos. Myanmar is a good platform to exert pressure on China and exercise control over the strait of Malacca, passed by about 50 thousand ships yearly (one fifth or one fourth of the world commodity turnover). 11 millions barrels of oil are shipped through the strait daily. One of the oil consumers is China. Moreover Myanmar is rich in resources: oil, tin, tungsten, zinc, lead, copper, coal, precious stones, gas. It allows to easily win influential neighbors favor. Under the given circumstances Washington’s calls for the country’s international isolation will hardly produce any results. Myanmar will always find someone instead of the US. Vladislav Gulevich: "The United States and Australia have an agreement on US military presence on Australian soil. No new bases are envisioned but the US servicemen have a right of permanent access to the Australia’s military infrastructure and the US naval presence in adjacent seas is to grow. Having military facilities in South Korea and Japan the United States is able to boost its influence in Western and Southern Asia-Pacific, including the South China Sea considered to be sovereign territory by the Chinese. The Sea control presupposes obvious geopolitical advantages once this waterway is the shortest and the most safe one for shipping from China, Japan and Russia to the Singapore strait and back. New Zealand watches the Chinese Asia-Pacific diplomatic expansion closely, especially after China became close to the island nation of Fiji, situated in Southern Pacific, 1170 km from it. There is an apprehension that the very pace of Chinese – Fiji cooperation development may lead to one of the Fiji island becoming a place of China’s permanent naval presence. Here – the Chinese in Fiji, there – the Chinese in Timor. " The same story takes place in case of a small island nation called Timor-Leste. The island enjoys an advantageous geographic position. It’s situated at arm’s length from neighboring Australia and Indonesia, the bottom of the Timor Sea is rich in oil and gas. For instance, the Bayu - Undan’s oil reserves are estimated to be $ 3 billion. The vicinity of the strait of Vetar is important too. It’s a deep water strait and is ideal for submarines passage from the Pacific into the Indian ocean. In contingency submarines effective activities will require control over it, that, in its turn, requires control over Timor-Leste. In 2002 this former Portuguese colony eyed by Indonesia became independent. Since then the Washington and Beijing have been vying for influence there, the last one doing much better. The Chinese have already received a $ 378 million contract for two power plants construction. Light arms, uniform and other military equipment are bought in China. There is a 4000 Chinese diaspora on the island. A $ 3 billion credit from China was agreed on in January 2011. Before the career open Timorese used to get education in Australia or the USA to be promoted to high positions in politics or economy. Now it’s not the case anymore, they prefer to go to China for the purpose.  As the situation dictates, Washington strengthens its military strategic ties with Australia and New Zealand. An Australian military delegation headed by Stephen Smith, minister of defense, visited the US in July 2011 on the occasion of the 60 anniversary of the bilateral alliance. Afghanistan and growing might of India and China were among the issues topping the agenda. Australia confirmed its resolve to go on being the US “south anchor” in South-East Asia (1). US State Secretary Hillary Clinton made public the Washington’s intent to make the XXI century a century of the US Pacific policy (2). Australia is the major US ally in this part of the globe, its army strength is 51 thousand and it has over 19000 reservists. The country’s mobilization reserve is 4,9 million men. Canberra’s military expenditure is 2% of its GDP.  There are 16 US military facilities on its territory, including a missile test site and a navy communication station for nuclear submarines. Timor-Leste, Indonesia and Papua – New Guinea are situated to the North. The distance between Papua – New Guinea and continental Australia is only 145 km, narrowing down to just 5 km in case of the Australian Boigu and Papua – New Guinea. Vanuatu, New Caledonia and the Solomon Islands lie to the North- East of the Australian continent. New Zealand is situated to the South-East. Among the countries listed here only New Zealand is a staunch and unambiguous ally of Australia, be it economy or policy. The others are attentively (and not without results) viewed by Beijing.  The United States and Australia have an agreement on US military presence on Australian soil. No new bases are envisioned but the US servicemen have a right of permanent access to the Australia’s military infrastructure and the US naval presence in adjacent seas is to grow. Having military facilities in South Korea and Japan the United States is able to boost its influence in Western and Southern Asia-Pacific, including the South China Sea considered to be sovereign territory by the Chinese. The Sea control presupposes obvious geopolitical advantages once this waterway is the shortest and the most safe one for shipping from China, Japan and Russia to the Singapore strait and back.  New Zealand watches the Chinese Asia-Pacific diplomatic expansion closely, especially after China became close to the island nation of Fiji, situated in Southern Pacific, 1170 km from it. There is an apprehension that the very pace of Chinese – Fiji cooperation development may lead to one of the Fiji island becoming a place of China’s permanent naval presence. Here – the Chinese in Fiji, there – the Chinese in Timor.  Moreover, there is a chance the Chinese would have a foothold in the Seychelles. China’s Defense Minister Liang Guanglie said so in September 2011 in response to the Seychelles president James Michael’s proposal to host a China’s naval base on his country’s soil. Situated between Asia and Africa to the North of Madagascar in the Western part of the Indian ocean, the Seychelles is a country of great strategic importance. Control over a significant part of the Indian ocean, as well as the waters adjacent to the shore of East Africa (Kenya, Mozambique, Somalia) becomes possible once an adequate naval force is based there. The Seychelles signed a military cooperation agreement with China in 2004 that includes 50 Seychellois servicemen getting training in China (3). Besides the Chinese rendered significant aid to the Seychellois navy. In turn the Seychelles openly declared adherence to the principle of “One China” that is refused to recognize Taiwan. The Chinese navy ships already patrol narrow waters of the Indian ocean where the pirates threat is high. They need logistics resupply and maintenance facilities. May be that’s what the Seychelles may provide them with. Once the Chinese economy depends on external trade to great extent, Beijing has vital interest in eliminating piracy in this waters. Washington fears then there will be no way to push the Chinese navy out (2). In 2004 Booz Allen Hamilton, US government consulting firm, reported the substance of the Chinese tactics is to acquire a “necklace” of naval basing facilities in the Indian ocean (3). The Chinese interest towards the Seychelles evokes apprehension on the part of Washington keeping in mind there is a US unmanned aerial vehicles facility on the islands destined to tackle mysterious Somali pirates and exercise control over the territory of Somalia.  Still there are weak points of China’s position in the Asia-Pacific. Some experts say Beijing has no clear blue water strategy at the state’s level. Defense and promotion of economic interests is one thing, but a full-blown doctrine of strengthening its presence in the whole Pacific is something else.  A blue water strategy is something of a larger scale than just strategy and tactics adopted by a navy. It should comprise coordinated multifunctional activities of special state institutions – from major staffs and military experts to oceanographic institutes and economists. That’s why China will avoid sea conflicts as long as it can to upgrade its naval potential and implement its strategy towards Pacific countries including those in the immediate vicinity of the two major US allies – New Zealand and Australia. Beijing needs time. China relies on diplomacy (inexpensive means of taking care of its interests) and economy.  In case of economy China’s advancement into Africa is a good example: in 2003 the bilateral trade turnover was $10 billion, it was already $20 billion in 2004. China signed agreements on cooperation in the field of natural resources extraction with Angola, Nigeria, Zambia, Congo, Zimbabwe etc. Asia-Pacific is still only third China’s aid recipient – after Australia and the USA but it strives to get a foothold in as many strategically areas as possible, so that at the moment the US becomes critically weak it could start a dialogue with it not from the position of weakness but rather the position of strength.  1. Edi Walsh «America’s Southern Anchor?» (The Diplomat August 25, 2011) 2. “Clinton says 21st century will be US`s Pacific century” (Xinhua/Wang Fengfeng, 12.11.2011) 3. Jody Ray Bennett «Seychelles: An Open Invitation for China» (ISN Insights, 27. 12.2011)

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