Source:
36th Parallel
Analysis – By Dr. Paul G. Buchanan.
Introduction: 36th
Parallel Assessments Founding Partner Dr. Paul G. Buchanan has been
traveling in the US for a month. He has had an opportunity to observe
the US election campaign from both coasts, and in this brief discusses
the implications for foreign policy of a successful Mitt Romney
presidential bid.
Photo Source:
Swampland.time.com
The 2012 US presidential election is focused on
economic policy and management, but foreign policy issues have crept
into the campaign. The US relationship with Israel, Iran, China, the
Arab Middle East and Russia have become the subject of debate between
President Obama and the Republican challenger, former Massachusetts
governor Mitt Romney. Although Mr. Romney trails in the polls less than
two months from the election date, it is worth considering what his
election could mean for the US approach to the South and Western
Pacific. In this brief 36th Parallel Assessments outlines the conceptual
strands informing the Romney foreign policy perspective, then moves to
analysis of what it means for future US-Pacific relations.
The core foreign policy approach of the Republican Party has
traditionally been realism. Because of the exigencies of the Cold War
and its aftermath, Republican realism in practice has had “soft” and
“hard” as well as neo-realist variants (in the latter economic power
takes precedence over military power in the promotion of national
interests). During the Cold War the soft and hard realist versions were
applied by presidents Eisenhower and Nixon according to strategic
circumstances and diplomatic necessity so that nuance could be achieved
in the conduct of US foreign affairs.
Hard realist approaches involve
the application of power based on self-interest. Soft realist approaches
mitigate the application of power with non-interest based concerns,
such as through the provision of humanitarian assistance to
non-strategically important countries. For the Republican Party in the
late 20th century, the key was to balance the hard, soft and neo-realist
approaches to world affairs. Notable Republican realists include Henry
Kissinger, George Schultz, Brent Scowcroft and more recently the
strategist Robert Kagan and economist Robert Zoellick.
Paul G. Buchanan
"
Compared with other regions, the approach to the Southwest Pacific will be less effected by a change to a Romney administration, but there will be changes nevertheless. The US will take a stronger line on Chinese influence in the Pacific, which will include reassertion of US naval dominance in the South Pacific waterways and sea lanes of communication used by the Chinese for trade and the prioritization of US defense ties to the countries surrounding China.
"
Beginning in the 1970s, a line of thought emerged in US politics that
came to be known as neo-conservative. Not be confused with
neo-liberalism, which is an economic school that follows the monetarist
prescription of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, neo-conservatism is
an ideology that extols the moral superiority of ”American” values and
with that the necessary role of the US as the world’s diplomatic
arbiter and systems regulator. This requires US preeminence in
economics, diplomacy and international security affairs. The vision is
eminently idealist in that it speaks to a higher purpose behind American
exceptionalism, but is not equivalent to the idealism so often
associated with pacifists and traditional political liberals. Prominent
neo-conservatives include the late Jeanne Kirkpatrick, Dick Cheney,
Richard Perle, Dan Senor, Paul Wolfowitz, John Bolton and Elliot Abrams.
Neo-conservatism gained ground within the Republican Party during the
Reagan presidency but saw its influence reduced under the George H.
Bush administration (the first president Bush was a committed realist
who had an extraordinary amount of experience in international affairs
and US foreign policy. He was particularly unimpressed with the
neo-conservative desire to re-shape the world in the preferred American
image).
In the late 1990s neo-conservatism came back with renewed vigor under
the auspices of the Project for a New American Century, which provided
the foundations of the George D. Bush foreign policy, particularly after
September 11, 2001. Believing that the US continues to be the world’s
greatest nation and that its decline is relative, can be arrested and is
the product of political failures by Democrats, the neo-conservative
approach to foreign policy is interventionist and uni- or bi-lateral in
focus. It places great emphasis on asserting US “exceptionalism” via
military diplomacy, moral supremacy and economic self-reliance.
Like president Obama before his election, Mitt
Romney has virtually no foreign policy experience and is considered to
possess a cautious, pragmatic, results-oriented personality. But the
similarities end there. Mr. Obama understands the constraints on US
power in an increasingly multipolar world (where complete national
economic self-reliance is difficult to achieve), whereas Mr. Romney
adheres to the belief in American exceptionalism and its continued
powers of moral authority on the world stage. He has reconciled his
beliefs in the field of foreign policy by appointing a mixture of
realists and neo-conservatives to his advisory team. The former include
Zoellick, Kagan and William Kristol (and to a lesser extent John
McCain), while the latter include Bolton, Wolfowitz , Senor and former
ambassador Richard Williamson. Although not working on his campaign,
Romney is believed to seek the occasional counsel of Henry Kissinger and
Condoleeza Rice (a Sovietologist by training) when necessary.
The general consensus is that Mr. Romney is less evangelical than his
neo-conservative advisors, but less pragmatic than his realist
counsels. His foreign policy stance is formally based on “American
leadership and peace through strength.” However, during the election
campaign he has genuflected to the Tea Party movement and conservative
Christians in the electorate who are now the core of the Republican base
by adopting neo-conservative rhetoric on issues such as Iran, Israel
and China.
Paul G. Buchanan
"
The US will continue to engage Fiji as it moves to elections in 2014, but its main objective will be to counterbalance Chinese inroads in that country under the Bainimarama regime. This effort will be given additional priority due to the expanding Russian ties to the Fijian regime. Likewise, the US will seek to counter improved Sino-Samoan ties by increasing its engagement with the latter (this will include addressing issues of Western Samoans working in and with American Samoan firms)
"
This is not uncommon, as presidential candidates often take more
extreme positions on issues of policy while campaigning, then moderate
those positions once confronted with the pressures of office (as was the
case with president Obama). The question is whether Mr. Romney will
jettison the neo-conservative approach if he is elected (which many
believe will be the case), or whether the neo-conservatives will be
given pride of place in his foreign policy team as a reward for their
work in shoring up the Republican base during the campaign.
The bigger issue is that in the words of journalist Bob Woodward, the
Republican Party is “at war with itself.” It may be impolitic to say,
but the Tea Party tail is wagging the GOP dog, and moderate
Republicans–that is, those who were economic and social liberals but
security conservatives (hence their realism)–are not only a dying breed
but increasingly unwelcome in their traditional party of choice. This
forces candidates like Mr. Romney, who is an economic liberal but
perhaps more of a social and security conservative than the old
“Rockefeller Republicans,” to bow to the nationalistic, isolationist yet
internationally messianic Right (a contradiction, to be sure, but that
is what the Tea Party movement is). Should he win the election, Mr.
Romney will find himself trying to arbitrate the internecine war within
the GOP by balancing his cabinet choices. One way of doing so is to have
a neo-conservative as Secretary of State and a realist as Secretary of
Defense (since Pentagon realism could provide a check on the State
Department’s evangelical and interventionist ambitions).
If elected it can be expected that Mr. Romney will
continue to advance the US “pivot” towards Asia announced by President
Obama. He will, however, have a more militaristic edge to his agenda
vis a vis
the PRC, as he appears to tie trade and security relations much more
tightly than Obama has done and has spoken of confronting China as a
trade cheat and military rival. He will re-focus US attention on Russia,
which in a Cold War throw-back he has called the “greatest geopolitical
threat” to the US. He will reaffirm US support for Israel, to include
its position on occupied territories, negotiations with Palestinian
authorities and dealing with Iran (in fact some analysts have suggested
that Romney’s personal friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin
Netanyahu has essentially allowed the latter to dictate the candidate’s
approach to the Middle East).
Should individuals like John Bolton or Dan Senor be given senior
cabinet positions, the possibility of armed conflict with Iran will
increase significantly (Bolton, who was US UN ambassador during George
W. Bush’s first presidential term and Dan Senor, who was a senior
advisor and chief spokesman in Paul Bremmer’s Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) administration of occupied Iran, are both staunch hawks
with regard to Iran and have called for pre-emptive strikes on it to
prevent it from acquiring nuclear weapons).
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It should be noted that Mr. Romney does not have any
high profile (ex) military leaders publicly working with his campaign,
which leaves it to his civilian advisors to define his security policy.
Since the neo-conservatives he is surrounded with are known as “chicken
hawks” due to their aversion for military service but advocacy of
military interventionism, this places him in the unfortunate dilemma of
not having experienced military people vetting some of the more risky
policies his advisors advocate.
Because Republicans are not as enthused about multilateral
institutions and approaches in international affairs, and because the
conservative Right in the US views them with hostility, a re-emphasis on
bilateral initiatives and relations can be expected under a Romney
presidency. His administration would not abandon multilateralism
entirely, especially in the case of ongoing initiatives such as the
Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations or International Security
Assistance Force draw-down in Afghanistan. If elected, Mr. Romney will
reverse the Obama defense cuts currently under discussion, as both sides
of his foreign policy team foresee an increased military nature to the
competition with China along with the emergence of new state-based
security threats in an age of rapidly evolving lethal technologies. He
will continue to employ the
Obama’s counter-insurgency strategy against
irregular threats, which consists of a “drones and bones” approach where
unmanned aerial vehicles and small teams of special operations troops
are used to track and hunt down Islamic militants world-wide with or
without the cooperation of local governments.
Two areas of agreement between Romney’s foreign policy advisors are
the myth of America’s decline and and with regard to the increasingly
multipolar nature of the international community. Republican realists
and neo-conservatives do not see the US as being in irreversible decline
and do not see the rise of middle powers such as those encompassed in
the so-called BRICs coming anywhere close to a true multipolar balance
of power. They note that the US is still the world’s greatest
manufacturing power, the largest trading nation, the core of the world
financial system, a leader in aerospace, telecommunications and robotic
technologies, and the preferred trade and security partner for a
majority of nations, to include some of the newly emerging regional
powers. They all concur that unlike the Obama administration’s purported
“leading from behind” approach (where the US supports and encourages
international endeavors but does not attempt to take the lead in every
foreign policy situation), the US is at the very least duty-bound to
lead the international community, if not chart the course of
international affairs.
Compared with other regions, the approach to the Southwest Pacific
will be less effected by a change to a Romney administration, but there
will be changes nevertheless. The US will take a stronger line on
Chinese influence in the Pacific, which will include reassertion of US
naval dominance in the South Pacific waterways and sea lanes of
communication used by the Chinese for trade and the prioritization of US
defense ties to the countries surrounding China. This ramping up of
regional security ties will be aided by the recent US-Australia and
US-New Zealand security agreements, which have bolstered the US military
relationship with both countries while promoting greater burden sharing
by them. As part of its enhanced commitment to bilateral defense ties
in the Western Pacific, the US will continue to work to cement its chain
of security partners throughout the region, which now include Japan,
Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, the Philippines, Brunei, Singapore and
Indonesia as well as Australia and New Zealand (the US is also pursuing
improved security ties with Malaysia and Vietnam, both of whom have
their own concerns about Chinese regional expansionism and in the
Vietnamese case a history of enmity with its larger neighbor).
The US will continue to engage Fiji as it moves to elections in 2014,
but its main objective will be to counterbalance Chinese inroads in
that country under the Bainimarama regime. This effort will be given
additional priority due to the expanding Russian ties to the Fijian
regime. Likewise, the US will seek to counter improved Sino-Samoan ties
by increasing its engagement with the latter (this will include
addressing issues of Western Samoans working in and with American Samoan
firms). The biggest objective for the US and its main ally, Australia,
will be to increase US and Australian influence in the Solomons and
Papua New Guinea now that those countries’ on- and off-shore mineral
resources are fully exploitable. The scramble for resource sector
investment supremacy is on, and since Chinese firms already are involved
in resource extractive ventures in these countries as well as other
Pacific Island states, Romney’s priority task will be to promote US and
Australian commercial interests as the chief competitors to Chinese
firms. All of these initiatives are already in place under the Obama
administration, but a Romney presidency can be expected to reinforce and
accentuate them.
Under a Romney presidency the US would place more emphasis on its
individual relations with Pacific countries and less emphasis on
regional organizations such as the PIF and SPC. Republicans have
questioned the utility of developmental assistance to non-strategic or
chronically under-developed nations, so it can be expected that those
questions will reverberate in Romney’s foreign policy approach to the
South Pacific.
Depending on whether neo-conservatives or realists dominate foreign
policy decision-making in a Romney administration, there is the
possibility of tensions with China increasing within the region.
Neo-conservatives will attempt to reassert the preeminence of US values
and US interests using a harder edged approach than that preferred by
the realists, who will continue to emphasize a soft power approach in a
region where the PRC cannot yet compete militarily but in which it has
much diplomatic and economic clout. The neo-conservatives will drive a
harder bargain on Pacific Island Countries when it comes to aid and
developmental assistance, although this may prove counter-productive
given the inroads the Chinese have already made in the region.
The larger point is that with neo-conservatives at the US foreign
policy helm, overall tensions within the region will likely increase as
the US toughens its unspoken containment policy
vis a vis the
Chinese. Should realists control US foreign policy under Mr. Romney,
than a continuation of the Obama administration’s “smart” power approach
is likely to continue without much alteration, albeit with an increased
military emphasis.
Summary. Although
it is looking less likely that Mitt Romney will win the 2012
presidential elections, his foreign policy positions provide a good
indicator of current Republican approaches to the subject. This is
useful for charting future trends should the GOP control Congress for
the next four years and/or mount a successful presidential bid in 2016.
The important aspects of Republican foreign policy before and after the
Romney presidential campaign will be a commitment to unsurpassed world
leadership based on military supremacy, moral authority and economic
might.
A
Romney foreign policy will be less multilateral in its perspective on
and engagement with the outside world than that of the current Obama
administration, and should neo-conservatives dominate the
decision-making process, will be more confrontational and
interventionist in nature, to include advocacy of the doctrine of
unilateral pre-emption against perceived adversaries and using military
diplomacy as the leading instrument of strategic power balancing.
For
the Southwestern Pacific this means the possibility of increased US-PRC
tensions spilling into regional politics, with a Republican-led US
putting more pressure on nations that are attempting to balance US-Sino
relations in their own foreign policy approaches. Besides geopolitically
important Pacific island states such as Fiji, the main focus will be
on Papua New Guinea and New Zealand, with the US and Australia
accelerating development of their bilateral military ties in pursuit of
better joint force integration and inter-operability.
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