Source:
36th Parallel
Written by Paul Buchanan on Thursday, January 17th, 2013
 |
| Change of Guard Ceremony, Government
House, Suva. Republic of Fiji Military Forces hand over guardship to
Republic of Fiji Police, January 1, 2012. Photo: RAMA, Fiji Sun
(www.fijisun.com.fj). |
Revelations
that the Fijian military-bureaucratic regime has rejected important
aspects of the draft constitution submitted by a panel of international
jurists led by professor Yash Ghai has made clear the intentions of the
Republic of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) to continue to play a core role
in Fijian politics after the 2014 elections.
That has led observers to question the RFMF’s commitment to democracy, and led some to wonder if the elections will even be held as
scheduled. As things stand a constituent assembly selected from a
variety of stake-holding groups by current Prime Minister, Commodore
Frank Baimimarama, will be convened in March 2013 with a charge to
deliver the constitution for ratification by September. Once ratified,
that constitution will be the foundational charter under which the
September 2014 elections will be held.
There appears to be a consensus amongst foreign observers that the
military objections to the draft charter are a sign of its reneging on
its promise to restore democratic governance in 2014. Many see this as a
sign of bad faith on the part of Commodore Baimimarama and the RFMF. In
truth, this view may have neglected what the RFMF had in mind all along
when it proposed the 2014 elections and hand-over date. What it had in
mind was not a liberal democracy akin to those of its traditional
patrons. Instead, what it envisioned, and which it has been pretty
honest about when speaking of its vision of Fiji’s political future, is
something that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and
Southeast Asia: a “protected” or “guarded” democracy as a successor the
the military-authoritarian regime. The concept is neither new or novel,
and the learning curve derived from the precedent of larger countries is
clear in the Fijian case. Fijian use of comparative referents is not
unusual in any
event.
Before detailing the specifics of “guarded” democratic regimes and
the future of such in Fiji, it is worth reviewing some basic issues in
constitution-drafting. Constitutions basically outline procedural and
substantive guarantees. Procedural guarantees refers to the rules of the
political “game:” who gets to vote, how they vote, how the votes are
counted, who is eligible for office, how voting is apportioned, the
duties and responsibilities of government and its respective agencies,
the rights are people entitled to in and outside of the political
process, etc.
Substantive guarantees refer to the privileges accorded
citizens: free speech, freedom of thought, association and movement, the
right to cultural autonomy and identity, and often much more. Some
constitutions are drafted along “minimalist” lines in that they refer
mostly to procedural rather than substantive guarantees. Others are more
ambitious, detailing substantive rights to education, health, housing,
welfare, caloric intake, a role in governance and redress for past
injustices. It goes without saying that the latter are harder to
implement. In most instances constitutions are a blend of procedural and
substantive guarantees, usually with an eye to providing the basic
foundations for governance in which the rule of law can apply (and in
which substantive guarantees can be negotiated).
A
“guarded” or “protected” democracy is one in which elected civilian
authorities constitute the government, and in which the universal rule
of law applies. However, unlike liberal democracies,where the military
is subordinate to civilian authority, in guarded democracies the
military as an institution serves as the ultimate arbiter of policy
decisions.
Unlike limited democracies, in which the franchise and collective
rights are circumscribed, in guarded democracies there are no
limitations on individual or collective freedoms, including the right to
vote. Nor is the military directly involved in politics. Instead, in a
guarded democracy the military serves as an unelected overseer of the
political system precisely because it sees itself as an apolitical,
autonomous and professional commonweal organization not beholden to
partisan interests.
Guarded democracies are not military authoritarianism wrapped in civilian garb.
If the civilian government operates within the operational and policy
parameters established by the military in the transition to electoral
rule, then the military stays in the barracks and out of politics. It is
only when civilian authorities are perceived by the military hierarchy
to be overstepping their bounds (as defined by the military), that the
armed forces as an institution intervene in the political process. This
makes the military the power behind the throne and encourages
self-limiting behavior on the part of civilian political elites.
36th Parallel's Paul Buchanan
"
what [RFMF] envisioned, and which it has been pretty honest about when speaking of its vision of Fiji’s political future, is something that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America and Southeast Asia: a “protected” or “guarded” democracy as a successor the the military-authoritarian regime[...]
The regime’s position is strengthened because large parts of Fijian society support its views on constitutional reform, and it has the support of foreign states [...]
The trouble with the negatively absolutist view is that it offers no incentive structure for the Fijian regime to do anything other than its current course of action. Moreover, the disincentive structure that it favors, sanctions, suspensions and exclusion, simply have not and will not work. Thus those who advocate such a view, be they states or non-state actors, have no leverage in the process.
"
From its statements the Fijian military regime has been clear in what
it expects of the new constitution. First, it expects that the concept
of one adult citizen=one vote will apply. Second, it expects that all
ethnic and sectoral preferences in politics will be eliminated. Third,
it expects that public service autonomy and freedom from political
interference will be enshrined in law (ostensibly as an anti-corruption
measure but also as a means of ensuring the positions of the numerous
military and ex-military appointees hired into the public service over
the last six years). Fourth, it expects that the military will be
allocated the role of “guardian” of the nation, including oversight and
veto power over the policy decisions of elected civilian political
authorities.
The latter, which is a substantive guarantee to the RFMF,
is designed as a check on the demagogic and populist instincts of
civilian politicians. Coupled with the pro-military bias of the
post-authoritarian public bureaucracy, this limits the effective power
of civilian government when it comes to making policy or political
choices inimical to the military vision of the “proper” role of civilian
elected authority in the Fijian context.
Although there are many specific points of detail in its ideal
version, the Baimimarama regime prefers a constitution with a broad
procedural minimum and selective substantive guarantees that favor
military institutional interests.
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| Leaked copy of Draft Fijian Constitution. Photo: Australian Network News (www.abc.net.au) |
That is why the RFMF has rejected the draft constitution. Due to the
tone of the rejection and the often personalized nature of the remarks
of military spokespeople with regard to the reasons for the rejection,
the regime will not request revisions from the international
consitution-drafting committee. Instead, the regime will use offer its
own revised constitutional template as the basis for the deliberations
of the constituent assembly. This includes elimination of provisions
drafted by the Constitutional Committee that give civil society actors a
formal place in political decision-making and agenda-setting, and
insertion of military guarantees along the lines mentioned above.
The
March 2013 date for appointment of the constituent assembly will go
ahead on schedule, as will the September 2013 delivery and ratification
of the new constitution. Regardless of the concerns of foreign and
domestic actors about the nature of the post-authoritarian regime,
Commodore Baimimarama and his supporters have the dominant position in
the lead-up to these milestones.
The regime’s position is strengthened because large parts of Fijian
society support its views on constitutional reform, and it has the
support of foreign states, China and Russia in particular, regardless of
the final charter or the nature of the post-authoritarian regime. So
long as that regime meets its (diplomatic, social and economic)
contractual obligations to its supporters and foreign states, it will be
seen as legitimate in the eyes of the majority of domestic and foreign
actors. This leaves the domestic opposition as well as foreign states that
support a complete transition to elected civilian rule in a quandary.
Some foreign actors such as Australia and New Zealand have financially
supported the constitutional panel’s draft-making, and have tacitly
admitted that the previous sanctions regime imposed on the military
authoritarians by a group of Western states has failed.
The
domestic opposition has been vocal about its opprobrium of Commodore Baimimarama
and his colleagues, seeing no role for them, either individually or
institutionally, in the post-authoritarian regime. Yet neither set of
actors can play a dominant role in, much less set the terms of the
negotiations that will determine the final constitutional draft
submitted in September 2013.
In light of these factors, it would seem that the best option for
“pro-democracy” interests to regard the constitution-drafting process
and subsequent elections leading to a “guarded” democracy as a step
forward towards “genuine” democracy rather than as a reneging on a
promise by the Baimimarama regime. Given realities on the ground,
adoption of the latter posture will be counter-productive and further
alienate the Fijian civil-military coalition from foreign and domestic
interlocutors.
Adoption of the former stance allows these interlocutors
to stay in the game, metaphorically speaking, in order to pursue an
incremental gains strategy in which the gradual evolution towards
liberal democracy (which includes military subordination to civilian
elected authority and institutions) is advanced. That may be a long-term
game, but it could well be the only game with a chance of success if
success is defined as the end of military guardianship of elected
government.
Already, differences in approach are evident between key foreign
states. Australia has
responded with caution, agreeing with some of the
Baimimarama regime’s objections to the draft charter. This appears
indicative of an incremental gains approach to the issue of Fijian
democratization. New Zealand and
Samoa have responded more negatively,
arguing that the
rejection of the draft constitution is evidence of the
military regime’s disinterest in real democratic promotion. The US and
other external actors, to include China, India and Russia, have remained
largely silent on the matter, which in diplomatic parlance equates to
tacit acceptance of the regime’s position.
Foreign non-governmental organizations, including the international
union movement, also take a negatively absolutist stance, decrying a
dictatorial take-over of the constitution-drafting process. The trouble
with the negatively absolutist view is that it offers no incentive
structure for the Fijian regime to do anything other than its current
course of action. Moreover, the disincentive structure that it favors,
sanctions, suspensions and exclusion, simply have not and will not work.
Thus those who advocate such a view, be they states or non-state
actors, have no leverage in the process. That is why, even if by default
or as a second-best option, the incremental gains strategy is the best
option for those interested in seeing Fiji progress away from
military-authoritarian rule.
Futures Forecast:
The Fijian Constitutional Congress will deliver a constitutional draft
in 2013 that conforms to the military-authoritarian regime’s preferred
vision. This will be ratified and elections leading to the installation
of a “guarded” democratic regime will be held in September 2014. The
post-authoritarian regime will be recognized as legitimate by the
international community. The influence of Commodore Baimimarama and RFDF
command will remain pervasive in Fijian politics regardless of whether
the Commodore runs for elected office or not.
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